DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 314 343 SO 020 472

AUTHOR	Orteza y Miranda, Evelina
TITLE	Proceedings of Far Western Philosophy of Education Society (36th, Santa Cruz, California, December 4-6, 1987).
INSTITUTION	Calgary Univ. (Alberta). Dept. of Educational Policy and Administrative Studies.
PUB DATE	87
NOTE	133p.
AVAILABLE FROM	Far Western Philosophy of Education Society, Dept. of Educational Policy and Administrative Studies, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, Canada T2N 1N4 (approx. $20.00).
PUB TYPE	Collected Works - Conference Proceedings (021) -- Reports - Research/Technical (143)
EDRS PRICE	MF01/PC06 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	*Aesthetic Education; Creative Teaching; Creativity; Critical Thinking; *Educational Philosophy; *Educational Research; Emotional Development; Futures (of Society); Methods; Models; Moral Values; Poetry; Principals; Second Languages; *Teacher Education; *Values Education
IDENTIFIERS	Plato of Athens; Socrates of Athens; Tolerance

ABSTRACT

Philosophy of education is characterized by a pluralism of philosophical methods, attracting divergent issues. The papers which make up this conference proceedings address critical comments on education. A list of the papers follows: (1) "Contra Bloom: The Center Will Not Hold" (A. Pearl); (2) "Non-Paradigmatic Research" (J. Jarrett); (3) "Comments on 'Non-Paradigmatic Research'" (N. Appleton); (4) "Aesthetic Education in the Foreign Language Class" (E. Herb); (5) "Focusing on the Creative Function in Teacher Training: Connecting Subject Matter Content with Pedagogical Process" (N. Flinders); (6) "Creativity and Other Ordinary Events" (D. Arnstine); (7) "Everyday Life in Schools: On the Meaning of Being a Principal" (R. Evans); (8) "The Classroom: A Forum for Moral Education" (K. Randlev); (9) "Socrates' Practice in Plato's Apology" (A. Gerry); (10) "Socrates' Practice: Some Afterthoughts" (H. Ravitch); (11) "Formed Feeling and Technology" (S. Gocke); (12) "Grandma's Cornbread vs. Microwave Mush" (H. Ravitch); (13) "The Concept of Tolerance" (J. Bellous); (14) "Bellous' Conceptual Analysis of Tolerance" (M. Stange); (15) "Models for Thinking about the Future: Some Philosophical Considerations" (A. Schlessman-Frost; T. Saunders); (16) "Schlessman-Frost and Saunders" (M. Stange); (17) "Critical Thinking and Paulo Freire: Theoretical and Practical Considerations for Teacher Educators" (R. Ahlquist); and (18) "The Heart's Education: Why We Need Poetry" (D. Swanger). (JB)

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1987

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PROCEEDINGS

OF

FAR WESTERN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

1987

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EDITORIAL

In past years, there were some attempts to develop philosophy of education as a discipline, more or less similar to philosophy of religion, philosophy of history, etc. by demarcating its conceptual limits and indicating which concepts, along with their relationships with one another, could be argued to constitute the study. It was an interest in developing a universe of discourse of philosophy of education. This is not its dominant interest now. A pluralism of philosophical methods, attracting a divergency of issues, characterizes the activities of philosophy of education. This is true of Philosophy of Education Society and of Far Western Philosophy of Education Society.

In this collection, for example, philosophers of education address and direct their concern to current critical comments on education, meeting head-on concrete problems of the educational world. Moral education, now discussed by means of novels or poetry, continues to be one of the prominent interests. The papers in this area seem to say that the abstractness of talk in moral education does not quite fit concrete, practical moral problems. The latter are grasped and understood much more intuitively by means of literature or aesthetics. Rule-bound reasoning will not suffice to one's understanding of one's moral problems but rather an understanding of how one's self, in all its particularity and singularity, is incorporated in confronting one's moral problems and arriving at their solutions. Interest in research, research methodologies, and models for inquiry remain a long-range interest to some members of the Society. Similarly, interest in cartography of educational concepts, not for its own sake, is evident. And the point now is to show, in the spirit of R.S. Peters, that first-order practical issues have their roots in "... fundamental reflection on the nature of human beings, the foundations of morality, and the place of reason in human life."(1)

What direction the development of philosophy of education will take is not easy to say. One can, however, hazard to say that there are some indications for a call to ground reason in lived experience, in concrete living, and to think anew and afresh of the world that actually confronts us, making sense of it and of our lived experiences in it. But does it matter whether one can tell which way philosophy of education will go? In the words of the poet, David Swanger,

> "Does the future move in only one direction?
> Think how roots find their way, how hair spreads
> on the pillows, how watercolors give birth to light."(2)

What, perhaps, matters in these meetings of Far Western Philosophy of Education Society is our remembering, to quote Petra von Morstein, that:

> "... philosophical thinking is a participatory activity, -- neither a solitary nor an esoteric activity, nor an activity for the sake of determining

> others or ourselves. To think is to think-with, in dialogue. Philosophers don't think for their fellow-human beings but with them."(3)

Our meetings are our occasions to attend to and enter into each other's conversations.

Once more, appreciation is expressed to Dr. Frank D. Oliva, Dean, Faculty of Education, The University of Calgary, and to Dr. Roger R. Woock, Head, EDPA Department, The University of Calgary, for their generous support to the publication of the Proceedings.

To Elaine Heinz, who came just in time to provide excellent service and to meet publication deadlines, I am grateful.

Evelina Orteza y Miranda
Editor

November 1988
The University of Calgary
Calgary, Alberta T2N 1N4 CANADA

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(1) Ray Elliott, "Richard Peters: A Philosopher in the Older Style," in D.E. Cooper (Ed.) (1986), Education, Values and Mind. (London: Routledge & Keagan Paul.), pp. 41-68.

(2) David Swanger, "What the Wing Says," Georgia Review, Vol XXXVII, No. 3, (Fall 1984).

(3) Petra von Morstein, "Problems of Self: Professional Philosophy in Personal Dialogue," Invited Address, Far Western Philosophy of Education Society, The University of Calgary, Alberta 2-4 December 1988.

FAR WESTERN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

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PROGRAM

THIRTY-SIXTH ANNUAL MEETING

FAR WESTERN PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

December 4-6, 1987

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, SANTA CRUZ/HOLIDAY INN

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 4

3:00 - 4:00 p.m. Registration (Lobby)

4:00 - 5:00 p.m. FIRST GENERAL SESSION (Coast and Dawn Rooms)

Chair: Don Rothman (University of California, Santa Cruz)

Roundtable Discussion: "Literacy and Aliteracy: The Silencing of America's Teachers"

6:00 - 7:00 p.m. Welcoming Reception (Coast and Dawn Rooms)

7:15 p.m. Dinner at King Chwan Chinese Restaurant (415 Ocean Street)

8:30 p.m. SECOND GENERAL SESSION (King Chwan Restaurant)

Inaugural Address: Arthur Pearl (University of California, Santa Cruz)
"When the Center will not Hold: Contra Bloom"

Respondent: Virginia Draper (University of California, Santa Cruz)

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 5

9:00 - 10:15 a.m. THIRD GENERAL SESSION (Redwood Room)

Chair: Francis Villemain

Elke Herb, (The University of Calgary)
"Aesthetic Education in the Language Class"

Neil Flinders (Brigham Young University)
"Training: Connecting Subject Matter Content with Pedagogical Process

Respondents: Barbara Arnstine (California State University, Sacramento)
Donald Arnstine, (University of California, Davis)

10:30 - 11:45 a.m. FIRST CONCURRENT SESSION (Executive Room)

Chair: Fred Muskal (University of the Pacific)

Rod Evans (The University of Calgary)
"Everyday Life in Schools: On the Meaning of Being a Principal"

Karen Randlev (University of California, Berkeley)
"The Classroom: A Forum for Moral Education"

Respondent: Arturo Pacheco, (University of California, Santa Cruz)

(Executive Room)

Chair: Steven Hackbarth (University of Southern California)

Alison Gerry (The University of Calgary)
"Socrates' Practice in Plato's *Apology*"

Sharon Denise Gocke (Napa Community College)
"Formed Feeling and Technology"

Respondent: Harold Ravitch (Los Angeles Valley College)

11:45 - 2:00 p.m. Break

2:00 - 3:15 p.m. FOURTH GENERAL SESSION (Redwood Room)

Chair: Nel Noddings (Stanford University)

Roundtable Discussion: "Morals Both Taught and Caught"

3:30 - 4:45 p.m. SECOND CONCURRENT SESSION (Redwood Room)

Chair: Henry Talifor (California Lutheran College)

Joyce Bellous (The University of Calgary)
"Tolerance"

Amy Schlessman-Frost and Frank Saunders (University of Arizona)
"Models for Thinking About the Future: Some Philosophical Considerations"

Respondent: Mark Stange (The University of Calgary)

Chair: Brian Metke (Burns Union High School, Oregon)

David Hyerle (University of California, Berkeley)
"The Brain Storm"

Roberta Ahlquist (San Jose State University)
"Critical Thinking and Paulo Freire"

Respondent: Gwenneth Browne (University of the Pacific)

5:30 - 6:30 p.m. FIFTH GENERAL SESSION (UCSC, Merrill College, Room 102)

in medias res Address: James Jarrett (University of California, Berkeley)
"The Philosopher as Teacher of Methodology"

Respondent: Nicholas Appleton (Arizona State University)

6:30 - 7:30 p.m. Reception (UCSC, Charles Merrill Lounge)

Host: Eugene Garcia
Chair: The Committee on Education (University of California, Santa Cruz)

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 6

9:30 - 10:45 a.m. SIXTH GENERAL SESSION (Redwood Room)

Chair: Richard Jacobs (California Polytechnic University, Pomona)

Roundtable Discussion: "The University Student: Barbarian or Pioneer of New Consciousness"

11:00 - 12:30 p.m. SEVENTH GENERAL SESSION (Coast Room)

Business Meeting

Brunch

Presidential Address: David Swanger
"The Heart's Education"

* * *

Invited Address

CONTRA BLOOM: THE CENTER WILL NOT HOLD

Arthur Pearl
University of California, Santa Cruz

> "Turning and turning in the widening gyre
> The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
> Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
> Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
> The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
> The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
> The best lack all conviction, while the worst
> Are full of passionate intensity."
> W. B. Yeats, "The Second Coming"

Allan Bloom has written a book, The Closing of the American Mind. By the time this is read, Bloom will likely be as little known to the general public as he was before his best selling magna opus was published. He is not important. The particular argument he makes is weak; what is frightening is that Bloom gained his hour in the sun, for doing what so many others in the twentieth century have done, directed their fury against democracy. It is the attack against democracy that I find troubling. No single assault amounts to much, but accumulated onslaughts do enormous damage. This has been a particularly bad decade for democracy. It is less and less a serious topic in the University, neither emphasized in courses of study nor practiced by administration. Bloom, in this essay, is given more than he deserves, not because it is great fun to attack a sitting duck, but because his line of thinking is increasingly influencing the direction of the University.

Bloom, like Yeats, believes things are falling apart and the center cannot hold. He thrashes out in all directions, finding convenient targets to blame for the moral and intellectual disintegration of the university in particular and the world in general, e.g., rock music, television, uppity blacks, uppity women, and moral relativism. But the real villians, lurking in the basement of our psyche are the various descendants of Nietzsche. In the Bloom wonderland, as in other wonderlands, things get "curiouser and curiouser." He both defends and attacks democracy. Most people both defend and attack democracy. More importantly, they defend and attack what they do not understand. It is difficult to understand a concept such as democracy when the term has been tossed about with so little discussion and analysis. Consider Oliver North's description of the killers he provided with weapons, (without bothering to inform the people he ostensibly served), as "the democratic resistance," or, various people's democracies, or that which is taught in public schools.

To this extent Bloom is right, we are in a state of intellectual crisis. There is no center to political, cultural or intellectual thought. Bloom is also correct when he concludes that the evacuation of the center by various self-interest groups who can hardly speak to each other in a common language is a serious condition. He is also able to recognize, if not fully appreciate, how the beginnings of democracy, and its appeal to reason and equality, brought forth not only a new approach to government, but a new responsibility for the academy. It is true that the original impulse ran out of steam and its detractors have taken over and one need not drag in Rousseau, Neitzsche, Freud or Heidegger to question whether humans are capable of liberty and justice for all (to coin a phrase).

Bloom's thesis, rambling and often incoherent as it is, is at rock bottom but another variation of the "excesses of democracy" theme that Samuel Huntington and his friends make a living off of. The position I take here is just the opposite. Our problem, as I see it, is not democracy run amok, but not enough democracy. Democracy as it is defined here, provides an underpinning for education, and becomes the basis of true educational reform. Democracy is both means and ends. It consists of four elements: 1) equal opportunity for all to participate in INFORMED debate on all the important issues that affect the society; 2) universal meaningful participation in all of the decisions that affect one's life; 3) clearly specified universal rights of expression, privacy, movement and a certain type of process (presumption of innocence, rights not to testify against one's self, rights to counsel, rights to trial before an independent tribunal and protection against cruel and unusual punishment); and, 4) Equal ENCOURAGEMENT to succeed in all of society's legitimate activities. The thrust of my remarks is that these elements provide a philosophical basis for true education reform. To make that case Bloom is contrasted with John Dewey and Dewey comes out more superior. The essay concludes with a brief exposition of the implication of democracy to curriculum, school organization, student rights and equality.

Democracy, by definition, needs a center, which is unifying vision -- what Marcus Raskin calls, a Common Ground. Without a center understood and endorsed by a majority, democracy cannot work. Decisions in a centrifugalized society are made by an unaccountable minority that wields power arbitrarily and, inevitably, immorally. In fact, democracy defines moral action, and determines, in a responsible and understandable manner, good and evil. In that sense democracy is a rejoinder to Allan Bloom, who is also concerned with good and evil, right and wrong, and quite correctly kens that such determination is impossible with moral relativism. But his insistence on some modern form of inquisition as a better alternative, borders on the insane.

John Dewey has something to say about democracy and morality. It is fitting to begin our discussion with him. John Dewey is dismissed with contempt by Allen Bloom. He is not even given the savaging that Marcuse, Adorno or Fromm receives. Bloom makes but three references to Dewey. In the first he is associated with John Stuart Mill and "liberalism without natural rights (teaching) us the only danger confronting us is being closed to the emergent, the new, the manifestations of progress." The second is a comment about his pragmatism and his linking of democracy to science, leading to "individual growth without limits, especially natural limits." In that reference Dewey is reputed to believe "the past was radically imperfect and regarded our history as irrelevant or as a hindrance to rational analysis of our present." In the third reference, Bloom quotes Max Weber's 1913 dismissal of science as a technique for mastery of life still believed only by "big babies in university chairs." Dewey, writes Bloom, fits the description of "'big baby'.. to a T" and he asks us to "remember what his (Dewey's) influence here once was." Bloom makes a 'big baby' of "everyone .... who has said, 'We hold these truths to be self-evident.'"

Would that Dewey had been much influence in U.S. education. He has been far more whipping boy than beacon. Few in education have read him and even fewer have based their educational philosophy or practice on him. Education has been too unintellectual for that. To get some sense of Dewey and his position on the issues raised by Bloom I turn to the work Dewey claimed to be his best, "Democracy in America." In that essay John Dewey goes to Jefferson for democracy. To Jefferson, America is an experiment with an attachment to local self-government and face-to-face association. Democracy begins in neighbourly community. Dewey is with Jefferson in opposing any generation binding its successors and arguing that property rights are created by a "social pact" without an inherent moral claim that government is morally bound to honor. Dewey insists that personal rights are superior to property rights and that Jefferson favors equalization of economic condition. Therefore to Dewey, Jefferson's source of democracy is moral -- not technical, abstract, narrowly political nor materially utilitarian. Moral, because it is based on a faith that humans can achieve freedom for individuals with respect and regard for others and a social stability based on cohesion, not coercion. Dewey believes that attacks on that tradition are also moral, and can be settled on moral grounds. Moral too, is the dimming of the democratic ideal. The dimming is the result of confusion that accompanied the change from an old order to one so novel that relations between people were dislocated. When the essay was written (1939), Dewey insisted that we have yet to develop a vocabulary for the moral values of a democracy. Not being conversant in that vocabulary may explain why Bloom was unable to detect the existence of a moral democracy.

Once the vocabulary for morality was Natural Law, then it became natural rights imputed to isolated individuals, now democracy, itself, must provide the moral basis of society. To Dewey an appeal to the individual is dulled by an inability to locate the individual (even more true today). Association for profit has distorted individualism. Spiritualism has lost its force. Dewey takes the position that as power over nature has increased, the moral challenge is to reduce the power of humans over humans. Issues of peace and poverty determine freedom or subjugation. We seem unable to join with others in the world, apart from war, and yet, as Dewey observes, war moves democracies to authoritarianism. Transforming physical interdependence into moral human interdependence is part of the democratic project. Individuals can only find security, a prerequisite for freedom, in association with others, but the organization these associations take on, particularly in the name of efficiency, limits individual freedom. Organization has taken over -- the servant has become the master to usurp the end for which it came into existence. Persons aware of regimentation of government are often oblivious of the regimentation in the work place. Democracy must create associations that have both the strength of stability and the flexibility to respond to change. Lastly, Dewey raises the question of the relation between human nature to physical nature. He, like Bloom, observes that theology provided the answer to the ancient world. He, like Bloom, observes that the rise of science produced skepticism. Dewey notes that laissez-faire economics became a moral standard and that a large number of people, who base their faith in material productivity, believe unfettered free enterprise will automatically make available all that is good to everyone. Dewey will not be found among this group.

Dewey, to be sure, was interested in science, but his support is hardly unqualified. Dewey asks only of science that it direct its attention to human problems, something that Bloom indicates has not happened and for which he too, faults science. Dewey believes that anything that obscures the moral nature of social problems is harmful. He traces the democratic ideal through its long history and in that analysis clearly puts the lie to Bloom's charge that he is antihistory. From his study of history Dewey concludes that earlier advocates of democracy oversimplified the issues. Simple ideas of democracy worked for a time, but ultimately they became a liability. Dewey is not discouraged by democracy's imperfection, he believes it takes luck and hard work to move humanity forward and to overcome our present challenges we must be deliberate and intelligent. Democracy is endangered by attitudes formed by anti-democratic traditions, customs, and institutions. Dewey's democracy is one in which struggle is waged on many fronts - political, economic, international, educational, scientific, artistic, religious. The impetus for the original thrust was leadership in a new land able to shake old habits of thought. Our current conflict is within our institutions and attitudes, democracy can only emerge when democratic methods of consultation, persuasion, negotiation, communication, cooperation are extended to make our politics, industry, education, culture an evolving manifestation of democratic ideas. Authoritarianism comes in new guises and owes its seductive power to claims of ideal ends. Democracy demonstrates the release of human powers in service of freedom in voluntary cooperation.

I would submit that Dewey has far more to say about the reestablishment of a center and the opening of the American mind in the University than does Bloom. He gives us a place to start. He establishes what Bloom cannot do, a moral basis for the university.

The University is a place where truth is sought and knowledge developed. The moral issues are in the selection of particular truths and particular knowledge. Bloom calls for careful examination of alternatives. So does Dewey. So do I. Bloom insists upon a curriculum that he acknowledges has no popular support among either professors or students. In the end he echos the advertisement of the Marine Corps, he wants but a few good men. He doesn't believe he could persuade, and therefore, he is for coercion. He wants to force students to read the great books and threaten them with failing grades if they do not assimilate them the way he, as teacher, decrees they ought to know. He would purge the campus of the professors who have capitulated to the "mob." Bloom argues the University died when it caved in to student radicals in the 60's. The faculty in the 60's, are to him, the German academics of the 30's, hence his references to Nietzsche and Heidegger. He dismisses the importance of McCarthyism, calling it a great period for the academy.

> "Professors were not fired, and they taught what they pleased in their classrooms."

I wasn't a professor, I was a graduate student. I was fired as a teacher assistant. Professors did not teach what they wanted. They certainly could not espouse "un-American" ideas. Asserting otherwise is monumental ignorance or disingenuousness. But the statement is consistent with the Bloom thesis. He acknowledges that philosophers have consistently lined up with the aristocracy -- so in this period when demands for ideological subservience were made by Regents, legislators and Congressional Committees Bloom's philosophers were not threatened since they were content to dutifully submit to any authority. In the 60's the philosophers were attacked by the mob and again they caved in. Only this time Bloom found acquiescence objectionable. On one point I agree with Bloom, the 60's were not a good decade for democracy. Violence superseded reason. But, the cause of the retreat from democracy was not only cowardice but a failed scholarship. Democracy is undermined because of an unwillingness to let go of an inadequate past and because scholars are unwilling to envision a desirable future. All social thought moves forward or it retreats. Bloom and Dewey represent the two tendencies.

Democracy and Knowledge

How does one begin a democratic discussion of knowledge? What is important? What is the logic and evidence to be used in such a debate? How will differences be resolved? Those were the questions silenced in the 50's and lost in the uproar of the 60's. They lie at the heart of the issues that Bloom and Dewey raise. Adequate answers to those questions cannot be answered from either purely a societal perspective or from purely an individual perspective. Persuasive answers require a centering -- a sufficient shared understanding by a critical mass from which various spokes of thought emerge. Minority views connect to the center and because of that connection have the capacity to be influential. There is a continuity to the center because important societal problems are enduring. Those that Dewey mentions, and Bloom dismisses, comprise the core of a philosophy of good and evil. The personal issues are also enduring and define the ways each of us make choices in every arena of our lives. The morality of societal choices establishes the boundaries for the morality of individual choices. If there is anything to be learned from this century it is that individual morality and societal morality interrelate. Our failure to address that connection brings out the worst in us. The large issues that occupied philosophers through the ages -- peace, poverty, fairness and dehumanization -- have recently been augmented by concerns about the environment.

Few dispute that war is bad. Few would disagree with Benjamin Franklin, "there has never been a good war or a bad peace." Bloom ridicules peace studies as yet another sign of university deterioration, a tad worse than black or women's studies. Dewey devoted much of the last years of his life trying to prevent World War II. What makes the issue interesting for academia is its philosophic richness. Everyone is for peace. Ronald Reagan calls for peace through strength, and can find scholars to provide logic and evidence to support that position. Saul Mendlovitz calls for peace through world order, a leap beyond the United Nations, and documents that view. Much energy, and considerable thought have gone into the idea of bilateral negotiation between the two super-powers, an exercise of which, is imminent. And distinct from these pragmatic philosophies is the rich philosophic tradition of pacifism -- translating into unilateral initiatives in disarmament. Each philosophic orientation to peace has a history, a logic and a definition of human nature. Each has morality. The good and evil in each cannot be left unexamined, but constitute a debate. A debate in which all can contribute. A debate that requires a wholeness of thought. The discussion is not solely technical, but technical data are relevant. The discussion is not restricted to social sciences, but social scientists have much to contribute, as do the humanities. That debate has not taken place in the University. In place of debate there is action and inaction, bumperstrips, tee-shirts, and buttons, but little reflection. In the absence of philosophical encounters we drift into one war after another.

Poverty was not too mundane an issue for Aristotle, it should not be too mundane for modern philosophers. It is far too important an issue to be left to economists. Poverty is a moral issue and it will be solved when it too is debated thoroughly as such. Moral, too are issues of justice, technological domination of humanity, and the environment. As we debate we come to understand how the various moral dilemmas -- peace, poverty, justice, environmental disintegration and uncontained technology -- interrelate and how every intellectual discipline contributes both to the problems and to the potential solutions. In the process of such debate we gravitate to a center.

Central personal decisions are also philosophical and moral. The selection of a career, a political orientation, culture carrying activities, leisure time pursuits and interpersonal relationships are not only determinants of the quality of life of the individual, they influence the community. Decisions in these personal arenas are moral. Democracy enters into any penetrating analysis of these decisions. The analysis cuts two ways -- one important quest is investigating the influence of democratic thought on individual decision-making, the other, critical to the construction of a theoretical foundation for the study of democratic principles and practices, is investigating the influence that individual decisions have on the de facto moral principles of a society. Spirited inquiry of individual aspirations and choices influencing and being influenced by the life and death issues of the species should define the character of the University. Bloom becomes Miniver Cheevey when he laments students' concern for vocation over contemplation of that which is timeless. The lament is specious and shallow. True scholarship studies the relationship between individual interest and the integrity of the society as a whole. Probing that relationship is essential to the mission of the university. The outcome of such scholarship would lead to exciting recommendations for both individual decision-making and societal priorities.

Democracy as Universal Equally Powered Participation

Who decides important questions in the University? Everybody! Participation by all in a decision is not capitulation to the barbarians, it is the moving from coercion to persuasion. A teacher is a teacher to the extent her/his arguments make sense. Students should challenge -- disrespect for authority is part of the dialectical process. The Chair of the English Department at the University of Oregon, debating me in the mid-60's on student participation, dismissed the idea of student participation in university decision-making with, "What can a college sophomore tell me about 16th century poetry, I am the world's foremost expert on 16th century poetry." My answer, "I don't object to you teaching about the 16th century; I object to you teaching in the 16th century." The issue was not the poetry, but its relevance, the quality of the instruction, the means of evaluation, etc. Not only are students important in that participation, but so too, are those who pay the freight. Ordinary tax paying citizens should be included in the discussions about the University's mission. The only legitimate restriction in such a debate is that an objection must be replaced with a counter proposal. Attacking without replacing does not solve anything and if the debate is solution oriented, much static can be removed. Inadequate proposals give way to better ones. It is that simple truth that has escaped the university for many years.

The Importance of Rights

Since both Bloom and Dewey agree that authoritarianism runs deep, it is imperative that we take the most simple and yet most effective precaution against authoritarianism -- a clear guarantee of specific rights. Rights must be understood, not as natural law or constitutional guarantee, but even more importantly, as vital to the quality of the debate. Four rights have held up over time -- expression, privacy, due process and freedom of movement. Without the protection of rights, nothing is safe. Marx's denunciation of them as "nonsensical" had disastrous repercussions. In the university, rights are unbridled freedom of expression, even if the tone is angry and the rhetoric ungrammatical. Rights include privacy for students as well as faculty. Due process should be extended to include evaluation of student achievement. And freedom of movement of students should not be infringed by gratuitously by faculty taking offense when students either find better things to do than attend class or show up a bit late. The university should be a shining example of rights in theory and practice. If Bloom had his way, rights would be virtually extinguished. Nothing could be more wrongheaded.

Equal Encouragement for all to Succeed

Bloom's diatribe is largely against equality. He insists affirmative action has made things worse for blacks. There is no evidence to support such a contention. Affirmative action, most certainly, has not solved the problem of inequality. It could not have, since the philosophy on which affirmative action is based in compensation for past injustices. Affirmative action is a cheap simple response to an expensive complex problem. Affirmative action patched onto an unbending institution a few underrepresented minorities and women. Once the affirmative actees were admitted, they were provided limited resources, kept ignorant about the workings of the system and rendered politically powerless. That any good could have come from a poorly designed expedient measure can only be interpreted as a promising development, raising questions of what could be done if equality was ever seriously attempted. At issue, is not past injustice, but present unfairness. The philosophic argument has not been well phrased. Equal encouragement is neither equal treatment as espoused by Daniel Bell and the other meritocrats, nor is it the equal result of distributive justice called for by Jonathan Rawls. Equal encouragement means examining all our institutions and processes for existing unfairness and dynamically acting on that which is found. Equal encouragement requires change in both individuals and institutions. It is not, as Bloom insists, that students must conform to an intransigent institution, nor is it the 60's cry that the institution must become omnipersonally relevant. The project is experiment and reflection. The experiments must be based on good knowledge and good process. We are not bereft of examples. The Upward Bound program at the University of Oregon demonstrated that supposedly unprepared students could succeed in the university. Some successes were so spectacular that movies were made of them, e.g., Love Mary. Perhaps an even more noteworthy experiment was, New Careers. Both disprove Bloom, but neither received the recognition he was given. Curious.

The Importance of Vision

Democratic processes do not guarantee a democratic education. The processes must lead to a clearly defined goal. Bloom can conjure up a university that unlikely ever was, call it the golden age, and get away with it, because without an opposing vision, the inadequate past has more than nostalgia going for it. It is the only game in town. In that sense Bloom is Ronald Reagan, profiting from the absence of competing visions. A democratic university must first be imagined. It is against that image that day to day activities are evaluated. The reaction to the anti-intellectuality of the 60's produced the anti-intellectuality of the renascent right, of which Bloom and Reagan are examples. The 60's degenerated into anti-democratic practices largely because of the absence of a vision. The destruction of vision cannot be blamed on the upheavals of that tumultuous decade, it was much more the other way around. Dystopia has dominated 20th century thought. Pessimistic thought about human and social capability has been developed and fine tuned in the academy that Bloom defends. Our challenge is to turn the university around and direct its attention to thoughts about a democratic future. Anything short of that will be more blithering Blooms obscuring the rising 'blood-dimmed tide' and the 'unloosed anarchy' engulfing the world.

> "Move thee with new desires
> For where we used to build and love
> Is no man's land, and only ghosts can live
> Between two fires."
> C.Day Lewis, "The Conflict"

Invited Address

NON-PARADIGMATIC RESEARCH

James Jarrett
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Since I officially became a Philosopher of Education some twenty-three years ago - having been for a number of years before that, just a philosopher in general, with a strong leaning toward aesthetics - there are four kinds of broad topics that I have especially enjoyed teaching and writing about. 1) The Nature and Purposes of Education. This is frequently approached through the writings of famous thinkers, notably Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, Mill, William James, Whitehead, Dewey, Ryle and others, but also including some who though they did not write directly about education, influenced its directions, like Descartes, Hume, Wittgenstein, and Susanne Langer. 2) Value Theory and Education. Here I usually start with a few weeks on straight axiology, and a quick history of ethics, and then move to schemes for promoting moral and ethical development. I do the same thing, in smaller measure with aesthetic theory and educational practice. I have students keep a values journal in this course, asking them to note value judgments, assumptions, advocacies, propaganda, cynicisms that they encounter in their daily rounds and ruminations. 3) Theories of the Self. I confess that my colleagues by and large regard this as my own indulgence, something only vaguely related to education, but I claim that the way we conceive the basic nature of the self or person is of almost determining importance to the way we conceive of the educative processes. One semester I pay attention to existentialist and phonomenological thinkers from Dostoevsky and Kierkegaard through Nietzsche to Heidegger and Ricoeur. Sometimes I get in a bit, too, on Ortega y Gasset, Jaspers, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. Pretty obviously, this is a course only for serious students, but they tend to become deeply involved. The second semester I devote to the philosophical aspects of Freudian and Jungian metapsychology. 4) Philosophy of Language, my favorite work in philosophy of education, is conceived somewhat eclectically, so that bits of rhetoric, philology, linguistics and semeiotics jostle each other throughout. This is also a journal-centered course, my avowed purpose being the raising of consciousness about many different kinds of signs and symbols as they occur in human discourse.

Yet, what I want to talk about for the rest of my time is another, newer interest, one that centers on a required course called "Logic of Inquiry." Students in our doctoral program take some four courses in methodology. This is one of them. For several years this course was taught first by a sociologist, then by a psychologist, before I inherited it and made it philosophical. I took it on with some slight reluctance for I knew it would require a lot of work. To be sure I had, early in my career, published a little textbook called Language and Informal Logic but I hadn't taught or written in this field for a long time. So I had to catch up and extend my interests to include the writings of a number of people that I had paid only slight attention to heretofore. However, after teaching it some four times now, I have come to enjoy it very much and to believe it is an important part of the education of students of professional education.

None of us needs convincing that in graduate schools of education, educational research is, at least beyond pre-service credentialling, king of the castle. Our students read vast quantities of published research, hear lectures based on even larger quantities of research, and learn, in some measure, to do research themselves. If they persist, they end up writing a dissertation that reports their own research, for which they are then awarded a doctorate.

And yet, there are two recurrent, slightly poignant complaints, from the research establishment: 1) Research is by nearly all teachers honored more in the breach than the observance. Even more generally, educational decisions are rarely based on research, but instead on traditional practice and on current quasi-political pressures from school boards, parents, and the administrators who answer to these policy makers. To be sure, teachers typically use textbooks that are somewhat anchored in research, but I think it is fair to say that in the vast number of cases they simply teach from the texts without examining or supplementing whatever research may lie back of the writing. For instance, a basal reader no doubt represents, in every instance, some research into the way children learn to read, whether or not that research is done by the author, but the teacher just prescribes reading in the text, and uses its exercises in a way much like the family doctor prescribes the drugs which have been recommended to him by pharmaceutical salesmen. 2) Also, university researchers and research advocates periodically bemoan the fact that their doctoral students do not themselves do research beyond their dissertation. The ones who do are those who are pressured by the publish-or-perish policies of research universities.

I am somewhat cheered by the movement today toward research in classroom, elementary and secondary classrooms not the lecture halls of Psychology I-A where hordes of students supply data to researchers by taking tests and responding to surveys. Furthermore, the kind of research now going on in classrooms often involves teachers as collaborators and may even be of the kind that I will shortly find occasion to praise.

But I continue to believe that part of the reason for teachers generally ignoring research in their teaching, except very indirectly, and also part of the reason why most education Ph.D.'s and Ed.D.'s do not do research lies in the kind of research that has become enshrined in the Establishment.

We all know what this mainline research is but how would we describe it to an intelligent stranger who admitted to not knowing? Perhaps something like this: it is the statistical manipulation of data which are gathered through the use of measuring instruments that carefully screen out all information not readily assimilable to quantification. This is what has been called paradigmatic research, though in the case of the social sciences and even more particularly in education, Thomas Kuhn would obviously refer to it as preparadigmatic. Jerome Bruner who has conducted this kind of research in psychology characterizes this as "logico-scientific" research. He says of it,

> "At its most developed, [stage], it fulfills the ideal of a formal, mathematical system of description and explanation. It is based upon categorization or conceptualization and the operations by which categories are established, instantiated, idealized, and related one to the other to form a system. In terms of these relations of connection, its armamentarium includes on the formal side such ideas as conjunction and disjunction, hyperonymy and hyponymy, and presupposition, and the devices by which general propositions are extracted from statements in their particular contexts. At a gross level, the logico-scientific mode (I shall call it paradigmatic hereafter) deals in general causes, and in their establishment, and makes use by constraining principles to assure verifiable reference and to test for empirical truth. Its language is regulated by requirements of consistency and noncontradiction. Its domain is defined not only by observables to which its basic statements relate, but also by the set of possible worlds that can be logically generated and tested against observables, that is, it is driven by principled hypotheses. The imaginative application of the paradigmatic mode leads to good theory, tight analysis, logical proof, and empirical discovery guided by reasoned hypothesis."(1)

Bruner would insist that the best examples of this kind of research come in the hard sciences, followed by the natural sciences, followed by the more mathematical social sciences, such as economics and experimental psychology, followed by sociology, anthropology, political science, and such quasi-disciplines as social welfare and education.

I am aware that my criticisms of this kind of research in education would carry more weight if I (like Bruner) were expert in the conduct of such research. The main value I can see in it is that of what Popper has taught us to call "falsifying" hypotheses, especially when those hypotheses are supported by beliefs founded in years, perhaps centuries, of tradition. A famous case is the work of Thorndike, early in this century, in showing the flimsiness of most beliefs in the transfer of training, for instance that learning to do abstract mathematics improves our thinking in practical matters or that becoming proficient in formal grammar almost surely will improve our writing styles. Such research has indeed been effective, as witness the almost complete disappearance of formal grammar from school instruction, its only vestige remaining in the red-ink corrections on student themes. Another place where such research has greatly altered teaching practice is the famous case of the Hartshorne and May experiment. You will remember that in this instance, two groups of students, of course the famous experimental and control groups, were observed to try to determine whether moral instruction did or did not affect the moral behavior of students. The control group went on with their usual classroom edification while the other group was deprived of it. Now the test case was whether unproctored students (not counting observation through one way mirrors as proctoring) cheated less or more as they were so instructed. Even if you have not read of this particular experiment, you already know the answer: there was no significant difference at all between the two groups of students. Word of this experiment seems to have spread like wildfire. I do not claim that the very great expunging of moral education from the public schools was wholly owing to this experiment, but I cannot doubt that it was part of the reason. And only after a considerable period of time were psychologists and philosophers again much inclined to try to devise new programs of moral and value instruction, such as the famous Values Clarification program or that associated with the work of Lawrence Kohlberg who built on Piaget, Immanuel Kant, and Socrates. It is worth adding that what these relatively recent investigators were saying was that the kind of moral instruction given in traditional schools is largely ineffective but that new and better kinds of such instruction are still possible. That was a salubrious realization. Many other examples could be given of experimental falsification, or at least, of paradigmatic researchers throwing great doubt upon accepted beliefs and practices in the schools.

Yet I am not persuaded that the record is so good on the side of positive results, rather than negative, that is, of helping teachers to teach better or of curriculum consultants to devise better curricula. There have been an enormous number of attempts in this direction, giving us such benefits as teaching machines, Dick and Jane readers, I.Q. tests, behavioral objectives and more recently, computers and Piagetian theory. Piaget is one of the few theoreticians almost universally recognized by classroom teachers. Even though his own research is somewhat of an embarrassment to paradigmatic methodologists, he has undoubtedly taught teachers that below a certain level of development, one associated with a rough age designation, it is probably fruitless to try to teach students certain scientific or commonsensical principles. A vast amount of so-called empirical research does seem to me trivial and a fair amount of it mischievous. I recently heard of the discovery that a screening test for admission to the John Hopkins medical school had adequately predicted academic success in the pre-clinical years, but correlated negatively with success in clinical apprenticeship and later practice. In short, the test had for years been eliminating in advance those who would have made better physicians than those admitted. In fairness, we must give credit to those empiricists who made this discovery, but one can be fairly sure that a great part of the trouble lies in the difficulty, perhaps the impossibility, of using standardized instruments to determine such very important decisions.

I am far from convinced that it is all that regrettable for classroom teachers to neglect most of what passes for main stream educational research as they go about their tasks. Indeed, I believe there are many dangers and disadvantages associated with such research. I will follow here the lead of a political scientist named Jill Vickers who has launched a strong attack on what she is pleased to call malestream research. Her argument is that women have been academically bullied into doing a kind of research that, in many instances, cuts against their own grain.(2) But in the present context I am going to stay a certain distance from the combative feminism in her paper and concentrate upon what she says about paradigmatic research in the social sciences.

Her great point is that this kind of research practices and extols certain basic attitudes and beliefs about knowledge and its pursuit. The key words are objective, detached, decontextualized, impersonal, and as a goal, dominance of nature. Her point is that there are great costs in assuming these stances. They suggest a kind of idealization of alienation from the thick messy world of people, or better say, persons. They apotheosize abstraction, and here we could easily return to Piaget who seems to make abstraction the continuing goal of human development.

I would add to Dr. Vickers' account Tolman's famous program of empirical science: predict and control. We are much indebted to the astronomers for the accuracy of their prediction of the movements of heavenly bodies, enabling us to buy a telescope in time for the appearance of Halley's comet. I think it appeared to some with better telescopes than mine. But prediction seems to continue at an extremely primitive stage in the social sciences. Even economics, which surely is devoted to prediction, seems most of the time to be gazing at a very clouded crystal ball. But social scientists have often rebutted such remarks by the plaint that theirs are, after all, very young sciences, so it is quite unfair to expect all that much of them. But the implication is: just wait, and you will see what we can do in that line. Possibly, but philosophers like Donald Davidson and Georg von Wright and psychologists like Sigmund Koch, and sociologists like Robert Bellah, and historiographers like W.B. Gallie do not hold out to us much hope for radical improvement. Indeed, Davidson has a convincing argument that psychology by its very nature cannot become a predictive science.

Are we, in extolling paradigmatic research for teachers to use, implicitly endorsing attitudes and approaches that are downright inimical to their functioning as teachers? That is, becoming distanced, decontextualized, impersonal, abstract, and unfeeling in their regard for their human subjects who thus run the serious risk of becoming objects?

But I am less interested in a systematic or even a prolix polemic directed against paradigmatic research in education than I am in suggesting what seems to me a non-paradigmatic kind that is far more useful in improving educational practice and in helping us understand the nature of educational processes and objectives. What shall we call this kind? Bruner, rather oddly suggests "narrative" as the name of the alternative mode, but I do not think this will do at all for the wide range of research procedures that I have in mind. I will want to return to "narrative" but only as one aspect or kind of a large spectrum of investigative procedures. I am not even sure that we want to call it research at all. I have rarely been tempted to call the sort of writing I do in philosophy research, or even the more erudite writing that other philosophers do either. Still, given the enormous academic prestige of research it is hard not to want to open that door up for the rest. It is a little like this cluster of words: cognitive, knowledge, truth, validity. It was not so very long ago when some neo-positivists categorized all discourse into two kinds: Meaningful and Emotive where the first category included only discourse of the kind that was reserved for either formal or empirical propositions. That is, those which can either be proved or disproved or those which can be publicly verified or diversified by strictly scientific procedures. Value judgments were of course dumped into the basket labeled emotive or non-sense. We were told that the hyphen in that word removed from it any stigma of the pejorative.

More importantly, what sorts of inquiry am I thinking of? That very word "inquiry" inevitably and quickly brings to mind the venerable John Dewey. Think for just a moment of what Dewey had to say about reflection, about transformation, about interest appreciation and growth. That growth idea was a seriously debatable one but that is part of its power; it made us think in a new way about educational goals. Growth toward what? Or think of Whitehead whose style reveals a mind about as different from Dewey's as could happen among genuine philosophers. And what was it he said about style? It was "the ultimate morality of the mind." Or again, he wrote: "What education has to impart is an intimate sense for the power of ideas, for the beauty of ideas, and for the structure of ideas, together with a particular body of knowledge which has peculiar reference to the life of being possessing it." There is a sentence that you can lovingly unpack as you would a cedar chest of treasures, each to be examined, turned over, considered in turn along with the question of whether there is anything the lot of them share.

Was it research that Dewey and Whitehead engaged in to come up with their seminal ideas? It does not matter, surely. It certainly was not a matter of mouthing cliches, of peddling horse-sense in the guise of punditry, of just saying something for the sake of an argument. These are sentences, paragraphs, essays and whole books that are at once the fruit of the most intense imagination and reflection and the sort of claim or advice capable of turning a person's head right around, of showing something that before had been invisible. Are these non-empirical judgments? Not if empiricism has to do with knowledge rooted in experience. They certainly are not just emotive ejaculations or suggestive non-sense. C.S. Peirce once pointed out that contrary to much supposition, philosophy is empirical; that is, it is grounded in observations of experience, but of aspects of that experience so common and of such seeming everydayness as generally to escape notice. Or think of still a different kind of philosopher, say Gilbert Ryle and his distinction between knowing that and knowing how. Not altogether original; before him both William James and Bertrand Russell had made a somewhat similar distinction, and it has long been common to distinguish between knowledge and skills, but Ryle was able to show us that from the time of Socrates, philosophers have expressed a certain disdain for knowing how, making it subordinate to knowing that. We remember Socrates' report in The Apology of testing the oracle's pronouncement (that no man was wiser than Socrates) by going to famous practitioners of various kinds, and finding that, alas, the great sculptors could not define beauty, nor could the famous rulers of men define justice. He could not either, he said modestly, but at least he knew that he could not and that he ought to try to as hard as he could for only then would practice be rightly guided.

Take just one other example, Ernst Cassirer in his Philosophy of Symbolic Forms and later in his brief, somewhat popular book, An Essay on Man, argued in his neo-Kantian way that kinds of symbols are perspectives on reality. We need to be able to think and understand in all the major modes of symbolization: mathematics, history, the arts, myth, religion if we are to have anything like a comprehensive grasp of the world. Now here is a philosophy that talks to curriculum, as Philip Phenix showed in his Realms of Meaning. If there are such modes of symbolization, surely each of them should be represented by one portion of the curriculum, and those subjects which do not figure in this system should be relegated to an inferior place.

I have chosen well-known examples of philosophers wrestling with educational problems and ideas in order to avoid detailed exposition. Yet to a great many of our students, these are not well-known, though most of the names are at least familiar, as those of current philosophers are not. Not many of our students have studied philosophy. The first time I taught my "Logic of Inquiry" class, I reminded students of Aristotelian logic as the first systematic attempt to think in terms of classes or sets, and to frame arguments in a syllogistic mode thus putting the whole emphasis upon what members of a class have in common permitting clear definition. In short, here was the beginning of logical thought, in all of its reductiveness, in all of its disregard for concreteness and uniqueness. But you already know what I found out. I wasn't reminding them at all; for all but a few, this was sheer novelty. So now I have to spend more hours than I can spare on these elementary beginnings of logic.

And when I get to Wittgenstein's amazing answer to Aristotelian definition and the theory of essences, the famous family-resemblance presentation, the students say, "Would you write that name on the board, please?" We are not turning out many philosophers but maybe that is less important than to provide students who are going to specialize elsewhere with a philosophic tonic and a philosophic dissolvent at arm's reach.

I do not have to convince this conference that philosophers have something to say about the educational enterprise. What I want to say is that this is an eminently respectable form of educational research and deserves better recognition than it frequently gets.

But in my course, I do not actually include many examples of philosophers talking about education. The main way the students are exposed to philosophic ways of thinking is from the pieces of philosophers like Charles Taylor, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Scriven, Davidson on methodology. They see exhibits of philosophy in these essays rather than readings about how to do philosophy.

For much the main part, what we are talking about is history, sociology, psychology, anthropology, and to a lesser extent, political science, economics and literary criticism to represent the humanities, and educational amalgams of these. I would like to include more literary critics, even art and music criticism. Richard McKeon has reminded us that in the 18th century criticism was itself a genre. Thus, both Hume and Gibbon along with Addison and Swift were practitioners of criticism. We are in powerful need of responsible and perceptive educational criticism today and occasionally we get it, as in some of the work of Paulo Freire and his disciples. We are in need, too, of educational sociology that has the quality of the work of Robert Bellah. His pleas for relating religious studies to the social sciences is a powerful one that has implications for educational curriculum theory. We need in educational research someone as insightful as Clifford Geertz is in his own ethnography of such places as Bali and Morocco. If I were compiling an anthology of Social Science essays, I would put Geertz's "Deep Play" in the position of highest honor. Maybe some day someone will find an educational observance, the high school assembly perhaps, that has the same centrality to this segment of society as he found the cockfight to have in Balinese society: the quasi-clandestine event that most engages people's passions, revealing nearly the whole gamut of their interests and values. Quoting Northrup Frye, he says that "If...we go to see Macbeth to learn what a man feels like after he has gained a kingdom and lost his soul, Balinese go to cockfights to find out what a man, usually composed, aloof, almost obsessively self-absorbed, a kind of moral autocosm, feels like when attacked, tormented, challenged, insulted, and driven in result to the extremes of fury, he has totally triumphed or been brought totally low."(3) He calls himself a "meanings-and-symbols ethnographer," one who "attempts to find out what some pack of natives conceive a person to be,...asking himself, 'What is the general form of their life?' and 'What exactly are the vehicles in which that form is embodied?' From such questions he tries to come up with a "sort of spiral with the notion that they see the self as a composite, a persona, or a point in a pattern." (4) These attempts to give "accounts of other peoples' subjectivities" need to be extended to our educational research. There remains much for us to understand about various kinds of student subjectivities, teacher subjectivities, principal subjectivities, even researcher subjectivities which will appropriately be incorporated in this non-objective research. How much more we need to know about the meanings and symbols of everyday school life. Possibly even more than we need to know the influence of class size upon suburban students' performance on standardized achievement tests, though this is by no means trivial as a question even if it easily admits of trivialization by how much it will end by excluding from consideration beyond the numbers.

We also need philosophers like Dilthey, Gadamer, Taylor, and Ricoeur to tell us about "Verstehen," an understanding that does not pretend to be a causal explanation. Perhaps "causal explanation" is already a redundancy, for what do we require of an explanation apart from its giving an accurate, precise account of cause and effect? But this does not invariably yield understanding, as understanding in turn may leave cause and effect to one side in its search for meanings.

To me the most illuminating educational research is a compound of a variety of activities and perhaps a variety of written products. The activities that come to my mind are observing, describing, reflecting, proposing, plotting, and interpreting. The products may be called, following a familiar classification from rhetoric, description, exposition, argumentation and narration. It would take me too long to elaborate on each of these. I will concentrate on plotting and interpreting from the first list and description and narration from the second.

By plotting, I mean not the Guy Fawkes kind but the Jane Austen kind: the thematization and the variegating of the themes, and the tieing together of the threads of an episode, the discovery of meaningful sequences. E.M. Forster once wrote that "The King died and the Queen died" is not yet a plot, but "The King died and the Queen died of grief" _is_. We can also plot our observations of educational experiences. We begin properly in the experiential and we see and concoct the unfolding of the plot.

This obviously nearly relates to the kind of product or rhetorical mode called narration. The emergence of narration as an important kind of understanding, a way of interpreting, is one of the most important chapters in contemporary methodological studies. Theory of narration has a long history in literary criticism, and it has been long recognized as a part of historiography. Its importance in psychology and in the social sciences more generally is a relatively new achievement. Theodore Sarbin has a new compilation of essays on narrative psychology, and there has emerged a "Life History" branch of personality theory. Psychoanalytic commentators have taken seriously Freud's rather plaintive remark that sometimes he seemed to be hardly more than a teller of stories, and say "yes, properly so": the whole enterprise ought better to be seen as constructing narrative than as doing scientific prediction and control. In philosophy, Alisdaire MacIntyre has shown the importance of thinking of ethical advances in the form of coming to see the unfolding of the story of a whole life as a meaningful sequentiality. Did not the Greeks often say, "Count no man happy until he dies?"

And if we may return one more time to Jerome Bruner, we can now look at his summary of the alternative to paradigmatic research in psychology. It will be remembered that he said of good scientific science that it "leads to good theory, tight analysis, logical proof, and empirical discovery guided by reasoned hypothesis." He goes on to say, "The imaginative application of the narrative mode leads instead to good stories, gripping drama, believable historical accounts. It deals in human or human-like intention and action and the vicissitudes and consequences that mark their course. It is essentially temporal rather than timeless.... And we know much less about it."

Let us follow him just a bit farther. He says that narration

> "operates by constructing two landscapes simultaneously. One is the landscape of action, where the constituents are the arguments of action: agent, intention or goal, situation, instrument. Its other landscape is the landscape of consciousness: what those involved in the action know, think or feel. The two landscapes are essential and distinct: it is the difference between Oedipus sharing Jocasta's bed before and after he learns from the messenger that she is his mother. Whereas truth in the paradigmatic mode is a clear matter that depends upon tests in some possible world to determine whether an explanation captures the relevant facts, the truth of a narrative is in principle problematic. To be sure, as Nelson Goodman constantly reminds us, the 'facts' against which the truth of a scientific explanation is tested are determined by the explanations or theory. But the tests to be applied to the facts are, given the condition, straightforward. Narrative accounts, on the other hand, can be lifelike and exhibit verisimilitude even when they contain demonstrable falsehoods. The property of narrative rightness remains invariant across outcomes of truth tests performed of 'factual' components of narrative."(5)

This is a powerful testimony by an elder and much respected member of the psychological establishment, though hardly one that is going to be given much credence by the great majority of academic psychologists and educational psychologists. It is often said that in thinking and writing narrative, we are not after a disembodied abstract, publicly verifiable TRUTH, but after verisimilitude, plausibility. Yet I want to add insight, enlightenment, enlarged understanding to that. Hamlet is sometimes reduced to a type, as if he were a mere personification of some unfortunate trait like indecisiveness, as Othello personifies jealousy, and Macbeth ambition, but we, of course, recognize this as a travesty. It sounds like the reductiveness of much social science, wherein general intelligence is reduced to a score on a paper and pencil test, and memory is identified with the ability to repeat nonsense syllables.

The making of stories, the construction of plots, involving characters and occurring in scenes, settings, can now be seen against an even larger movement of understanding how we grow cognitively, namely what is now often called Constructionism; Nelson Goodman thus speaks of world-making. Heidegger once said that the world worlds but only for a human, a "being there," an entuned sensitivity given to meditative thinking. Reading theorists are now much inclined to see reading not so much as passive decoding but rather as patterning, imposing schemata on texts. And this reintroduces Piaget, that high priest of developmentalism, of structuralism. And structuralism brings to mind Claude Levi-Straus, who tells us stories about the differences between raw and cooked humans.

It is to be remembered that Socrates and Plato were storytellers too, where the stories and myths were not just for comic relief but rather a way of understanding. Another philosopher wonderfully gifted in that way was William James. Think of his fine story about the squirrel who kept a tree between him and a circling camper. Did the camper go around the squirrel?

In stories, there are real, though of course fictional, agents. Things do not just happen but are made to happen, are chosen, are decided upon or against. Jill Vickers spoke of this as restoring agency to the known world which she believed was a natural propensity of women. I want to make it a natural propensity of men too, though one often suppressed.

I have spoken of plotting and narration, and now must say a few words about the other activities I singled out. Describing continues to have a bad name among "rigorous" researchers. Merely to describe is just as bad as being merely anecdotal. But are we not coming at long last to understand how wonderfully helpful to our understanding rich description, thick description can be? Naturally, description must be selective. No more do we set out to describe everything in sight and sound than we, in a parody of Francis Bacon, just randomly heap up mounds of data. I am pleased to see that educational ethnography is very much on the ascendency, a fact that is owing to such talents as that of Shirley Brice Heath. She and others are giving us close descriptions of children and parents in home and school, of peer relations and those of teachers and pupils, teachers and principals, superintendents and boards. We begin then to see what is going on. The descriptions "make sense." Our understanding grows.

My final kind of process or activity is that of interpreting and I can do no more than touch upon this extraordinary and ubiquitous way of dealing with the world, indeed, of being-in-the-world. Niezsche once wrote: "There are no facts, there are only interpretations." In modern jargon, this would be: There are no brute data, but only data which emerges on the basis of interpretation. But is it to be the pared down, expurgated interpretation in which we force ourselves to decide whether a correlation is significant? (Graduate students are still to be found who have not yet realized that statistical "significance" is an arbitrary artifact, such that a correlation could be explained away and dismissed as not significant only if it is determined that it would occur by chance in more than five percent of the cases.)

Charles Taylor says that verificatory scientific method is "grounded ultimately in the acquisition of brute data" by which he means "data whose validity cannot be foundered or undermined by further reasoning."(6) His point is that in political science, and he would surely add sociology, educational theory, there are no brute data. There is no getting over interpretation at every level. We sometimes pretend otherwise, but it's a smoke screen. We interpret, he says, in the interest of making sense of action, which means the discovery of a "coherence between the actions of the agent and the meaning of his situation for him. We find his action puzzling until we find such a coherence."(7)

Now this meaning is not at all to be discovered, typically, by confining ourselves to purely intellective, purely rational matters. Coherence will be thin until we take into account feelings, attitudes, perhaps fantasies and wishes and aversions. What would it be like to analyze Medea by leaving out the feelings of the characters and the feelings of us the observers? But is this after all different from leaving out of account the feelings of students and teachers as we try to interpret the classroom scene, the teaching/learning situation, as we call it?

The name of this interpretative game is hermeneutics, which as Taylor says, must rely upon insight. He says:

> "In physics we might argue that if someone does not accept a true theory, then either he has not been shown enough [brute data] evidence...or he cannot understand and apply some formalized language. But in the sciences of man conceived as hermeneutical, the nonacceptance of a true or illuminating theory may come from neither of these, indeed is unlikely to be due to either of these, but rather from a failure to grasp the meaning field in question, an inability to make and understand readings of this field." (8)

Interpretation is what philosophers have always done and tried to do well, perceptively, persuasively, keenly, even profoundly and occasionally succeeded. Sometimes the interpretation is of the written text, as when Aristotle tried to make sense of his philosophic predecessors. Sometimes it is of a human action as when Socrates tried to understand how children think that the gods are cheats and liars; or consider Descartes or Dewey interpreting problem-solving.

Paul Ricoeur and others have told us that since hermeneutics has traditionally been conceived to be the interpretation of a text, we should see, as with Freud and Jung, a dream is a text, for Weber an institution is a text, and for many advanced sociologists and anthropologists human action in general can be construed as a text. We look out of our hotel window and are amazed to see a bunch of naked people dancing in a circle around a newly constructed bonfire. What in the world are they up to? That is the puzzlement, we do not deliberately set about interpreting unless the text puzzles us, and there are always relevant observations we can make that will help us construct a perhaps plausible interpretation.

I have come to understand that what we are doing when we are teaching or trying to teach is interpreting, as is the case with the would-be learner, even more obviously. Maybe Nietzsche was right: there are no facts, no brute data, but only interpretation and that means discovering or inventing perspectives on a reality that itself is surely in some considerable measure a reality co-constituted by ourselves as observers and interpreters. We try, though, not to be irresponsible.

I have tried to describe something of what the philosopher as methodologist, or an epistemologist may do. Obviously others would interpret this role somewhat differently, and perhaps more convincingly than I have done. I hope to have made a plausible case for this as genuine philosophy and for our kind of methodology as constituting an important service we can offer our colleagues and students in schools of education. I have tried to suggest that there are a number of kinds of what I would be inclined to call humanistic research that can combine rigor with a continuous recognition of the poignant importance of keeping the whole human being in view as we get on with our attempts to understand the infinitely difficult processes of educating and becoming educated. Unlike sticks and stones, human beings determine the kind of being they participate and engage in. They are happily unpredictable every time they decide to be. In still other words, the predictors and controllers had better keep their results to themselves, lest their subject-objects perversely confound the findings.

What I want by way of research and want to persuade others to want, is something deeply subjective. Did not Kierkegaard say that our great human, uncompletable task is that of becoming subjective? That is, of becoming dialectically aware of our own changing selfhood. As teachers, I think our obligation is to become dialectically aware of the changing selfhood of our students and to conduce toward their growing consciousness. Whatever else our selves are, they must be far more than abstract thinkers, impersonal problem-solvers bent on decontextualizing in the interest of specious precision. Our feelings, our values, our sense of our own and others' being, our intuitions, our fears and hopes, our loves and aversions must come in to our scholarly endeavors. If we can admit and embrace this much, at least one other realization awaits us, and that is that this thick research is finally expressible in the stripped-down, expurgated, sterile prose of the highest-status educational journals. We and our students being the richly confused beings we are, our most appropriate style will be replete with metonymy and metaphor. Then in turn, perhaps to explore that which somehow lies beyond the merely human, we can say, with Dylan Thomas:

Man, be my metaphor.

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(1) Jerome Bruner, "Narrative and Paradigmatic Modes of Thought," an Invited Address, Division 1, American Psychological Association, Toronto, August 25, 1984.

(2) Jill McCalla Vicker, "Memoirs of an Ontological Exile: The Methodological Rebellions of Feminist Research," in Geraldine Finn and Angela Miles, (eds.), Feminism in Canada, (Montreal, 1982).

(3) Clifford Geertz, "Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight," in Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, (eds.), Interpretive Social Science: A Reader, Berkeley, 1979, p. 219.

(4) Ibid., p. 240

(5) Jerome Bruner, "Narrative and Paradigmatic Modes of Thought," an Invited Address, Division 1, American Psychological Association, Toronto, August 25, 1984.

(6) Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Science of Man," in Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, (eds.), op.ci., p. 30.

(7) Ibid., p. 35.

(8) Ibid., p. 66.

Response

COMMENTS ON "NON-PARADIGMATIC RESEARCH"

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The title of Professor Jarrett's paper on the program is "The Philosopher as Teacher of Methodology" and, of course, Professor Jarrett provides important insights into this topic. Principally, he does this in two ways. First, he tells us how he approaches the subject in a course he teaches, the course is philosophy of research or of inquiry or of research methods. The second, and the most compelling approach is the modeling he provides. We learn how to become a methodologist not by attending to pedagogical suggestions or prescriptions, but by observing Jarrett apply his craft and engage in philosophic inquiry.

The title of Professor Jarrett's paper as printed on the paper itself is broader than that printed on the program. It is simply "Non-Paradigmatic Research." While this title is not particularly descriptive, it more accurately represents the topic addressed by Professor Jarrett. In addressing the topic, Jarrett does many things. Two have already been noted.

1) He describes how to teach graduates about methodology.

2) He presents a splendid model of philosophic inquiry.

But he does more.

3) He describes the landscape on which a philosopher might focus. That is, the text to be interpreted by the philosopher is human inquiry or sets of human inquiry.

4) He describes what needs to be done in research in general, he indicates that the objective scientific paradigm has been and will continue to be practically worthless for the social sciences and for education in particular. Philosophers, sociologists, anthropologists, and other social scientists should inquire into meaning. The text is the school, the classroom, or the principal's office. An excellent example of the contribution a philosopher can make in this area can be seen in the paper presented by Rod Evans earlier during the meeting. Taking an episode out of everyday life in schools, Evans analyzes the disciplinary actions of a principal. By analyzing the text in which an adult, acting with the power of the state, corrects a student's misbehavior, Evans explores the meaning of schooling, what school is, its purpose.

5) Finally, Jarrett tells us, or at least suggests, what teaching should be: "What we are doing when we teach is interpreting."

With respect to this last point, a comment or two might be in order. A number of presenters over the last two days, including Jarrett, have talked about teaching as developing meaning for students. That is, by helping students interpret and understand a text, the teacher helps the student to bestow meaning on the subject matter or for that matter on the world.

It is popular to view this process as liberating. We should not impose facts, beliefs, values, or set interpretations on children, we should enable them to create or impose their own. But we should also recognize that there is a controlling interest in helping students interpret their world and derive meaning. Are we not trying to construct a meaningful text for students that is compatible with the meaning and reality of others in society? Are we not trying to achieve in our students certain interpretations and meanings which mirror our cultural history and identity? In fact, some of the time we act to liberate children from the provincial, restrictive meanings and interpretations of an unenlightened background or community. We want them to share a sense of community not with their parents, their peers, or perhaps the unreflective fundamentalist community in which they are being indoctrinated, but rather with our own. And, even in a more controlling sense, we want them to interpret certain situations in specific ways, we want them to embrace a particular set of beliefs and values and to draw upon these when defining a context. For example, when my child sees a particular and "peculiar" institution (slavery), I want him to interpret it as exploitation and to conclude that it is wrong.

I think even in a broader sense we can make similar observations with respect to our interest in research. One of the reasons Jarrett is impatient with scientific research is because it has been so fruitless in guiding matters that are important to him. It has not told us much about teacher-student relationships, for example. We do research about schooling and teaching not just so we can understand but in order to guide behavior. We want to be able to make teachers more effective. We want to understand environments so we can manipulate them or at least direct them to nurture the kinds of outcomes we desire. Thus, I think it would be a mistake to think of control as a key distinguishing characteristic between paradigmatic and non-paradigmatic research.

Finally, it might be worthwhile to acknowledge some conceptual ambiguities associated with meaning and which have the potential to create pitfalls for the non-paradigmatic or interpretive researcher. The researcher must keep in mind that when we speak of interpreting a text, a text can have meaning at several different levels. What the actor understands or what a situation means for an actor may be quite different from any "objective" meaning of the situation as catalogued by a neutral observer. For example: 1) the act may not have any discursive meaning for the actor at all; he may not have given it any thought. 2) Upon reflection the actor's account may not be accepted by the observer. The actor may be wrong, or he may not be aware of subconscious meanings, or he may misunderstand his own motives. This, then, has the consequence of correcting an actor's interpretation rather than describing it. 3) Different levels of meaning or understanding may exist for both the actor and the researcher. The meaning of an event for a participant may be compatible with but different from that of the interpretive scientist. While they differ, both can be correct. 4) Closely related to this last point is the recognition that meaning is often tied to the consequences of some event and the relevance of these consequences to different individuals. It is in this sense that we ask a child, "Do you know what it means if you fail to pass this course?" At times it is the failure of the student to share a common meaning in such matters with a teacher or parent that leads to exacerbation.

These are not meant to be new questions or areas for analysis for philosophers studying action, language and meaning have raised them before. Rather, these are concerns which may require continued attention as we gravitate toward the use of interpretive science and hermeneutics.

To conclude, Professor Jarrett has directed us to an area of philosophic inquiry with great promise. The art and skill with which he models the inquiry he advocates should serve as an incentive to us all.

AESTHETIC EDUCATION IN THE FOREIGN LANGUAGE CLASS

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In this paper I suggest a definition of aesthetic education, explore its relevance for the FL (foreign language) class, and suggest ideas and guidelines for its implementation into the FL class.(1) It offers a theoretical framework which can be brought into agreement with specific FL methodologies and classroom activities.

Language learning and teaching, and aesthetic education, irrespective of methodology, are educational activities. This is a tautology, a fact which is often forgotten. As H.H. Stern regrets, "the relevance of education for language learning and teaching theories has frequently been overlooked or underestimated."(2) Education for language teaching theory can be regarded as a "multidisciplinary source discipline. By treating it as such, educational assumptions in language teaching can be brought to light, and language teaching can be viewed more clearly in relation to other educational activities."(3)

But aesthetic education and language education have connecting links other than or in addition to the concept of education. Aesthetic education always deals with language in either one or both of the following aspects:

1. Language as the medium of literary art, which becomes an aesthetic object in the aesthetic experience;
2. Language as the linguistic medium with which we communicate, i.e. describe, evaluate, and interpret our aesthetic experiences.

Language education, a broader concept than language learning or acquisition, implies initiation into a foreign culture. Its use encompasses a great variety of its possible functions, including the artistic and aesthetic. The term aesthetic education, draws from philosophical aesthetics and from the concept of education. The philosophical discipline of aesthetics is concerned with the "analysis of concepts and the solutions to problems that arise when one contemplates aesthetic objects."(4) Its central points of interest are contemplation, evaluation and judgment of the objects and their qualities. Aesthetic objects, in turn, comprise all the objects of aesthetic experience, thus, it is only after the aesthetic experience has been sufficiently characterized that one is able to delimit the class of aesthetic objects."(5) It is obvious that the art object such as the poem, the painting, the song, etc. must be distinguished from the aesthetic object which only comes into existence by involvement of the percipient in the aesthetic experience.

The aesthetic experience can be distinguished from other kinds of experiences by a predominance of aesthetic over practical, moral or scientific concerns. It is often characterized by the following features: a person perceives and apprehends the sensuous and aesthetic qualities of an object or event in a direct and non-inferential way by engaging perceptual, emotional and intellectual powers. Attention is directed to form, to relationships of elements which make up the whole. Focus is also on qualities which are of human relevance and which we describe in metaphorical terms. Finally, the aesthetic experience has a high degree of unity and is gratifying and valuable to the percipient.(6)

Philosophical aesthetics is not identical with aesthetic education. The aesthetic experience, however, is a central part of aesthetic education. Aesthetic education is not identical with the unreflected experience of works of art or other objects. Education always suggests the initiation of the individual into a public world and deals with what is communicable by language. Education, furthermore, implies more than the training of individual skills or isolated competences. It refers to the development of the intellectual and emotional powers of a person and a linkage with a wider system of beliefs. Aesthetic education, then, has two components: the facilitation of aesthetic experiences and the development of a common language with which we can reflect on these experiences, describe and communicate them to others. Aesthetic education implies conceptual and non-conceptual operations.

Certain formal similarities between aesthetic education and language education can now be established. For example, the communication-based language class contains two distinct stages, namely the receptive or pre-production stages, where listening and reading comprehension are facilitated, and the production stages, where students respond orally or in writing. Even though these stages overlap and fuse, a predominant characteristic of the receptive stage is immediate and intuitive understanding, whereas the production stage focuses to some degree on articulate responses based on, and shaped by, propositional knowledge. Both stages are necessary if we want to call these activities educational and successful. If students know grammatical rules but are unable to understand messages and respond to them in the FL, we would hesitate to ascribe to them any communicative competence. Likewise, if students are well informed in areas such as art theory or history, but not capable of experiencing a poem, a song, or a sunset and find no words for what they had seen, heard or experienced, we would not call them receptive or responsive to aesthetic values.

The aesthetic field is wider than that of art, which means that aesthetic experiences are not limited to art works, but include a wide range of objects and natural events. For the FL classroom this means that aesthetic responses are not confined to literary texts, as it is often believed, but include all kinds of material such as songs, music, films, pictures. In this paper I intend to describe in more detail what is involved when we perceive some object or respond to it in an aesthetically relevant way. Furthermore, I will offer some suggestions as to how the aesthetic component could be encouraged in the FL class in its own right, or for more intrinsic reasons than merely didactic considerations. By shifting attention to aesthetic qualities when reading texts, looking at pictures, or listening to songs, students eventually will develop dispositions such as aesthetic awareness and responsiveness, which employs, in addition to the cognitive, also the imaginative, emotive and perceptual powers. This can make any learning more personally meaningful and relevant, including language learning. What I am suggesting here coincides with what Krashen and Terrell call "acquisition activities," which refer to a "broad range of events which have a purpose other than conscious grammar practice.... For acquisition to take place, the topics used in each activity must be intrinsically interesting or meaningful..."(7) These "affective-humanistic activities, involve students' feelings, opinions, desires, reactions, ideas and experiences."(8) These comprise a great part of the mental activities which are also involved in aesthetic perception.

Some typical aesthetic perceptions are: seeing the balance in a painting or poem, noticing the majestic look of a mountain or a sad expression in a face, hearing that a melody sounds happy or plaintive. We do not take such expressions literally but, rather, in the phenomenal sense. Yet, to see a balance or to notice an expression, we literally have to see, hear and read in the case of a literary text. Aesthetic perception, then, is dependent on ordinary sense perception but these perceptions differ in purpose, context, and knowledge which we utilize.(9) While ordinary sense perception usually leads to some kind of action and is characterized by a purpose, practical or scientific, in aesthetic perception we bring into awareness the formal or expressive qualities of the object in question. Aesthetic perception, furthermore, allows for the inclusion of all kinds of other mental activities such as imagination, association, recollection, feeling. Yet it is not purely subjective. Whatever comes into one's awareness must always be seen in its relevance to and be controlled by the physical reality of the object.

Aesthetic perception is very close to Wittgenstein's notion of "noticing an aspect" or "seeing as."(10) He distinguishes between two kinds of of seeing: when two people look at two faces, they do have the same visual experience, but only one of them might see a likeness between the two faces, noticing some particular aspect about the faces. The famous duck-rabbit drawing can be used to explain the meaning of "seeing as." Once we see the drawing as a rabbit, and once as a duck. Important in both cases of seeing is the change which takes place and of which we are aware usually with surprise. The change in perception can come about gradually or suddenly and can last a long or a short while. In this sense, aesthetic perception breaks with our routine, conventional or dispositional ways of perceiving and constitutes always an occurrence. Because of a dominance of visual illustrations, it is not uncommon to demonstrate the characteristic features of aesthetic perception using the case of visual perception. The main features can quite easily be applied, and, if need be, modified, to suit other objects of perception.

A few comments about the case of literature seem to be appropriate. Even though the physical aspects of the literary text are minimal, and therefore reference to perception arguable, nobody has ever doubted that our response to literature is aesthetic. We identify the literary text by its linguistic structure, and by the process of reading, we realize it in our minds. Reading does have some perceptual elements considering its close connection to sight and sound.(11) Reading is partly conceptual, considering the referential meanings which have to be understood (denotative) and partly imaginative, as the readers fill out the possible meanings in their minds (connotative). Wolfgang Iser makes a more subtle distinction when he differentiates "between perception and ideation as two different means of access to the world: perception requires the actual presence of the object whereas ideation depends upon its absence or nonexistence."(12) Iser explores in detail the reading process and the aesthetic response which develops in a dynamic and dialectic relationship between reader, text and their interaction.

As much as we are guided by the physical reality of the visual object, so as well, the "'schematized aspects' of the text offer us knowledge of the conditions under which the imaginary object is to be produced."(13) As other objects of perception lose their reference to reality and become aesthetic objects when we focus attention to certain qualities, so the reality in the literary text "can only come into being by way of ideation, and so the structure of the text sets off a sequence of mental images...which will be coloured by the reader's existing stock of experience, which acts as a referential background against which the unfamiliar can be conceived and processed."(14)

According to Iser, communication between text and reader is stimulated by the indeterminacy of the literary text and a "fundamental asymmetry"(15) between text and reader. The missing common code has to be "created by a process of interaction between explicit and implicit elements in the text and between revelation and concealment."(16) The lack of a common code, the absence of reference to reality demand intense reader participation which sets into motion a process which forces the reader eventually to see reality with new eyes.

Conceding the great number of differences among the objects of aesthetic perception, the art forms, and the modes of perception, I have tried to focus on some common features that are present in all aesthetic perception. Those perceptual experiences which break with our habitual ways of perceiving, which encourage imagination and association, and which focus on formal and expressive qualities can and should be facilitated in the language class.

I would like to suggest how the FL teacher can go about such a task. Perhaps once a week, one half or one full class period could be set aside to work with visual, auditory material and short literary texts. Pictures could include a selection from nature, art, travel or architectural design magazines. They should be as large as possible, colourful, and drawing attention either in terms of what is depicted or the way it is portrayed. The teacher would, by pointing out and describing, guide the students' perception toward colour schemes, shapes, configuration, expressions, moods, and encourage personal reaction of the students. Reproductions taken from old art calendars could be used with a similar approach. For auditory material, folk songs, popular songs, political songs, classical songs, and short pieces of classical music are useful. The qualities which could be pointed out would relate to tempo, rhythm, melody, harmony and, again, expression of feeling and mood. Personal associations and thoughts of the students could be encouraged. Literary texts should be at a compatible linguistic level and could consist of short pieces of poetry and prose. The teacher could point to the various poetic features at the levels of language, structure, imagery and meaning. When presenting such material in the FL class, focus should be directed mainly to perceptual and expressive qualities, which include subject matter represented. The activities, however, should not be used to teach art, music, or literary theory. The material, ideally, should be integrated topically into the syllabus. This means that the students already are familiar with the vocabulary relating to a certain topic and can focus attention more exclusively to the aesthetic qualities of the object presented. In this way they can experience one theme or topic through various media or forms of expression.

The last part of this paper addresses questions related to aesthetic literacy and its development and to aesthetic terms and their classification. Maxine Greene defines aesthetic literacy as the acquisition or the development of "certain decoding and interpretive skills, certain modes of 'knowing how,'" and suggests that "the discrimination, sensitivity, and responsiveness associated with such a literacy contribute to an understanding of the world around."(17)

As a concept closely tied to that of aesthetic education, aesthetic literacy pertains to a certain mode of awareness as well as to the linguistic skills which are necessary to describe and communicate perceptions and responses. It is often claimed that aesthetic experiences cannot be described, or that they are ineffable, and that the aesthetic object is esoteric. To this one can reply that every experience can be, at least partly, accounted for, conceptualized and communicated. The difficulty in communicating such personal and unique experiences is often a case of lack of aesthetic education or literacy, and not necessarily that aesthetic experiences, as though by definition, are altogether impossible to communicate. Language is an essential part of aesthetic education, as education deals with what is communicable by language. Aesthetic qualities are inter-subjectively verifiable and need to be distinguished from subjective feelings or sensations and pains on the one hand and from knowledge by appeal to reason on the other. The importance of language can also be demonstrated by the role of the critic or the teacher, who by pointing out and describing "gives us directions for perceiving," and whose comments are "'filled in,' 'rounded out,' or 'completed' by the act of perception, which is performed not to judge the truth of his description but in a certain sense to understand it."(18)

Even though description, interpretation, and evaluation usually overlap or fuse in aesthetic communication, I will here concentrate on description, i.e. on aesthetic terms which are in themselves often value-tending and emotive, as these form the centre of all aesthetic talk. I will attempt to sketch the system of classification into which they fall. Aesthetic qualities are always dependent on non-aesthetic ones, which means that we can regard non-aesthetic qualities as vehicles for the expressive significance of aesthetic qualities. Non-aesthetic qualities refer to colours, shapes, patterns (visual), pitch of tone, melody, rhythm (aural), texture, roughness, smoothness (tactile), and dialogue, first-person, character, rhyme (intentional/literature). Under normal conditions everyone can perceive and describe them, and, in case of disagreement, arguments can easily be settled. By metaphorical use we often transpose terms from the non-aesthetic into the aesthetic field. "Shrill," for example, is used to describe the quality of a sound. By calling a colour "shrill," we extend the use of "shrill" and describe the quality of a colour. Frank Sibley suggests that there exists "a large and accepted vocabulary of aesthetic terms some of which, whatever their metaphorical origins, are now not metaphors at all, others of which, whatever their metaphorical origins, are now not metaphors at all, others of which are at most quasi-metaphorical."(19) Sibley explains that terms such as forceful, dynamic or tightly-knit do their job perfectly well in any aesthetic as well as non-aesthetic context. He asserts that just because we know their literal use, are we able to use them in any aesthetic context? To link experiences in this way, to explore similarities in non-aesthetic and aesthetic areas is "a feature of human intelligence and sensitivity...and can be encouraged and developed."(20)

The terms describing aesthetic qualities can be roughly divided into four groups. The first one consists of terms just mentioned: shrill, sombre, brilliant, smooth, describing the qualities of non-aesthetic qualities. These regional qualities are those we often respond to and admire for themselves, and which reflect vital and deep human concerns. The qualities and corresponding terms of the second group refer to the structure and unity of an object as a whole, in which the parts are seen in their relationship to the totality. Examples are: balanced, dispersed, structured, compact, harmonious. The terms in the next group are taken from the expressive and emotive realm, such as sad, tense, cheerful, restful, melancholy. Aesthetic objects are expressive of feeling in the sense that they show formal similarities to the forms of human feeling. Finally, there are terms expressive of emotion or feeling evoked in the recipient and often used in a recommending or condemning fashion. These terms include interesting, exciting, horrible, touching.

This short list of terms, which could be expanded and modified for specific purposes, shows clearly that most of the terms are easily accessible to FL students at various levels. In many cases, they are cognates, and most of them describe qualities which are personally relevant and meaningful in many areas of life. I should like to mention another group of terms, such as good, excellent, or poor, which we use for evaluation and judgment. It is obvious that these are not restricted to the aesthetic field but can be found in various areas where judgments are passed. To tie these terms into the present point of discussion, and also to demonstrate that aesthetic terms are not whimsical or arbitrary, consider the relationship between terms we use in aesthetic talk. The fact that a painting contains bright shades of red and yellow cannot be a reason to judge it bad, but it could be a reason for saying it is garish. And the garishness of the colours may be a reason for calling it bad. The primary function of aesthetic terms, according to Freedmann, is to be value-tending and to have "descriptive and emotive meaning of equal import."(21)

The development of aesthetic literacy can be a realistic goal in the FL class. It can be justified on the following grounds: as aesthetic terms are subject to some rules and can be inter-subjectively validated in the presence of the object, they can be taught and learned. Furthermore, with the linguistic skills acquired, the students can communicate "certain phenomena which are outstanding or remarkable or unusual," and that "catch the eye, ear, seize our attention and interest, and move us to surprise, admiration, delight, fear, or distaste."(22)

In conclusion, I would like to make some brief comments on the role of the FL teacher. The methods the critic uses to get someone else to see aesthetic qualities resemble very closely some of the activities of the FL teacher. When pointing out certain features in an object, the critic's descriptions include in alternating or varying fashion the use of non-aesthetic and aesthetic terms. This is comparable to communicating with the FL students in the new language using an already familiar vocabulary interspersed with new terms which gain meaning and significance within a given context. Furthermore, the critic as well as the FL teacher make use of contrasts, repetition, comparisons, reminiscences, and besides the verbal performance, stress non-verbal behaviors, i.e. tone of voice, expression and gestures.(23) It is implied here that we become aware of certain qualities by acquaintance and description only, and not by reasoning and argument. Similarly, the FL students gain comprehensive knowledge by acquaintance, knowledge which is qualitative rather than theoretical.

In this paper, I have sketched the concept of aesthetic education, pointed out its relevance for foreign language education and suggested possibilities for its implementation in the FL class. The introduction of the aesthetic perspective, i.e. development of perceptual awareness and aesthetic vocabulary in the FL class, adds a dimension which expands the scope of the language environment and makes language learning more personally relevant, and therefore successful.

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(1) Many philosophers and educators do, however, support the idea of aesthetic education and its feasibility in a formal educational setting. The Journal of Aesthetic Education and some of the works cited offer a good selection of relevant articles.

(2) H.H. Stern, *Fundamental Concepts of Language Teaching*. (Oxford: University Press, 1983).

(3) H.H. Stern, *Fundamental Concepts of Language Teaching*. (Oxford: University Press, 1983).

(4) John Hospers, "Problems of Aesthetics." *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. 1972 ed.

(5) John Hospers, "Problems of Aesthetics." *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. 1972 ed.

(6) Monroe C. Beardsley lists these five features as characteristic of what is conventionally considered an aesthetic experience.

(7) Stephen D. Krashen, Tracy D. Terrell. *The Natural Approach. Language Acquisition in the Classroom*. (San Francisco: The Alemany Press, 1983), p. 97.

(8) Stephen D. Krashen, Tracy D. Terrell. *The Natural Approach. Language Acquisition in the Classroom*. (San Francisco: The Alemany Press, 1983), p. 100.

(9) The importance of purpose, context and knowledge in visual perception has been demonstrated by Norwood Hansen in his chapter on observation (4-30).

(10) Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*. Trans. G.E.M. Anscombe. 3rd ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), 1978, pp. 193-214.

(11) *Ibid*., p. 69.

(12) Wolfgang Iser, *The Act of Reading: A Theory of Aesthetic Response*. (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1978), p. 137.

(13) *Ibid*.

(14) *Ibid*., p. 38.

(15) *Ibid*., p. 166.

(16) *Ibid*., p. 169.

(17) Maxine Greene, "Aesthetic Literacy in General Education." *Philosophy and Education*. Ed. Jonas Soltis. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 119 and 120.

(18) Arnold Isenberg, "Critical Communication." *Aesthetics and the Theory of Criticism*. Ed. William Callaghan et al. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 137.

(19) Ibid., p. 335.

(20) Ibid., p. 339.

(21) Marcia P. Freedmann, "The Myth of the Aesthetic Predicate." Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, XXVII, (1968), p. 53.

(22) Frank Sibley, "Aesthetic Concepts." Philosophy Looks at the Arts. Ed. Joseph Margolis. (New York: Charles Scribner & Sons, 1962), p. 340.

(23) Frank Sibley discusses the critic's methods in detail; the similarity to the activities of the FL teacher in a communication-based class is striking and worthwhile exploring.

FOCUSING ON THE CREATIVE FUNCTION IN TEACHER TRAINING: CONNECTING SUBJECT MATTER CONTENT WITH PEDAGOGICAL PROCESS

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Part I

Basic Premise

The basic premise of this paper is that effective teacher training programs need to assist students in reaching beyond competence in subject matter (content) and pedagogical process (methodology) to:

A. Focus on developing the prospective teacher's capacity to recognize and utilize the process underlying the respective categories of the curriculum, viz.(1)
   1. Language/Arts: subjective evaluation related to language and the expressive arts.
   2. Mathematics: deductive thinking skills.
   3. Science: inductive thinking skills.
   4. Social Studies: objective evaluation related to social norms and characteristics.

B. Exercise the capacity of prospective teachers to transform knowledge (of content) into communicable pedagogical forms -- seeking effective personal answers to such questions as:(2)
   1. Where do teacher explanations originate?
   2. How do teachers decide what to teach and how to represent it?
   3. How do teachers question students about what they teach?
   4. How does the successful college student transform his or her expertise in the subject matter into a form that an elementary or high school student can comprehend?

Assumption

The assumption of this paper is that creativity, as it was traditionally defined, is the human capacity that makes this bridging between subject matter content and pedagogical methodology possible. It is the creative capacity that constitutes the third prerequisite to successful instruction. Our failure to address this attribute directly and effectively in teacher training programs impedes our efforts to develop more superior teachers. It is not the only barrier, but it is a significant one.

Choosing Between Competing Definitions of Creativity

If the foregoing assumption is correct, then the operational definition of creativity becomes very significant. Teacher trainers can hardly be expected to succeed if they cannot understand what it is they are supposed to be communicating to prospective teachers. Lee S. Shulman and his colleagues at Stanford have acknowledged this problem by pointing to the fact that a century ago teacher evaluation was based on *content proficiency exams* while today teacher evaluation is based on *the assessment of pedagogical skills*. Shulman argues that what is lacking is a research base that explicates how teachers connect content to method.(3) This phenomenon appears to be the mystery in teacher training. I contend that creativity bridges this gap. It follows that if a prospective teacher's ability to bridge this gap is to be consciously improved by intentional experiences in teacher training programs, we need to refocus our perception of creativity away from the modern mystical view toward an older more traditional view.

A Choice Between Competing Definitions

There is substantial evidence that modern education and other segments of the society stifle individual development by communicating a narrow, restricted and mystical view of creativity. By mystical I mean obscure, baffling, mysterious, inexplicable and incomprehensible. In spite of significant exceptions by some educators, much of the literature and far too many of our young people conceptualize creativity as a trait limited to a few special, gifted, and talented individuals. I do not believe this is true. We seem to have rejected an older, more broadly defined view of creativity and replaced it with a narrow part of that older definition -- the mystical part. The result is less clarity and greater confusion. Researchers announced a decade ago that none of the theoretical accounts of creativity appeared to explain adequately its nature or provide for its measurement.(4) Our understanding has increased little since then.

The Ancient Meaning of "Create"

The ancient definition of "creating" is illustrated by the Hebrew word *barah*, as used in Genesis, Chapter One, Verse One: "In the beginning God *created* [barah] the heavens and the earth" -- this is commonly interpreted "He organized existing elements for some purpose."(5) Before the 20th century, creating was generally perceived as making; it was ordinary, natural, common, widely practiced, expected, and easily understood. "Creating" in this sense was expected of everyone. In those prespecialization eras, if one did not develop a fairly wide repertoire of creative responses, life quickly became less enjoyable and much more insecure. A loaf of bread, a basket, a tool, a shoe, whatever, was very much an individual creation. These skills were widely dispersed and carefully perpetuated.

Man was considered the offspring of God -- created in His image and likeness. He was to become like his Father in heaven.(6) God created by organizing things out of existing elements for some purpose, and so should man. Creativity was an inherent aspect of Being. The limits may have seemed boundless, but they were not restricted to the mystical. Jesus, the great Teacher of Israel, voiced this philosophy in His statement: "The Son can do nothing of Himself, but what He seeth the Father do."(7) Following some pattern toward a predetermined end was acceptable; it was not viewed as noncreative behavior.

This ancient notion of creativity, viewed from man's perspective, did have a mystical dimension. Man's ways were not God's ways. He did not understand all that God understood. Abraham, Jacob, and Moses marvelled at the power and wisdom of God. They did not always understand His mighty works; such were a mystery unless God provided explanations. But in their own human stewardship these patriarchs were very comfortable learning to become like God. Creativity for the ancients was a continuum. Creating consisted of organizing existing elements for some purpose: planting and harvesting, building and preserving, singing and dancing, adoring and reverencing. Only that which God gave to them without explanation, which they could not comprehend, was mystical. Creativity enveloped more than mystique. (See Figure 1)

Creativity Continuum



Figure 1

A New Definition Of Creativity

A modern perception of creativity has recently come to dominate both professional education and the arts. The new definition equates "creativity" with the development of new, novel, strange, difference, spontaneous, unusual or even bizarre products and actions. As J.C. Gowan et al. observed in 1967,

> creativity is a word which has recently been taken over by science from religion (and) it is almost impossible to discover it in a dictionary or encyclopedia more than a decade old. It is a new concept, recently attributed to the personality of man, and still fraught with some mythical connotations.(8)

This new definition of creativity tends to be elitist and mystical in nature. Educators should avoid perpetuating this narrow view of creativity. It is restrictive, often debilitating to the individual, and may add confusion and inefficient complexity to the educational enterprise.

Limitations of the New Definition

I became concerned about the definition of creativity several years ago while teaching courses on the subject to prospective teachers. Frequently, I began the first class period by asking students to suggest words they considered to be descriptors or indicators of creativity. Consistently, the reported list was dominated by terms such as new, unusual, unique, strange, different, and novel. After reaching a tentative agreement on the definition of creativity, I would ask the students to indicate by raised hand, how many saw themselves as creative individuals. The response was consistent: only a few (usually 10 to 20 percent) of the twenty-five to thirty-five students would respond in the affirmative. Intimidation was high, confidence low, and self-esteem questionable. Confusion was evident.

This response pattern enticed me to reexamine the literature related to creativity, and I found the exploration fascinating. Researchers did not agree on the theoretical approaches to comprehending creativity nor did these theories explain adequately its nature or provide for its measurement.(9) Clearly, confusion was alive and healthy in this field. The more carefully I examined the record, the more apparent the confusion became.(10) I found abundant clues to why students perceived creativity as a product rooted in some mystical "twilight zone." Titles like C.A. Morizot's Just This Side of Madness and D.W. Fritz's Perspectives on Creativity and the Unconscious clearly convey a message that creativity is not to be found in the ordinary, natural, common, usual, widely practiced, or easily understood. Rather, it is portrayed as some type of mystical power or force that lies beyond the immediate management of the ordinary individual. Chiselin expressed this view in his declaration that creativity "is not to be found by scrutiny of the conscious scene, because it is never there....For only on the fringes of consciousness and in the deeper backgrounds into which they fade away is freedom attainable."(11)

D.N. Perkins, in a recently published study, openly acknowledges that creativity is commonly perceived as a mystery.(12) Refreshingly, his overall message in this provocative report veers somewhat from the dominant definitions in creativity literature. In his view creating should be viewed as the application of "commonplace resources of the mind."(13) The potential for creativity is not rare or entirely mystical.

But Perkins straddles the fence when he tries to distinguish between the verb "to create" and the adjective "creative." He joins many others in maintaining that the verb "to create" is too general and broad in its application to be useful in defining "creativity."(14) He argues that it is necessary to use the more restrictive adjective, "creative" to denote creativity. The distinction is important only because the operational definitions he associates with the verb and the adjective are so different.

This was not the case anciently. Since World War II, entire libraries of ancient documents have been discovered in Syria, Palestine and Egypt. The content of this vast reservoir of writings makes it clear that the ancients perceived creativity quite differently than either medieval or modern man have.(15)

When early Christian apologists labored to reconcile the ancient Hebrew world view with a form of Greek (Platonic) philosophy a doctrinal conflict arose that added to the confusion. There arose in the fourth century a squabble in theology that was resolved by concluding that God created things ex nihilo, out of nothing.(16) The shift from a sacred to a secular society occurred in America between 1880 and 1920. The shift seems to have set the stage for and contributed to conflict and confusion in contemporary educational thought on creativity. Contemporary literature is full of assertions such as "In the Old Testament man was not creative,"(17) or "the faithful formalist has no chance of creating anything."(18) Such arrogant statements can be understood only as one realizes how far the pendulum has swung toward the mystic definition.

In a way it seems ironic that a secular world would adopt a mystical foundation for one of its most admired phenomenon. Yet the evidence abounds. Some writers freely acknowledge that the "popular stereotype sometimes confuses the creative genius with the emotionally disturbed."(19) Or, as the editors of the Colorado Symposium of 1962 argued, "the study of creativity need not limit itself to the eminent, the extraordinary; [nevertheless] if we include 'everyday creativity' in our study, we may be in danger of making our conception of it meaningless."(20)

This type of thinking only perpetuates the mystical stereotype. It seems to prevail in spite of counterthrusts, such as J.P. Guilford's position that creativity can be understood and explained, and similar research findings like those of Calvin Taylor and Paul Torrance. The entanglement of creative activity with the mystical has been solidly retained in many modern definitions. Focus on the exceptional has been so alluring that it has obscured the universal distribution of the ability to create and the diverse expression of creativity in the individual.

Educators, it seems are better served by the ancient definition which holds that creativity is simply the act of organizing existing elements for some purpose. This older definition includes the ability to originate the new and different and emphasizes the value of developing skills and products that promote the ordinary, natural, common, widely practiced, expected, and easily understood. It is also a perspective much more friendly to the kind of research we are capable of conducting.

It is a view that can be an extension of the basic curriculum. The structure and function of the general curriculum constitute a vital and exciting approach to fostering creativity as a human resource.

Part II
Creativity as an Extension of the Basic Curriculum

Rather than focusing on various groups or special programs to promote creative responses, it seems that educators should concentrate on providing individuals in all settings the opportunity to organize (utilize) existing elements and clearly perceive the purpose for which a student engages in this activity. Students can quickly mature in this kind of creativity. It is a very concrete process accessible to all from the most handicapped to the most gifted. It has a variety of forms and fits into the teaching/learning process at all levels. Such an approach allows for the fullest range of new, useful, or exciting creations that improve civilization. It enhances such actions and it avoids the denial of any individual's inalienable capacity to be creative. Perhaps most important to the educator, it is simply an articulation, an affirmation, of the essence of traditional curriculum.

Creativity as an Expression of the Curriculum

For more than a century American educators have been attempting to refine the objectives of public school curriculum. These purposes can be reduced to four fundamental components, most clearly evident in their practice in the elementary classroom: (1) language and the expressive arts, (2) mathematics, (3) science, and (4) social studies. Each of these components represents a specific type of thinking, a set of glasses through which each person perceives different aspects of the world. The assumption is that all four sets of glasses are necessary if a person is to maximize his or her personal understanding, effectiveness, and satisfaction.(21)

The distinction between these respective components can be recognized in the performance pattern of most elementary school teachers. For example, it is common practice to divide the school day into these four areas. A teacher tells her students, "Put away your reading books and get out your math books," or announces, "Now we are going to do science." At secondary levels, although the four segments of the curriculum pie are subdivided into smaller slices, the objective remains the same: prepare students to see the world around them by equipping them with these four special intellectual instruments. If any of the four sets of glasses are missing or defective, then students will be disadvantaged. Students will be unable to see and understand what otherwise might have sustained and improved their lives.

Each of the four tools has its own unique characteristics, its own conceptual emphasis, purpose, evaluative criterion and declaration.

The Value of Language and the Expressive Arts

The mechanism underlying Language and the Arts, for example, equips the individual to make personal, interpretive judgments. Properly fitted glasses in this area help individuals evaluate what is satisfying and dissatisfying, beautiful and ugly, according to aesthetic guidelines. It is a subjective approach to understanding and communicating feelings. Language and the expressive arts are means to this end. Prose, poetry, art, dance and music are specific examples of subject matter.

The Value of Mathematics

Mathematics trains a student to use the power of logical deductive thought. This instrument enables the person to validate and invalidate based on principles of internal consistency. With these glasses an individual can quantify and measure. Students learn to control and utilize matter by addressing it in terms of symbolic numbers and conceptual principles. They learn that 3 - 2 = 1, and they affirm the internal consistency of their knowledge by demonstrating that 2 + 1 = 3. Confidence is assured by the balance of the equation and the order that sustains the principles. The capacity to dissect the world with the language of numbers allows man to perceive order in nature and to make greater use of this natural order.

The Value of Science

Study of science is a way to develop the student's capacity to use empirical inductive thought. The elementary teacher who directs her students to plant a bean in a paper cup of soil and observe the consequences as sunlight and moisture are supplied is fitting these students with another set of glasses. She is teaching them how to confirm or disconfirm guesses about what might happen. She is equipping them with the methodology of prediction based on manifestations of natural law. She is providing them a tool by which they can access their physical environment by understanding both its discrete and complementary functions.

The Value of Social Studies

The hours spent discussing social studies is the educational optometrist's attempt to fit each student with a fourth set of glasses that will bring into focus another dimension of life. The ability to recognize and assess norms and values is the desired goal. Expertise in social science allows people to understand what is normal and not normal, and what different peoples consider desirable and not desirable. In its mature form this mode of thought is buttressed by the language of statistics which allows a student to communicate another form of prediction. Mr. Rogers' invitation to "Come on over to my neighborhood," a field trip to the fire station, a study of the Civil War, or a comparison of voting patterns in two different cultures are all examples of teaching students proficiency in normative/valuative thought.

The Four Objectives of Teaching

Fitting students with one or more of these four sets of glasses, or possibly the fifth set discussed below, is a helpful metaphor for teaching. These respective modes of learning each reveal a different dimension of life, just as the 35mm camera, X-ray machine, radar instruments, and sonar devices are each designed to help us capture different dimensions of existence. These four mechanisms constitute the basic frame of education.

Traditionally, elementary teachers are expected to have some expertise in all four areas. Their task is to help the student (1) find satisfaction through language and the expressive arts by combining skills and acquired aesthetic sensitivity, (2) use the instrument of numbers to validate deductively the application of theorems that have internal consistency, (3) experience the inductive empirical search for confirmation based on predictability, and (4) discover normative action through observation and statistical prediction. Secondary teachers are usually specialists who spend their time working with only one or two sets of these glasses. When the teacher does not possess these instruments, or when his or her vision is impaired by lenses with flaws and defects, students are likely to suffer. Concepts such as core curriculum and general education are intended to prevent such difficulties, but they are not always successful.

Creativity and the Four Curriculum Components

The relationship among creativity and the four curriculum components becomes clear as one examines (1) the subjective evaluative nature of the mechanism that underlies language and the expressive arts, (2) the convergent nature of logical deductive thought in mathematics, (3) the divergent nature of empirical inductive thought in science, and (4) the objective evaluative nature of normative/valuative thought in social studies. When viewed from this perspective, the fundamental mechanisms (knowledge structures) underlying the regular school curriculum clearly are nothing more than the primary elements of creative thought. Organizing existing elements, symbolically or empirically, is the mainstay of proficiency in each of the four segments of the regular curriculum, just as it is an exercising of the very capacities which constitute the substance of creativity.(22) (see attached chart)

Possible Impact on Teacher Training

This paper suggests the training of prospective teachers could focus on confirming the acquisition and the use of one or more of the four sets of glasses, rather than on merely the completion of particular courses for certification. Educators would recognize that all students possess the fundamental capacities for creative action, and that creative activity expands as students mature in their mastery of the four mechanisms that underlie conventional curriculum. Research efforts would focus on the connecting of content to methodology as well as on the acquisition of subject matter proficiency and pedagogical skills.

The Missing Component -- A Note on Balance

Historically, a fifth component was part of the educational curriculum of Western culture. This set of glasses equipped the students to see and understand the value of revealed standards of conduct and character. As useful and pertinent as the four components now used in American education are, many people feel the vacuum created by this missing set of glasses.(23) Contemporary curriculums in America are now largely devoid of any formal attempt to help students identify moral imperatives. As Irving Kristol and others have duly noted, textbooks no longer direct students in discerning right from wrong. The academic intellect is in disarray -- consensus has essentially evaporated and the nation's moral vision is impaired.

Some observers feel this is a critical curricular deletion. We make serious attempts to help students determine what is beautiful or ugly, valid or invalid, confirmed or disconfirmed, conforming or nonconforming; but there is little or no provision for any instrument that teaches what is right or wrong in an imperative sense. Critics of this condition frequently suggest that the perpetuation of such education may result in the demise of democratic society. Perhaps this challenge looms as the most vital test of our creativity.


A
Content Proficiency
B
Pedagogical Skills
Creative Function
Connecting A to B

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
SOCIAL STUDIES
LANGUAGE & ARTS
Objective Evaluative
Subjective Evaluative
?
Logical Inductive (Divergent)
Logical Deductive (Convergent)
SCIENCE
MATH

NJF/1987

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(1) A report on the experiment at State University of New York (SUNY) to incorporate a type of "structures of knowledge" emphasis related to teacher training and the four components of the curriculum is found in William E. Doll "Preparing for the Post-Industrial Society: Oswego's New Direction in Teacher Education," a paper presented at the AACTE meeting in Detroit, Mich., Feb. 23, 1983.

(2) Lee S. Shulman, "Those Who Understand: Knowledge Growth in Teaching" *Educational Researcher*, (February 1986), pp. 4-14.

(3) *Ibid*.

(4) William E. Rowerton, *Creativity: A Review of Theory and Practice (Wisconsin Research and Development Center: 1970)*, p. 15.

(5) It is recognized that an ongoing debate has existed between scholars who favor the early Greek philosophies that held creation to be the product of forming from existing matter and those who prefer the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo* -- making things out of nothing. However, even those who argue the necessity of the latter position because of certain Christian doctrines, such as the resurrection, acknowledge that anciently the common belief was that existing materials are required in order to create. For example, see Jonathon Goldstein "The Origins of the Doctrine of Creation Ex Nihilo" *Journal of Jewish Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 1, (Autumn 1984), who states "Believing Jews and Christians have long been convinced that their religion teaches that God created the world *ex nihilo*, from absolutely nothing. Yet medieval Jewish thinkers still held that the account of creation in Genesis could be interpreted to mean that God created from pre-existing formless matter, and ancient Jewish texts state that he did so." p. 127. In a response to Goldstein's article published in the same journal under the title "Creation Ex Nihilo Revisited: A Reply to Jonathon Goldstein, Spring, Vol. 37, No. 1, 1986, David Winston notes that "there is no evidence that the rabbis were especially attached to a doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*. Indeed there is prima facie evidence that such a doctrine was far from being commonly accepted by them." p. 91.

(6) Genesis 1:26-27, Matthew 5:48 (KJV).

(7) John 5:19.(KJV) cf. R.F. Biehler and J. Snowman, *Psychology Applied to Teaching*, 4th Ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1982). This text exhorts teachers to recognize that creative"....activities should center on originality and creativity. Copying, assembling, prefabricated kits, filling in sections on paint-by-number pictures, and similar activities are less desirable." p. 99.

(8) J.C. Gowan, G.D. Demos, and E.P. Torrance, Creativity: Its Educational Implications (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1967), p. 1.

(9) Rowerton, p. 15.

(10) Textbooks of educational psychology offer an insight into this confusion. See for example, David Ausubel, Educational Psychology: A Cognitive View, (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 1968). This text claims creativity is one of the most vague, ambiguous and confused terms in psychology and education. Steven V. Owen et al., Educational Psychology, 2nd Ed. (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1981). This text acknowledges that creativity remains as yet an elusive term and precise measurement is thus far impossible. Herber J. Klausmeir, Educational Psychology 5th Ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1985). This text leaves the impression that a sound body of knowledge regarding creativity exists and it is basically a matter of becoming informed.

(11) Brewstin Chiselin, The Creative Process (New York: The New American Library, 1952), pp. 21-22.

(12) D.N. Perkins, The Mind's Best Work (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 2.

(13) Perkins, p. 5.

(14) Perkins, p. 243. See also H.E. Gruber, G. Terrel, and M. Wertheim, Contemporary Approaches to Creative Thinking (New York: Antherton Press, 1962), p. x.

(15) The Nag-Hammadi, Ed. James M. Robinson, (New York: Harper & Row, 1977). Edgar Hennecke and Wilhelm Schneemelcher, New Testament Apocrypha, vols. 1 & 2 (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965). James H. Charlesworth, Ed. The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, 2 vols., (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1983 & 1985). Hugh Nibley "Apocryphal Writings" Tape transcript edited by F.A.R.M.S. Staff, given at a BYU Seminar held in Long Beach, CA, 1968.

(16) St. Augustine, Concerning the Nature of God, chapter XXVI.

(17) H.H. Anderson, Creativity and Its Cultivation, (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 1.

(18) B. Chiselin, p. 19.

(19) J.C. Gowan, p. 2.

(20) H.E. Gruber et al., p. x.

(21) Numerous recent studies address this vacuum. For example, Robert N. Bellah, *Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1985); A. James Reichley, *Religion in American Public Life* (Washington D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985); Richard Vetterli and Gary Bryner, *In Search of the Republic: Public Virtue and the Roots of American Government* (Totowa, Illinois: Roman & Littlefield, 1987); Neil J. Flinders, "Public School Textbooks: Reflections of a Shift in the Philosophical Foundations of American Education" *Proceedings of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society*, 1986. Paul C. Vitz, *Censorship: Evidence of Bias in our Children's Textbooks* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: Servan Books, 1986); Peter Dobkin Hall, *The Organization of American Culture, 1700-1900: Private Institutions, Elites, and the Origins of American Nationality* (New York: New York University Press, 1982).

(22) Project IMPLODE, *Igniting Creative Potential* (funded under Public Law 90-247, Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. Grant No. 54-70-155-I ESEA Title III. Copyright 1971, Bella Vista Elementary School, 2131 East 7000 S., Salt Lake City, Utah. Based on the research of Calvin W. Taylor, J.P. Guilford, and E. Paul Torrance. p. 1.

Response

CREATIVITY AND OTHER ORDINARY EVENTS

RESPONSE TO NEIL J. FLINDERS

Donald Arnstine
University of California, Davis

Neil Flinders' paper on creativity and teacher training offers us an unexpected surprise. He makes three major claims and then concludes that teacher training should remain pretty much what it has always been. The concept of creativity is central to his discussion. One would think that this focus on creativity would result in something new, or at least a little different. But Flinders surprises us, instead, with the familiarity of his conclusion.

How does he do this? First, he declares a very limited purpose for schooling that excludes aims which most people would find acceptable if not essential. Second, creativity is defined in such a way as to omit the characteristics of originality and value, features often associated with "creativity." Finally, he joins this rather thin notion of creativity with a narrowly academic notion of educational aims and arrives at the following, familiar program for teacher training: "If the emphasis in this paper is implemented," he writes, "the training of prospective teachers would focus on confirming the acquisition and use of one or more of the four [curriculum components], "that is, language and the arts, mathematics, science, and social studies. I will focus the remainder of my remarks on the manner in which Flinders has constructed his argument, and on what I take to be some important omissions from it.

The first of three major claims made by Flinders is presented as a "basic premise." He writes that the objectives of the public school curriculum "can now be reduced to four fundamental components (p. 6)." Each of these components "represents a specific type of thinking [by means of] which each person perceives different aspects of the world (p. 6)." First, language and the arts ... "Equips the individual to make personal, interpretive judgments; it is a subjective approach to understanding and communicating feelings (p. 6)." Mathematics enables one to quantify, measure, and utilize the principles of internal consistency. Science develops the pupil's capacity to use empirical, inductive thought. And the social studies cultivate the "ability to recognize and assess norms and values (p. 7)."

There are two fundamental problems with this quartet of curriculum studies. First, the study of each of them can and, in fact usually does, produce a variety of skills, attitudes, and understandings far broader than the ones mentioned by Flinders. And depending on how they are studied, none of the outcomes mentioned may result. Second and even more important, these four curriculum areas, and even the outcomes selected by Flinders, could hardly be characterized as the objectives of the public school curriculum. Whatever happened to the familiar aims of democratic citizenship;

reliable, efficient work habits; responsible family membership; ethical attitudes toward others; and so on?

It isn't clear why Flinders presented all of the foregoing as a "basic premise." Perhaps he thought a supporting argument could be avoided. But since his claims about school objectives and about the alleged benefits of curricular studies seem to be questionable if not false, he could help his case by trying to construct some arguments in its defense.

Flinders' second claim is about the concept of creativity. He rejects the notion that it is a mystical, inexplicable process, and instead defines it as "simply the act of organizing existing elements for some purpose...it is a very concrete process accessible to all (p. 5)." A useful feature of Flinders' definition is the fact that educators interested in promoting creativity need not limit themselves to working only with specially selected students, since creativity can be found in everyone. But Flinders pays a high price for this utility since, by his definition, any act at all can count as a creative act. If creativity is simply organizing existing elements for some purpose, then brushing one's teeth, washing dishes, and taking out the trash are all creative acts. Without getting mystical about it, I would suggest that most people think that creative acts are in some sense original and are uniquely valuable. By omitting these features, Flinders has offered a definition of creativity that cannot distinguish between creative and uncreative acts. Hence the concept can have no role to play in any theory.

Flinders' third claim is a combination of the first two. He writes, "Organizing existing elements [that is, creativity]...is the mainstay of proficiency in each of the four segments of the regular curriculum...(p 8)." It follows, then, that prospective teachers should acquire and use the four curriculum components (i.e., language and the arts, math, science, and social studies), since they must be creative in order to do it. This conclusion appears to follow from the claims previously advanced. Thus Flinders has given us a unique conception of the objectives of education, and he has banished the mystery from creativity. But he has created some new mysteries about teacher training. What would it mean to acquire proficiency in the curriculum through the employment of creativity? Does Flinders propose a new way of learning the familiar school curriculum? What would such learning be like? Is it like writing a poem or painting a picture or like reading a newspaper or adding a column of figures? Or is it like getting dressed or taking out the trash? Until Flinders can settle matters like these, we will have to call it creative when a teacher tells her students to read the chapter on pronouns and answer the questions on the ditto sheet.

EVERYDAY LIFE IN SCHOOLS:
ON THE MEANING OF BEING A PRINCIPAL

Rod Evans
The University of Calgary

In the following paper I would like to begin the task of reflecting on an actual school situation as it was described to me by a junior high school principal. The story, which was part of a larger research endeavour, is told first in the principal's own words. In the second part of the paper I would like to give thought to the principal's story in an effort to see in what way the story might be significant for the work of teachers, principals and educators generally in their everyday relations with children and young people. In the process I hope to be able to raise for discussion certain questions of pedagogy and the nature of pedagogic relations that seem to have been curiously neglected.

> In about forty minutes I have a parent coming in my office whose child was suspended along with another student -- though for the second student the case was totally different. This was two days ago when I dealt with a major disciplinary matter. In both cases the offence was the same -- the use of abusive language and challenging the authority of the teacher, in one case in the classroom and in the other case in the gym. So for me that was something I had to be concerned about, and it takes up a good chunk of my time.
>
> Junior High School Principal
> April 1987

In the case of the first student, we had an assembly last Tuesday morning to introduce the new principal. So students were expected to go down to the gym, homeroom by homeroom under the supervision of their teachers. Now on the way down there was one student who was chewing gum. Now chewing gum is a minor offence so far as the school is concerned. But we feel there are times when it could be allowed and not at other times, depending upon the circumstances. Anyway, in this case a student was chewing gum. I do not know whether he was blowing bubbles into other people's faces -- but the teacher told him to spit it out. Anyway, he decided to defy the teacher and was not very cooperative and gave the teacher a hard time. He would not obey the teacher and was reluctant to leave the gym. At that point the homeroom teacher stepped in and said to the boy: "Okay, go and spit your gum out" which he did. When the boy came back the homeroom teacher said: "Okay, now for the rest of the assembly you sit by my side" so he could keep a little closer supervision on him. Then the boy said "Fuck off" you know, or something like that ....

Now in my value system this kind of abusive language has no place in school. It has no place in the upbringing of a child. I know kids use it on the streets; they use it amongst themselves. It is one of the ways kids in junior and senior high schools want to prove themselves to their peers, and it becomes one of the ways by which they become accepted. I know this as an educator having worked with these kids. But all that said, still I cannot control what goes on among the peer relationships. But when it comes to school, well that is a formal place and such language cannot be tolerated. It is demeaning from my value system. Then when kids use that kind of language in the presence of a teacher it shows a lack of respect for that teacher and that teacher's authority. And the kids know that we are consistent in our treatment of that kind of abusive language. In my books the use of abusive language is a major offence. So at that point I told the guy that he is suspended for three days.

Of course, he said that he did not say "fuck off" to the teacher, he just said it in frustration. That may be so -- I am willing to accept that. But on the other hand any expression of his frustration in the presence of teachers and other students -- in other words in a public place -- is not acceptable.

To me it is important to make a distinction between a public behaviour and a private behaviour. We have even said that such language is not acceptable even among the peer group within the school confines. Suppose a teacher is passing by and he heard a student conversing with his peers and such language is used, we would still punish them. You see, within the confines of the school in any relationship be it student-teacher, student-student, whether in the hallways or classrooms or anywhere in or around the school, such language cannot be used. Because I am sure most parents attach a certain sanctity to the home. Likewise the school has a certain decorum. It is a learning place where you learn the right things and we discourage learning wrong things.

If the school is to be a real place of learning then it must command respect, just like churches command respect. You go into a church and right away it commands respect. When you go into a home -- and I talk about homes as we traditionally know them -- it commands a certain respect. And even a business place. Let us say you walk into a banker's office, it commands a certain respect and decorum and standards of behaviour. And I put schools in the same category. in other words it is a place whose decorum is defined in terms of certain standards that are expected. And as a principal I am responsible for creating this kind of environment, this decorum. I am in charge of that.

In this story we find ourselves in the presence of an everyday school situation. A rebellious teenager decides to break the rule which forbids chewing gum in school. He becomes verbally abusive and insulting when he is told to throw out his gum. What began as a straightforward case of rule-breaking has turned into something much more serious. For the principal it has become a major disciplinary matter that can no longer be ignored. Something important is at stake here. The principal feels that decisive action is called for. So the student is taken to the principal's office and given a three day suspension. It seems as if the problem can now be considered solved.

In a nutshell this is what the principal seems to be recommending to us, that to be a principal means being ready and willing to stand guard over the moral tone of the school. If a school is to be truly a school only certain things should occur. Swearing at teachers and chewing gum in public are ruled out as an affront to whatever it is that makes a school truly a school. What the principal seems to be saying is that to be an educational administrator requires first of all a grasp of what it is schools stand for, not in any technical sense, but rather in the way that we would wish to ask why we should have schools in the first place. And secondly, as the principal makes plain, it requires the taking of a stand on behalf of, or in the service of, this understanding. The principal shows us that there is a kind of protective quality to the work of educational administration. The principal is called upon to articulate and defend what it is that makes a school a special and distinctive kind of place. The task is now that of excluding all those activities that cannot be collected under the idea of school. A certain kind of understanding is required.

But let us return to the incident in the gym. The situation is in many ways classic. A restless adolescent decides to test the limits of the gum rule in full view of teachers and other students. We can well imagine the flagrant, even ostentatious way in which this could have been done. A chance for glory perhaps? In the eyes of the principal this seems to be a clear cut case of insubordination that cannot be tolerated. It was, he says, "a major disciplinary matter" that could not be ignored. And yet at the same time do not educators need to ask about the conditions under which growth in self-awareness can be achieved? About how growth to responsible adulthood can become a real possibility for us.

As educators we realize that growing up and becoming adult is never the result of the passive accommodation of self to the contours of an already existing world. Where such accommodation occurs, it leads rather to an abbreviated sense of self -- a truncated consciousness which never becomes aware of one's possibilities for becoming. Real growth exists in a reciprocal, or better, a dialectical encounter with the world in which limits and boundaries are seen not as immutably fixed, points of reference to which one must somehow accommodate oneself, but rather as that which must constantly be striven against. It is only through such striving, such testing-of-limits that one becomes, in a sense, fully human. Paradoxically, it is in our encounter with limits that we become aware of the limited yet at the same time limitless-ness of the world. The human project of growing up requires by its very nature a constant encounter with limits, a constant pushing or testing of limits as part of the vocation of becoming truly human. The existence of limits, of limitation, can in this sense be seen as pedagogically necessary -- part of the stuff of which pedagogy is made. The absence of limits means the absence of striving. A truly unlimited world would preclude the very possibility of pedagogy. That is why those who would advocate total and unlimited freedom for children have already forgotten that it is only in our experience of limitation that full humanization can become a possibility for us.

How does this relate to the situation in the gym? It seems that for this principal it is the rule that counts. It is the rule as the concrete expression of limitation to which one must orient. But already what is missing here is the sense that the rule (experienced as limitation) is already something essential to growth. A recognition that education in a deeper sense requires the continual questioning, probing, testing of limit as a condition of its own existence. As a process of self-formation education, begins and takes its point of departure in the dialectical interplay of self and world. Only when we encounter world as world, i.e., as that which offers its own resistances do we ourselves become aware of the boundaries, and thus possibilities, of our own existence. We ex-ist.

This is the pedagogic significance of rules. It is not -- as some of the more radical critics of education suggest -- that children would be better off without them; that all we need to do is throw out the rules and children would be freed to grow unfettered and untrammelled. But it is to say that the rules themselves are not the things. This is what a strong reading of this event would want to make clear. That for an educator more is involved here than just the repairing of a broken rule.

We can now pose the question as to whether the principal understands the situation in such terms. Although there is some evidence in the story that the principal understands that the swearing was the result of the boy's frustration he is not ready, it seems, to permit such understanding to interfere with his task of maintaining acceptable behaviour in school. For this principal any "expression of frustration" in the presence of teachers or other students is simply not acceptable and must be punished.

Perhaps it is a question of conventionality, of ensuring that students understand and abide by socially approved standards of behaviour. In a way it is and in a way it is more than that. Teachers, after all, are people "in authority" and the use of such language in or around the presence of a teacher could be seen to constitute an erosion of such authority. To be effective, authority is often thought of as something that needs to be guarded and protected. Because it is vulnerable it must be shielded from attacks and encroachments of various kinds. Only when it has been "secured" can it do its work and perform its effects. That is why the principal tells us that in his books the use of abusive language is a "major offence...that cannot be tolerated."

But what is it precisely such language abuses? For the principal it seems to be a threefold abuse. Such language abuses not only the teacher and the teacher's authority but also (and more importantly) the overall tone or pedagogic atmosphere of the school. It is this (last) abuse that constitutes for this principal the heart of the problem. "The school has a certain decorum" says the principal, "It is a learning place where you learn the right things and we discourage learning the wrong things."

It is here that the principal begins to come to grips with the question concerning the nature of school. He raises a crucial question. He asks: What does school name? What makes a school uniquely and identifiably school? Here, (and in the lines that follow) we encounter a concern for whatness. The principal expresses a concern for difference, for what makes a school a school and not some alternative kind of social organization. At the same time the principal is also implicitly recommending that this is what educational administrators must do. To be a principal, in other words, is to raise the question concerning the special meaning of school. It is to ask ongoingly about the special nature of school as that to which one must orient as principal.

To be a principal then, is to orient oneself to questions of whatness. And when this principal addresses the question of meaning he formulates and expresses certain feelings and dispositions. He speaks of a particular kind of tone or atmosphere that a school (to be a school) must possess. In other words he makes topical for us his view of what a school is and, at the same time, his view of what (commensurately) a principal must be.

In the mind of this principal there exists an indissoluble reciprocity between the notion of "principal" and the idea of "school." A reciprocity born not of any kind of theoretical formulation but of life (experience) itself. To be a principal, in other words, is to have some sense of the essence or particularity (the what-ness) of schools. And for this principal the question of what-ness is bound up not solely with the idea of school as a place of academic learning, but more importantly with the idea of school as a place "where you learn the right things and we discourage learning wrong things." In short with the idea of school as morally oriented. As educators we sense here that the principal has grasped something exceedingly important about the nature of schools and the task of administering them.

What we see at work here is the principal reaching toward a more profound and basic notion of school. His talk is animated neither by considerations of a merely technical nature nor by managerial preoccupations of one kind or another, but by a more foundational attempt to grasp what it is that makes a school truly a school. But the question is difficult. We are on slippery ground here. It is not easy to grasp what constitutes the essence of school. Yet what the principal seems to be saying is that what makes a school truly a school is the presence of a certain atmosphere or ethos which commands by its very presence a certain attitude or state-of-mind. A certain discipline perhaps? A discipline by which one orients to the value of learning as that which is worth orienting to. It is a discipline which, at the same time as it opens one to the value of learning, also sponsors an understanding of the conditions learning imposes. For the principal this ethos or atmosphere is inseparable, (we might say indistinguishable) from the idea of school. It is what a school must have for it to be truly school. In a sense it is what school names. To be a principal is not only to recognize that this is so, but to act so as to bring into being (incarnate) this atmosphere, this collective consciousness.

And yet when the principal begins to reflect on his role as principal he thinks largely in terms of the responsibility he believes he has for maintaining (producing?) a certain kind of learning "environment" within the school. "And as principal I am responsible for creating this environment -- this decorum. I am in charge of that." For the principal this "decorum" is necessary if the school is to be "a real place of learning." And although we do not know for sure, it sounds as if this environment is roughly equivalent to abiding by certain rules and regulations, (not chewing gum; not using abusive language), and to maintaining, amongst other things, certain status differentials between students and teachers: "When kids use that kind of language in the presence of a teacher it shows lack of respect for that teacher and that teacher's authority." Maintaining an "environment" of this kind is what the principal suggests it means to be a responsible administrator.

And yet a troubled notion of school emerges in these lines. We might make a distinction here between orienting to what we might regard as a pedagogic standard and orienting to that which the standard produces. And for this principal what the standard produces seems to be a conventionalized sense of schools as places that exude a certain scholarly tone, insist on the importance of status differentials, refuse to allow children to chew gum, use abusive language and so on and so forth. As places, in short, that possess what the principal calls a certain decorum. Of course, we must be clear that what is at issue here is not whether such features are bad or wrong or somehow inappropriate -- this is not the question -- but whether they in themselves constitute the totality of the way we are to speak of schools and the task of administering them.

But let us return once more to the situation in the gym. The principal tells us that the boy in question is guilty of using abusive language in the presence of teachers and other students. Of course we cannot be pleased this has occurred. But what is it precisely that such language abuses? For the principal it seems to be a threefold abuse. Such language abuses the teacher, the teacher's authority, and it abuses the overall tone and atmosphere of the school. For the principal such language cannot be tolerated. It cannot be tolerated because it strikes at the heart of the very idea of school as a special place with its own ethos and way-of-being. What such language shows is a disrespect for what it is a school stands for: "A place where you learn the right things."

This is not an uncommon view of schools. We can see how the principal might understand schools in this way. And yet something is still pedagogically troublesome. As educators we need to remind ourselves of the importance of doing a strong reading of this situation. Doing a strong reading is not a question being ultra-critical or pedantic. The attempt is not to find fault when we all know how difficult it is to act appropriately in all circumstances. Principals are human too. But it is a question of adopting a committed stance to questions of educational administration and of searching for some animating principle that could serve as a common orientation to the everyday events and incidents that confront us as educators.

What would a strong reading of this situation entail? In my view it would involve the recognition that in place of a pedagogic orientation what we see the principal orient to is a certain image or appearance of pedagogy rather than pedagogy itself. A kind of pedagogic facade. We see this in the way that the principal regards Robert's swearing as "a major disciplinary matter" and as something that "challenged" the authority of the teacher. And yet from a pedagogic perspective we would want to see this situation less as something that threatens the teacher's authority, than as something that is constitutive of it. In a sense as the raw material of which pedagogy is made. It is what enables a pedagogue to be a pedagogue. A true pedagogue is less likely to say, "You cannot use such language in my presence, it is insulting and demeaning to me and erodes my authority as a teacher" as much as he or she is likely to realize that as a teenager it can be a very belittling experience to feel treated as a child and to feel put down in full view of one's friends. Furthermore, a pedagogically sensitive adult understands the child's need to save face in public and that the act of swearing at a teacher could well be an unreflective response to such a need. As educator he or she sees the task as trying to save this situation in such a way that growth can occur and the pedagogic relation preserved.

I think we need to ask what is exemplified by the principal's story. What is being recommended here? In a sense what this principal appears to be saying is that to be an educational administrator is to orient not to the idea of pedagogic standard, but rather to that which stands in place of a pedagogic standard, namely to a set of rules: do's and don'ts. Or as the principal prefers to call it, a certain decorum. But while the principal recognizes that schools embody (or should embody) certain values, there is a question here of what these values might be. We might say that while the principal grasps the iconic character of schools that for which the icon stands as icon slips through his fingers. What remains is a mere semblance (outer casing) of the thing itself. Yet the power of any icon derives not from the icon itself, (for in itself it is no-thing) but from the animating idea (spirit, vision) which in-forms it and from which the icon draws its strength, its shape and its power.

The point for us as educators is that, without a grasp, however tentative, of this in-forming vision behaviour becomes ritualistic. It becomes merely ritual insofar as it forgets or fails to remember that behind the icon lie deep human needs that give form and shape and justification to the icon in the first place. And with this forgetfulness comes the danger that the icon may come to rule the vision. Then the vision can exist only in an attenuated (which is to say distorted) form. In an age consumed by various forms or styles of technicist thinking it seems we live perpetually in the shadow of this danger.

But the vision needs help. It needs ministering. Left to its own devices it cannot do so well. To work its effects it needs a certain space free from encroachments of one kind or another. In a sense this is what the idea of school provides -- a space within which the informing (pedagogic) vision can be ministered to. This is the principal's charge. It is what in a deep sense he is charged with. Pedagogy is not something that stands at our command to be put to use whenever the occasion serves. It is not use-full in the same sense that we might find a tool or implement useful. Pedagogy does not serve our purposes so much as we serve (minister to) it. In a curious reversal, pedagogy turns the tables and makes of us the instruments of its accomplishment. This is why we need to see a pedagogic orientation less as something we are "in charge of" than as something that charges (empowers) us.

How much of this does the principal see? Or does his preoccupation with the idea of school as a "formal place" where certain things "cannot be tolerated" overwhelm a more primordial, pedagogic sense of schools as places that exist to allow children to come to terms with themselves and the world around them? This is not to say that rules are not required or that a certain tone or decorum may not be warranted. But it is to say that neither the rules nor the decorum are the things themselves. This is not what schools ultimately stand for.

This is what a strong reading of this situation would want to make clear. It would wish to do so not from any desire to be needlessly cynical or nihilistic in any way, but rather from a desire to strengthen and inform our grasp of what it means to be a principal. This, after all, is the primary and basic question. It comes before all those other questions which ask, for example, about the role of the principal, or the functions of the principalship. And yet it is a question which is seldom asked in any thoughtful or self-reflective way. Is this because we feel we know the answer? Or is it because we feel the question will yield little in the way of useful knowledge? Either way it remains neglected and unasked.

And yet in another way the question is inescapable. Here I am thinking not so much in terms of various kinds of conceptualizations that have been developed, but rather about the way in which the question, (What does it mean to be a principal?) is ongoingly answered by principals in their everyday encounters with students, parents, teachers and others. In a much less self-conscious way principals answer the question every day in the way in which they deal with troublesome children, irate parents and anxious teachers for example. Or with the "problem" of gum-chewing, or the "problem" of swearing for instance. Of course, such answers are always provisional. By their very nature they can never exhaust the totality of what it means to be a principal. And yet being a principal, an educational administrator, does not mean just anything. That is the point of this paper, to try to work out in relation to a concrete situation of practice just what it does mean to be a school principal. I would call this activity decisive. And yet strangely it is the most neglected and forgotten activity of all.

THE CLASSROOM: A FORUM FOR MORAL EDUCATION

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In consideration of the question, "Where have we gone so morally wrong?", Robert Bellah speaks of the conflict between traditional American individualism and the need for a communal value system. He suggested that individualism in our society comes directly from and has been directed by such diverse influences as the frontier, free enterprise, and the intellectual community from Alexis de Tocqueville, French philosopher and observer of American life in the early 19th century, to Ralph Waldo Emerson's essay "Self-Reliance," and Walt Whitman's emblematic poem "Song of Myself" which furthered dramatically the idea of individualism in the late 19th century.

Bellah sees American individualism as the cause of such seemingly unconnected events in recent history as the freeway shootings in L.A., the actions of the so-called "conspirators" in the Iran-Contra events, and the unethical activities of Wall Street as personified by Ivan Boesky. Americans searched inside of themselves for values, for their value orientation, but that kind of individualism created a "detached individual" as noted by the California philosopher, Josiah Royce. This detachment, of course, would preclude a full involvement in public life which our Constitution and our Republic demand. This is not to say, according to Bellah, that our citizenry does not believe in basic religious values and civic republicanism. But what arises out of competing value systems is a kind of inaction that at best is disturbing and at worst, destructive as can be seen by the examples cited above.

Dr. Bellah is convinced that the schools should "convey to students moral values and traditions, in an open way" by emphasizing that, despite his belief that all of us have an underlying value system based on basic "religious" standards and "civic republicanism," there is no one, right, correct version. But there seems to be a "version" that pertains to us all in a communal manner. In his research (connected with habits of the heart) he "found that students while claiming no common moral direction, actually espoused similar concepts of what constituted morally correct public and private behaviour."(5)

The schools have made many attempts at reconciling individual values and communal regulatory principles by employing various programs for moral development. The work of the Values Clarification people: Simon, Kirschenbaum, et al. and that of Lawrence Kohlberg on the stages of moral development amply illustrate an ongoing involvement with moral education from the earliest grades through the university. In the case of the Values Clarification people, the method seemed to imply a moral relativism that negated its worth. This may be so. Nonetheless, I agree with Barry Chazan who remarks in his summary chapter on Values Clarification that its "importance lies in the fact that it is a symbolic barometer of the frustration and the hope of the world of education vis a vis the values domain...as a statement of dissatisfaction" with past approaches and "a belief that values education" still "is an honorable and crucial function of schools."(1)

Chazan maintains that the fashioning of practical educational strategies and programs in moral education is a most complex procedure. It requires a joint enterprise for philosophy and education."(2) At the same time, small attempts in classrooms can also be made.

Consider my own department of English literature. Here, it seems to me, is one of the most fruitful areas of consideration for the teaching of ethics. Alasdair MacIntyre, in After Virtue goes to literature from Plato to contemporary writers such as William Gass, a philosopher better known for his short stories, to find and understand the place of "virtue" in our lives. He particularly interprets the work of Jane Austen as determining that self-knowledge was "both an intellectual and a moral virtue."(3) His use of both content and form to illustrate moral philosophy and method is worth considering.

As a student I pored over the life of Emma Bovary, wondering sometimes for days whether it was boredom or desire that compelled her to act. What choices would I have made? Wuthering Heights was, for me, a dramatic novel about choices versus obligations. To this day I can remember agonizing over my loyalties to the various characters. Oh how I wanted Heathcliff to triumph! I was struck with the fact that even in the throes of a decision that seemed correct, Cathy grieved for what she had to leave behind, the compromises that she was forced with which to live.. I might also suggest the works of philosopher-writer Iris Murdoch whose characters embody certain vices, such as self-centeredness and moral characteristics as well and provide interesting and rewarding situations to contemplate, weight, and experience vicariously.

Three works that are suitable for grades 8 through 12, are by Willa Cather, Galway Kinnell, and Elizabeth Tallent. First, consider Willa Cather's moving short story, "Paul's Case." This is a story of a young man so taken with the material rewards of life that he is not afforded because of his lowly family economic status and the provinciality of his town and becomes a thief and flees from arrest to the Big City. There he becomes an usher in a theatre where he remains until the fear (and possibly guilt) of being found out so overcomes him that he goes to the train tracks where he inextricably falls back "into the immense design of things." The fact that this story was written more than 50 years ago, before MTV, makes it all the more poignant for young people who cannot only see some of themselves in Paul, but shudder with awe at the idea of this cosmic, communal hold materialism has on us all.

The second example comes from the work of Galway Kinnell, a poet, who writes frequently about simple natural events: The kind of Nature that is irrational, unemotional, and affecting. His poem, "The Bear," deals with the pursuit by a hunter (either real or imagined) who goes after a bear in the woods. In order to track his prey, the seeker must become somewhat like the animal he stalks, and in so doing begins to lose his humanness, becomes bear-like, and perhaps in doing so fixes his own end. For if one becomes as an animal, then one may well be required to live, and die, as one as well. For Kinnell, this may not be such a terrible thing. As the poem ends, the hunter dreams of lurching out, even in death, to a kind of "transcendence."

The last example from literature for use with secondary students is Elizabeth Tallent's recent novel, Museum Pieces. Although this book is quite accessible, and thus "easy" to read, its power comes not from its facile exterior but from the complexity of its characters: two teenagers and their misaligned and often disgruntled parents. Because the book in its form attempts to develop a point of view for all of the characters, chapter by chapter, teenage readers have a chance to experience not only the lives of their two peers, but to look at the situations engendered by contemporary life that the adults face as well. Tara and Nat, the two young girls in question, often seem to be standing still while the tortuous lives of their parents swirl around them.

Chapter 2 begins:

> "Tara doesn't know who she wishes she was. In the orchard behind Nat's house, squinting down the length of her body and Nat's, side by side, she had played a game of seeing whether she could forget, for a moment, whose leg was whose, because their legs were not much different, in dirty running shorts, the brown knees puckered with scabs of various sizes and resistance to picking, the heels horny and cracked from going barefoot, especially if she viewed them through the prismatic haze of her wet, lowered eyelashes, wet because she had just drunk her fill from the cold copper nozzle of the garden hose while Nat held the arc of water steady with her thumb."(4)

There is a whole world that is standing still for these girls, waiting for them to grow up, make judgments, decide what is right, and how to lead their lives. I would contend as does MacIntyre that the best of literature not only allows vicarious experience into worlds otherwise unavailable to us, but also shows us human beings contemplating moral dilemmas and resolving them in ways that are useful as examples.

Using literature in this way can be connected with other activities which enrich the literary experience as well. Writing fiction works particularly well in this context because it not only gives the student a chance to experience the opportunity to order one's world out of chaos, a purpose that many professional writers embrace, but also provides another position from which to discuss ethical considerations.

In the classroom I have found a wide variety of moral systems and even a strong streak of amorality. I assigned my students in English class this past year a supplementary activity: the task of polling friends, family and neighbors in our small middle-class, ethnically diverse community. The significant personal values that they and their respondents listed included: honesty, self-respect, responsibility, integrity and personal freedom. On the side of public values the students included: honor, peace, equality of opportunity, democracy, and the pursuit of happiness. These findings inspired us in our discussion about the stories and poems that we were reading and led to writing stories of our own, using the context of our own experiences.

Aided and abetted by Professor James Jarrett and Peter Kahn, both at Berkeley, I then proceeded with a trio of situations upon which the student writers expanded. This exercise became another opportunity for learning. The writers developed some unusual solutions to the situations that required a particular moral stance, especially when perceived on several different levels. As we read aloud and discussed the papers, the various moral insights could be shared with all the students.

The first assignment was: "Someone did something he or she at first thought was right, but then discovered to be wrong." What was remarkable to me, as their teacher and who was sometimes inured to what was going on with them, was how easily, how readily, they responded to the writing assignment. We are still not sure what will come out of this experience, but we will return to the classroom with some of the same students this fall.

In conclusion, it seems obvious that with the help of the philosophical community and schools of education the debate on moral considerations must continue and must be allowed to filter down to the practitioners, who after all actually encourage, influence and direct the students' thinking on these matters. We must work to illuminate the communal values we hold without sacrificing our commitment to individualism.

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(1) Barry Chazan, Contemporary Approaches to Moral Education: Analyzing Alternative Theories, (Teachers College Press: Columbia University, New York and London, 1985), p. 67.

(2) Ibid., p. 119.

(3) Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 1984), p. 241.

(4) Elizabeth Tallent, Museum Pieces, (New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1985), p. 13.

(5) Robert Bellah, address to Commonwealth Club of California, August 21, 1987.

Galway Kinnell, Selected Poems, Galway Kinnell, (Houghton Mifflin Co., Boston, Mass., 1982).

SOCRATES' PRACTICE IN PLATO'S APOLOGY

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Let us begin a search for the notion of human practice. Let us not be taken off course by our usual connotations of practice as the application of theory or practice as that which always escapes science or theory.

In what sense could there be a science that does not conform to modern science having its beginning with Galileo and his carefully worked out method combining Aristotelian induction, a knowledge of mathematics and of nature? What was it that science meant before this mark of the modern age?

In Platonic and Aristotelian times science was an all-encompassing term for "specialized knowledgeableness and any true knowledge."(1) Up until the time of Plato, the Greek words *episteme* and *techne* were linked. They carried the meaning of being completely at home in something, understanding and being able to make one's way in something.(2) But Plato distinguished between *techne* and true knowledge. *Techne*, as a skill or craft, conforms to the earlier meaning of knowledge in the sense that one can learn the properties of the materials with which one is working and the appropriate methods and procedures one must go through in order to fashion a product. But true knowledge is not of this model.

Aristotle also differentiates *techne* from knowledge. Science or knowledge could be divided between theoretical knowledge, which included physics, mathematics and metaphysics, and practical knowledge which concerns man as a political being.(3) Here, theory and practice find their home within knowledge. That is, they are different forms of knowledge, but each is knowledge. *Techne* does not fall within practical knowledge because the choices and decisions made in the practice of a *techne* are not political. Practice, insofar as it is knowledge and not *techne*, concerns man in his relations with other human beings.

Our question then is in what sense can this practice be called a science? We want to understand how it can be that practice is not just jumbled up actions.

Practical knowledge has to do with how one conducts one's life, whether one desires pleasure, power or knowledge above all else. It also has to do with how we shall conduct ourselves in the relations we have with others, whatever these may be given our place in the family and in society.(4) Practical knowledge is demonstrated by the person who knows and is able to do exactly what is required of him in a given situation.

We have in Plato's *Apology* a prime example of practical knowledge at work. Here, standing as the practitioner of philosophy, concerned with unearthing the good in people's minds and lives, Socrates is faced with the awful temptation of winning his life by the persuasive power of words. Speaking in his own defense, the awful choice between serving truth and risking not being understood and using his skill in speaking to sway the jury in his favor could not have had a more poignant meaning. For the charge against him was this very kind of tampering with knowledge and truth, and thus corrupting the youth of Athens through speech.

How Socrates conducts himself in his own defense demonstrates practical knowledge and differentiates for us between what is good and what is expedient. In the person of Meletus, one of Socrates' accusers, we are led through Socrates' words to behold the sophist. Meletus' accusation comes forth not from concern for the youth of Athens. He has no ties to and no interest in the cause for the sake of which he indicts Socrates. He speaks not from the heart of the matter. His attack on Socrates resides in the realm of public opinion, and he can raise no proof as to the truth of his allegation.

The causelessness and hollowness of Meletus' accusation points to the power of public opinion, the sway of the general belief. But Socrates' unswerving steadfastness to the truth and goodness of his life work, and consequently to truth in his speech as he makes his defense, stands in bold contrast to the swaying power of the general belief. The great calamity is not that Socrates might be put to death, that he might suffer this ordeal or one similar like banishment. The great calamity is that Meletus and other accusers bring before the court of justice a groundless charge in attempting to put an innocent man to death.(5) Defeat lies not in receiving the death sentence. It is not a deviation from practical knowledge that death be the result of one's efforts. Rather, defeat would lie in Socrates' laying down his cause as though this were not ultimately important but only a bluff. Then, would Socrates' accusers win the day and public opinion be feared and honored.

Rather than plotting his own safe-keeping, even as he went about his mission incurring hatred for the sake of good, or admonishing others and himself for giving attention to acquiring money, reputation, honor, and for giving no attention to truth and understanding, Socrates might have more perspicuously given up such an unpopular mission if it were his own life he sought to protect. That is, the cunning, worldly savoir-faire or thought-taking for one's own life is the very antinomy of the mission he would carry out. Guarding his own interest was not the guiding principle of his life work. That this kind of practical know-how should be brought to speech in Socrates' defense and that such know-how presents itself to Socrates as the very means by which his life might be saved illumines the real nature of the conflict.

What is at risk in the possibility of his not being understood is not Socrates' life. When he claims that he is quite aware of the nature of his task(6) in speaking in his own defense, it is not his own acquittal he has in mind. The atrocity he would prevent is an unknowing decision of the jurors which would betray their office in the service of justice and betray the cause Socrates has devoted his life to serve. Not to recognize what is at stake in the trial of Socrates' life is mischief in the worst possible way committed by those men chosen as guardians of the good and the just. What is at risk in Socrates' not being understood is that a greater calamity than Meletus' groundless indictment shall come to pass in the form of a thoughtless sentence in the name of justice. The great import of Socrates' trial lies not in the life or death question but in whether or not the good will be recognized.

In not minding after his own life but devoting his speech in service of the cause for which he spent his life in dialogue with others, particularly the youth of Athens, Socrates takes a stand entirely with the mission that gave him reason for living. To have done anything less in his speech would be to doubt the veracity of what he stood for in his life work. While we may think it only human nature to waiver, to doubt, it is Socrates' unflinching commitment to act and speak in only one way, as the voice of the cause which gave him reason for living that demonstrates to us the unmistakable difference between practical knowledge and sophistry.

It is Socrates' immovable conviction of the goodness and truth of the cause for the sake of which he acts and speaks; it is this conviction that enables him not to be overcome by the thought of the immediacy of his own death, not to be overcome by this fear and so lose his words and composure in coming to his own defense. This is nowhere more marked than in Socrates' words to the members of the jury, first to those who voted against him and second to those who voted for him, after he had received the verdict. Here, he speaks to inform the latter group of the proper way of regarding his fate. And he refers precisely to the conviction that was at no point in the midst of his speaking in his own defense interrupted by that prophetic voice which had always been his constant companion and which had checked him whenever he would go off course.(7) His composure was a function of his having given himself totally to the cause for which he spoke.

This unswerving behavior is a clear contrast with Meletus' words and deeds. Though Meletus swore an affidavit against Socrates on two grounds, Socrates shows that Meletus is not capable of holding to his word on either ground. With regard to the allegation of corrupting the minds of the young, Meletus cannot at first say who it is that has a beneficial influence, thus evincing his lack of concern in the cause which he has stated and sworn to. That Meletus' charge comes forth not from the interest held in mind by the law safeguarding against such practices which would corrupt the minds of the youth; that his drawing on the law is rather to serve some other purpose is the reason for Meletus' vulnerability with regard to the meaning of his accusation. Because he has no real interest in the welfare of the youths whose interest the law he would call upon has in mind, Meletus is easily led wherever Socrates' speaking leads him. Having conceded that no man prefers to be harmed rather than benefited, Meletus is then led by Socrates to conclude that Socrates could not intentionally make the characters of his companions worse, for then he would run the risk of being harmed by them. Socrates' arguments seek not to establish what must be the case by means of logic. They did not free him of the allegation against him, but demonstrate Meletus' inability to keep before his eyes that to which he not long ago had sworn. In this way also, Socrates speaks not to defend his life, but in speaking practices the cause to which he devoted his life's work.

The lack of guiding power that Meletus' affidavit has for his responses to Socrates is most obvious when Socrates brings Meletus to assert that Socrates disbelieves in gods altogether. In this assertion Meletus contradicts his sworn statement that Socrates believes in deities of his own invention instead of the gods recognized by the state.(8) That Meletus is so easily taken off course is evidence that he does not know what he swore to know. If his affidavit cannot guide and steer his course through the confusion of ideas Socrates brings to speech, then his word is of no more value than the confusion of ideas Socrates brings Meletus to stand in.

The fact that Meletus goes back on his word brings into sharp relief the intransigence of Socrates' position. Having devoted his life to bringing to light the good and true in himself and others, having fashioned his life and being in this manner, Socrates could not doubt or deny the cause which gave him reason for living. If he were to depart from this way of living for fear of death, he would not only make a mockery of his life work by claiming that only now had he come to his senses, but he would commit an offense much more grave. Not only would his departure now under stress of imminent death show that in his life he was merely going along with his idea of how he ought to live as one goes along with a group of friends not really knowing what it is they are about. But what would be infinitely more grave would be the sudden taking into his own hands of his life. Were Socrates now to abandon the conduct of his living and speaking formed in the service of the good and the true and speak on his own behalf, then would that prophetic voice sound its alarm and arrest his speech. To speak for himself would be for Socrates to speak as one knowing better than that which gave him the very capacity he would now use for himself. To depart from service to the cause that had been the guiding force of his life and to now use words in order to save his life would assume an arrogance that such a person as he knows better on his own what should be said and done.

If Socrates were to depart from his way of living and acting for fear of death, he would be behaving as though he had not been called to duty. Then he could justly be called to task as any other incumbent who had neglected his duty and deserted his post. If he were to behave as if the threat of death meant a freedom to abscond from his post and to do anything he chose, then would he enter the realm of confusion that Meletus was found standing in; then would he lose his way in making decisions and choosing courses of action.

Rather than being brought to task on grounds of neglecting his duty and behaving irresponsibly, Socrates is summoned to court on a frivolous charge. His prosecutor proved himself incapable of holding to his own sworn statement. This unfounded charge is nothing Socrates need defend himself against. But what is preposterous is that this statement, which can be now one way and now another according to its author, is what brings him to trial as though it were the gravest of matters having his life at stake.

But what is really at stake is something more than convincing the jury that he is not guilty of the charge brought against him. For to reply on this level Socrates would really be guilty of corrupting minds when his duty was to uphold the good. If, in order to free himself of this groundless charge, Socrates had played upon the minds of the jury, pleading on behalf of his family, his growing sons who would suffer irreparable wrong, that his life be spared, then would Socrates be guilty of attending to the lesser charge and losing sight of his first duty. If Socrates had behaved as if the charge brought against him were cause for his swooning, he, standing aghast at the thought that all along he had been serving evil while only thinking he was serving good, then would it have been a real trial of whether or not this man was guilty of the charge brought against him. But Socrates is not bothered by what the general public, the people of Athens think. He is not moved on this account.

For what is at stake is not the truth or falsity of the charge brought against him. It is only what is always at issue: whether or not Socrates will heed the call to serve the good. His cause in the court room is not what the jury and spectators take it to be. For Socrates there is no unfounding and questioning of the value of his life's work. There is no placing it in an awful void. Hence, he is able to maintain perfect composure as he gives himself to the cause it is his duty to uphold. Keeping his attention fixed on the cause that calls him to duty, he does not behave as though his life's work would have been in vain unless now, in this one consummate moment, before the people of Athens, the real nature of his life's work is brought into the open. This is not the crux of the matter. It is only that Socrates devote himself to upholding the good as he has done in the past. He cannot say or know whether it will come to pass that the jurors will understand. His task is only to abide by his cause in what he says. But what would be tragic, and what Socrates recognizes as the nature of his task to prevent, is that the caretakers of justice should mistake where justice lies and thus pass judgment as speaking on their own and not fulfilling their duty.

We have in Socrates' practice an acceptance and fulfillment of the task that was set before him. In giving himself to that task, he gives up a willful planning and directing to bring about what he would have be the result. He resigns himself to the task at hand not fatefully, but as his only proper role. That is, it would be out of place for him to comprehend the entire situation of his being summoned to court now, of grasping in advance what he must accomplish and how he must orchestrate the scene to bring about such a foreseen result. Socrates is less the conductor and more one of the players. Giving himself to his proper role he relinquishes the urge to conduct the scene, to behave as though he could stand outside it and rule what must come about and how it shall come about. In humility he takes up his role and in firm conviction decides that this is his duty.

But the taking up of his role is nothing passive. Seeing what is called for, seeing this as the custodian of the good and coming into play in this way forms what is coming to pass. The coming into being of what Socrates sees needful, seeing as the caretaker of the good, is what illumines the real nature of the trial. Without his vigilance and active duty in the service of good, there would be nothing formed in the proceedings in court that would bear witness to the function he must need do as officer of the good. Resignation to imminent death, despairing of the value of good in human life, even now as he stands in court speaking in his own defense, would be to give up the cause. Taking up one's duty means that one's acts are consequential and that what shall come to pass depends upon one's alertness to how it is that one must fulfill one's duty. And in Socrates' caring and attention to what good would come into being, we have as a result the Apology, and Plato's works evoking throughout the centuries the same care for the good that was Socrates' life's mission.

Practice is science in the sense that there is a law to which one must submit oneself in what one attends to, in seeing what is relevant, what calls for action and in guiding and forming what one must say and do.

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(1) Hans-Georg Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science, trans. F. Lawrence, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1981), p. 89.

(2) Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, trans. W. Lovitt, (New York: Garland Publishing, Inc., 1977), p. 13

(3) Gadamer, p. 89.

(4) Ibid., p. 91.

(5) Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, Eds., The Collected Dialogues of Plato, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 16.

(6) Ibid., p. 5.

(7) Ibid., p. 24.

(8) Ibid., pp. 10, 12, 13.

Response

SOCRATES' PRACTICE: SOME AFTERTHOUGHTS

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Alison Gerry provides us with a valuable discussion of human practice by focusing on the life of Socrates, his defense of that life as described by Plato, and specifically on the failure of Meletus to prove his charges against Socrates conclusively. While it should be safe to assume that Socrates' behavior was exemplary, it must be observed that a number of (recent) commentators do not share this point of view. Allan Bloom, for example, in *The Closing of the American Mind*, states that Socrates' defense is "not very convincing" and that it "cannot be characterized as intellectually honest."(1) Earlier, in his commentary on the *Republic*, Bloom alleges that "The *Republic* shows us why Socrates was accused and why there was good reason to accuse him."(2) Indeed, Thomas West states: "Socrates knew that he was guilty of the specific charge and therefore silently agreed with the judgment of guilty."(3) I.F. Stone's *The Trial of Socrates* (published after the presentation of this paper) also contains harsh criticism. Stone argues that "Socrates was one of those Athenians who despised democracy and idealized Sparta."(4)

It is necessary therefore to vindicate the practice of Socrates before one may appeal to its integrity, virtue, or praiseworthiness. Socrates was without question a lover of wisdom. But he was also a lover of Alcibiades and Charmides.(5) This too must be explained.

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(1) Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), pp. 265-266.

(2) Allan Bloom, *The Republic of Plato* (New York: Basic Books, 1968), p. 309.

(3) Thomas G. West, *Plato's Apology of Socrates* (Ithaca: Cornell U. Press, 1979), p. 225.

(4) I.F. Stone, *The Trial of Socrates* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1988), p. 121.

(5) Plato, *Symposium*, 222b.

FORMED FEELING AND TECHNOLOGY

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In this paper, I am presenting an attempted defense in favour of a conscious, deliberate training of the emotions in an effort to support the hypothesis that, in the 21st century, the only truly successful people will be the relatively few, capable of not only technical expertise, but also of a genuine understanding and promotion of human touch, to serve as an antidote to the reification attendant upon technological sophistication. If Martin Heidegger is correct in assuming that essential being is revealed through the way in which we use tools in time, then a cursory analysis of a few modern inventions should aid us in our endeavor. The following is a very partial list of modern advances with their respective perceived cultural losses.

1. VCRs are perfect reflections of our continued linear view of time with nonrepeatable beginnings, middles, and endings. We record two or three programs while watching another at the same time in order not to miss simultaneous transmissions. Control, economy of time, and repeatability are all here. Given the TV viewing manner of the average American family and the availability of video rentals, the cost may be on time spent with friends and family in conversation or exchange of ideas. Also, roundedness, depth, and expansion - all a natural part of 16 mm film- are lost to the flatness of videotape.

2. Compact discs give us perfect control and results. The sterling sound is boasted to be better than the actual performance. In striving to emulate this technical excellence provided by machines, modern musicians may achieve impeccable technique and could lose the spirit or soul of the music.

3. With microwave ovens we have economy of time. But the old-fashioned art of tasting and adding ingredients to the nascent culinary creation could be lost in the process.

4. Slide rules have been replaced with calculators. In so doing we may have lost the opportunity for exercising and honing mental alacrity.

5. Computers facilitate speed, complexity, and increased accuracy. Where information and knowledge are viewed as capital (cf., Boeskey affair, university research), the virtues of sharing and mutual exchange of findings and information become ever more indigent. A certain elite group is responsible for programming and controlling the computers for use by the masses, but too many will eventually become estranged from the natural physical world and lose relationship to it. If we have computers to tell us what is wrong with our cars and to diagnose human illness, the danger is a loss of the sense of feeling and comprehending along with an ignorance of detail and an indigence in discriminatory choice and decision.

The selected illustrations depict a profound belief in our ability to control, possess, and save time. Operation and efficacy of machines are highly valued.

Some would argue that our technological age is a welcomed one for its comfort and convenience. This overlooks the attendant dulling of feeling, especially regarding others. In the film My Dinner with Andre, Andre speaks of the dulling effects of owning an electric blanket. We tend to forget that half the world may be cold, or we do not need to worry about whether our partner is cold. Compassion is absent with respect to others' possible coldness. True empathy is usually born of experience and upbringing, and is not the result of vicarious knowledge. Hubert Dreyfus believes that technology's major threat is not holocaust but that it will someday provide a perfect fix for everything.(1)

The young people of today often refer to themselves as the "push-button" generation. Everything is so easy for them. Yet successful relationships are difficult for far too many, in part because responsive intimacy and feeling have not been a part of their experience. Thus, the tendency of young "punks" to mutilate their skin with safety pins may be seen as an attempt to experience feeling in some measure, however extreme or bizarre the tactics. Heavy metal rock can be interpreted as another assault on the senses or as an effort to wake up and feel. A paradox arises when gross sentiment is sought time and again through films of violence or assaulting music, but such effect results in a progressive dulling of the senses, akin to drug usage. Lost is the ability to respond to or understand those delicate, intricate feelings expressed through certain kinds of music or poetry in which the interplay of subtle, dynamic change is woven in a moving, mental architecture of delicacy, shadings, and nuances. At this juncture, a definition of feeling is in order. Susanne Langer believes that "feeling, in its broad sense, of whatever is felt in any way, is sensory stimulus or inward tension, pain, emotion or intent. It is the mark of mentality." She regards feeling as a phase of physiological process that is different from many other bodily functions because the feeling phase is entirely intraorganic. Metabolism, circulation, endocrine action, and digestion are all complex processes that are normally not felt. Nervous bodily actions enter into what she calls "psychical phases." They reach a certain threshold of intensity and trigger the phase we actually feel. This phase may develop suddenly, for example, from a pain when the intensity, location, and value character are distinct and sharp. A shock of terror would produce somewhat the same effect except the location would be less precise. A deeply engendered process might enter the psychical phase gradually so that it may be hardly noticeable, as when we reach a sense of feeling weary or when we feel a moment of fleeting emotion. Langer believes that "the normal substrate of 'feeling-tone,' from which the more acute tensions build up into specific experiences, is probably a dynamic pattern of nervous activities playing freely across the limen of sentience."(2)

Langer believes that since the psychical phase is transient and generally labile, it lends itself to the preconscious process of the formation of ideas, images, fantasies, and intentions which are "rooted in the fabric of totally unfelt activities. [This is the 'process' which] Freud reified with the substantive term, 'the Unconscious.'"(3) The historical dichotomy between reason and feeling may be replaced by the possibility that "intellect is a high form of feeling - a specialized, intensive feeling about intuitions."(4)

> As soon as feeling is regarded as a phase of a physiological process instead of a product (perhaps a by-product) of it, a new entity metaphysically different from it, the paradox of the physical and psychical disappear; for the thesis I hope to substantiate here is that the entire psychological field - including human conception, responsible action, rationality, knowledge - is a vast and branching development of feeling.... Human emotion is phylogenetically a high development from simpler processes, and reason is another one; human mentality is an unsurveyably complex dynamism of their interactions with each other, and with several further specialized forms of cerebral activity implicating the whole organic substructure.(5)

"Mind" then can be described in terms of physiological processes that have attained the highest degree of complexity and subtlety. "Mind" is no longer viewed as a metaphysical reality separate from the brain. While this view of mind may at first seem simply to restate the traditional materialist position, it actually goes beyond materialism in recognizing the existence of qualities in art and feelings which are ineffable, but very real. Langer believes a theory of mind should end, not begin with metaphysics. It is only when we are aware of the full implications of a biological basis for feeling and, therefore, mind, that we can begin to speculate reasonably on the ineffable through metaphysics. Science has the task of ascertaining this biological data which should, in time, very possibly support Langer's theories. Feeling is an integral aspect of everything from the low organic activities to the highest reaches of mind. Intellect, then, the highest form of feeling, includes emotion, intuition, and reason. That is why Langer defines "feeling" as "the starting point of a philosophy of mind. The study of feeling - its sources, its forms, its complexities - leads one down into biological structure and process until its estimation becomes (for the time) impossible, and upward to the purely human sphere known as 'culture.'"(6)

Culture inculcates the belief in and use of certain methodological paradigms useful for the particular epoch. Both Susanne Langer and Thomas Kuhn are known for convincing analyses of philosophical and scientific paradigms in relation to their limited usefulness, despite the tendency to adhere to and promulgate tenaciously such paradigms with unquestioned and unreserved faith in academic and scientific circles, e.g., continued emphasis on empiricism, equating truth only with facts that are arrived at by observation and quantification. It is easier to rely on reasoned belief than to grapple with the implications of new ideas.

Langer points to mathematics as an example of the hope we may place in something other than empirical fact. Mathematicians use no sense-data. Their knowledge is neutral abstraction, articulated in mathematical symbols unrelated to concrete data; yet, scientists trust the power and truth of mathematics precisely because it makes no assertions about things at all. Scientists are more and more disposed to use the method of pure reason through mathematical constructions, and mathematical constructions, of course, are mere symbols. "They have meanings in terms of relationships, not of substance; something of reality answers to them, but they are not supposed to be items in that reality."(8) In this sphere observation now is largely indirect, and readings and interpretation take the place of the once-reigning empiricism. The problem of meaning has replaced the problem of observation. It is now generally agreed that "our sense-data are primary symbols" and Langer contends that we are on the brink of a new epoch, one filled with generative ideas and fruitful questions in which "a new philosophical theme has been set forth to a coming age: an epistemological theme, the comprehension of science. The power of symbolism is its cue, as the finality of sense-data was the cue of a former epoch."(9)

A new understanding of humanistic learning may be at hand. Humanistic education is a certain orientation toward teaching and learning, whereby the whole person is addressed in an effort to challenge both the feeling and rational sides of the individual. Humanistic education can thereby refer to any field of study, including science, mathematics, literature, and art.

The inevitable question, if Langer is correct in her convincing depiction of feeling, is "How do we then teach emotionality or train the emotions if feeling is the foundation and pinnacle of intellect?" But this may perhaps be the wrong question, too easily a mirror of our current paradigm, which is now viewed as indigent by many. A systematic, uniform prescription may ignore the very uniqueness afforded an individual by a well-cultivated emotionality. So, adhering to Langer's theory that artistic symbols, qua artistic, afford insight, not reference, an example may be drawn from a recent film, Man Facing Southeast, to provide symbolic import with respect to the present thesis.

Man Facing Southeast takes place in an Argentinian insane asylum, where the patients become a symbol of so-called "sane" people, we who are apathetic, uncaring, and even unknowing of the fact that we are unhappy and unfeeling. Rantes (Antes means "before" in Spanish), one of the patients, mysteriously appears in one of the wards of the hospital, claiming he came in a spaceship and that he is a hologram of his true self, projected onto the earthly plane. When pushed for information about his origins, Rantes explains that it would be impossible to describe place and time as he knows it to earthly humans, thus implying that he is from an entirely different dimensional plane. Intense observation of Rantes by a certain doctor at the institution reveals that Rantes is a genius: he plays Bach impeccably; his theories about his being and mission are logically cohesive throughout. Rantes seems content, and all is well except for the fact that 20th century beliefs generally eschew the possibility of spaceship aliens, so Rantes is labeled "delirious." Categorically disarming the doctor repeatedly by shattering his heretofore impenetrable logic, Rantes demonstrates an uncanny skill for laying bare the utter absurdity of our everyday perceptions of the world and our behaviour in that world.

One curious aspect about Rantes is that he seems quite impassive much of the time, but underlying that is a deep emotionality based upon compassion which attracts children and the insane. Rantes claims he cannot feel the way humans do, but he understands their feelings. He is a Cybernetic Christ who responds to hunger and sorrow in a purely rational manner. If someone is cold, he offers his coat. If someone is hungry, Rantes gives him his food automatically. It is perfect altruism; self is not considered. It is beyond the label "good" so that self-righteousness is not even a possibility. Yet Rantes does express joy and contentment, emotions, feelings.

Many times Rantes is likened by the doctor to a computer. Many humanists today decry the possibility of ever endowing computers with feeling. Yet can it be said, for example, at least hesitantly, that computers unlike humans display infinite patience? No matter how many times a student provides the wrong answer, the computer is patient in its polite invitation to try yet once again.

It has often been said that at the root of negative, destructive emotions such as hatred, envy, jealousy, and anger, we exhibit a deep-seated belief in the sole reality of the material and the self as material entity. The positive emotions such as love, compassion, and empathy are based on a faith in something called "spirit." Yet, the Mayans have a word, Pixan, meaning "what manifests within form, or spirit," so that the material and spiritual are inextricable. Could it be that our contemporary malaise of emotional indigence is borne not of our unflinching belief in materialism per se, but rather of our voracious dependence upon and manipulation of matter or the material world without regard for the possibility of deep sentience laying in every so-called inanimate object?

An incipient step towards healing our indigent spirits may be to break the deeply entrenched perception of animate versus inanimate, material versus spiritual, in an effort to recognize the material as a vehicle for learning about our own sentient being. If psychologists are correct in saying the majority of us use only about 10 percent of our brains, then, with effort and the proper orientation, we might learn to produce from our bodies and minds not only alpha, theta, and beta waves, but also microwaves, laser beams, and x-rays. We may all learn to create and project onto the sky, serving as a screen, a feature-length film for ourselves and others, by using only our mind power. The functional power inherent in crystals used in many technological devices from telecommunications to computers may also be ours, given the myriad crystal structures in our bodies.

Yet, to pursue these powers for their own sake would betray a lingering allegiance to the old paradigms and perhaps a deleterious lack of meaning. Langer's definition of meaning supports the premise that our malaise is probably a sympton of the way in which we relate to the material world: "But meaning involves several terms, and different types of meaning consist of different types and degrees of relationship. It is better, perhaps, to say: 'Meaning is not a quality, but a function of a term.' A function is a pattern viewed with reference to one special term around which it centers; this pattern emerges when we look at the given term in its total relation to the other terms about it."(11)

She illustrates this with a muscial example, while acknowledging that the total relation can be very complicated. For instance, we can treat a musical chord as a function of one note known as the written bass. Given the foundation note, we can indicate its relation to all of the other notes written above it. In the case of the A-chord, for example, the note A serves as the written bass, with the sixth (F), the fourth (D), and the third (C) notes falling in order above A. "The chord is treated as a pattern surrounding and including A."

The meaning of a term is also a function, according to Langer. The term itself holds the central position, and the meaning rests on a pattern. In even the most simplistic of meanings, a term must have at least two other things related to it for meaning to obtain: "an object that is 'meant,' and, a subject who uses the term." Similarly, in the example of the musical chord, at least two other notes beside the key note are needed to determine what the actual chord is, even though one of the notes might be "understood" by musicians and not overly manifested. In explanation of this idea of subject and object, Langer writes: "The same may be said for a term with a meaning; the existence of a subject is often tacitly accepted, but if there is not at least one thing meant and one mind for which it is meant, then there is not a complete meaning - only a partial pattern which might be completed in different ways."(12)

Furthermore, any term in a pattern may be viewed as the key-term to which the others are related. In our example, the A-chord, with A as the bass note, may be taken as a function of its lowest note, A, as we saw in the previous example. It may also be viewed with reference to D, upon which the chord is built harmonically. "A musician analyzing the harmony would call this chord 'the second inversion of the seventh-chord on the dominant, in the key of G.' The 'dominant' of the key is D; that sounds more complicated than the other treatment, which fixed the notes from the A upward, but of course, it is not really so, because it comes to just the same pattern."

Similarly, a meaning-pattern may be viewed from the point of view of any term in it, and so, our descriptions will differ, even though we are describing the same pattern. Langer strongly points out that "what relates the terms to their objects is, of course, a subject"; that will always be understood."(13)

If this be so, then perhaps what is called for is a deeper understanding of the architecture of relationships in which emotion and sentiment provide the variegated and complex designs of human exchange and knowledge of each other. Encouraging analogues, symbols of our times, along this line include the discovery of holograms, which project a three-dimensional image in which every part contains the whole; mathematicians' depiction of four-dimensional images projected onto a computer screen, where the entire image is seen at once (unlike three-dimensional figures where different sides are occluded, depending upon where the observer stands) and yet transforms constantly as the observer moves; children's fascination with Transformers; and much of the New Age music, which assiduously avoids sentimentality altogether but captures sentiment, purified and unsullied. Holograms can perhaps be viewed as a symbol of the transparency of self with which mystics such as Christ are associated. The theoretical understanding of the fourth dimension provided us by mathematicians and physicists may soon become experiential knowledge, just as children who work easily with Transformers thoroughly learn all aspects of the third dimension, thereby readying themselves for a propulsion into the fourth, heretofore looked upon as the realm of mystical, metaphysical speculation, primarily because it doesn't fit our preconceived, limited notions of what constitutes "reality." It seems to be our responsibility as educators to help bring about these transformations through attending to the cultivation of emotional components in our young people.

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(1) Hubert Dreyfus, "Knowledge and Human Values: A Genealogy of Nihilism." Teachers College Press, Vol.82, No.3, (Spring 1981).

(2) Suzanne Langer, Mind: An Essay on Human Feeling, Vol.1. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press 1967), p. 22.

(3) Ibid., p. 22.
(4) Ibid., p. 149.
(5) Ibid., p. 23.
(6) Ibid., p. 32.
(7) Ibid., p. 17.
(8) Ibid., p. 19.
(9) Ibid., p. 21.
(10) Ibid., p. 25.

(11) Susanne Langer, Philosophy in a New Key (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1942), p. 55.

(12) Ibid., p. 56.
(13) Ibid., p. 57.

Response

GRANDMA'S CORNBREAD VS. MICROWAVE MUSH

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Sharon Gocke argues for a "conscious deliberate training of the emotions" as a remedy for the ills of 21st Century Technology. The questions raised in this paper are difficult because the assumptions and inferences packed into them require close scrutiny. First, a causal relationship between technology and human emotions must be established, and this is not done explicitly. Second, what is produced by technology in its present state may well be tasteless by our standards, but there is no reason why a genuine technological advancement cannot include affective content.

Since this paper contains too many examples for a brief response, there is greater utility in focusing on one, the example of microwave cooking. It is assumed in this example that the joy of cooking, the "old-fashioned art of tasting," is lost in the process of preparing food, and consequently the product itself is devoid of taste. While it might be objected that technological improvements can produce epicurean delights, there is a more serious problem: in fact, suppose that a child of the 21st Century actually prefers some tasteless microwave mush to Grandma's cornbread? What shall we tell this kid? Let us say that Grandma grinds the cornmeal herself, carefully adds seasoning to her personal taste, and then bakes the cornbread in cast-iron cookware in a wood burning stove. What do we do if a preference for microwave mush remains unaltered? And what do we say if Grandma actually prefers microwave mush to her own cooking?

The question then reduces to the issue of whether emotions can be taught -- not virtue, perhaps, but preferences. Consequently, the paper must answer this question before it can be argued that emotions ought to be trained deliberately.

THE CONCEPT OF TOLERANCE

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In the study of multicultural education tolerance emerges as a central and problematic notion. It is central because intercultural learning is thought to require it and problematic because of the conceptual confusion which accompanies its use. Two questions arise with respect to the term: What is tolerance? and, Does diversity require tolerance? In addressing these questions this paper will engage in a conceptual examination of the term. On the basis of this analysis, tolerance will be considered as a moral principle and as an educational ideal. It will be shown that the pedagogic importance of the term can only be derived from clear thinking about the word, a clarity which is frequently lacking in the Canadian debate.

The tolerance notion has several dimensions which are: psychological, conceptual, epistemological, and utilitarian. The conceptual aspect is the concern of this essay; the others may be dealt with indirectly.

Tolerance is not a technical term; it is common in everyday language. Two nouns correspond with the verb tolerate and the adjective tolerant, these are tolerance and toleration. In the British discussion of the issue, a distinction is sometimes made between the two nouns such that toleration is used to describe the act of being tolerant, or the disposition to be tolerant, while tolerance is understood to refer to a more purely physical endurance of something.(1) The British tendency points out a Canadian one. Theorists in our nation use tolerance primarily and toleration as its synonym; that is, one word does all our work. This latter habit is adopted in this paper, but such economy makes it all the more important to map out the concept so that all of its features may be pinpointed.

We have then two main divisions within the concept: tolerance as a specific instance of enduring or forebearing something, and the disposition or trait to show tolerance. The specific act and the trait have certain descriptive features in common.

In all cases tolerance has an object. The nature of the relation between the tolerator and the tolerated object is characterized by dislike or disapproval. Tolerance as endurance or forebearance implies a difficulty which may produce hardship or suffering of some kind. The object is measured against some ideal state or standard and is found wanting. Tolerance represents an instance of, or tendency to, fill in the gap between the object and the standard with either patience or indulgence. To be indulgent is to expect no change in the object and therefore passively to accept what one disapproves. Patience on the other hand implies the willingness to wait out an event, such as childishness, in the hope that maturity will emerge. That is, the quality of the endurance is not necessarily passive. One may put up with something in a variety of ways.

In fact since tolerance involves dislike or disapproval, it may not be said that a person is tolerating X if he or she has no strong feeling about not X. A condition that must be satisfied is that those who are tolerant care about the object. A characteristic of toleration is that it is "half-hearted"; we accept on one level what we cannot accept on another.(2) So that if I tolerate someone's snoring I am half-hearted or divided in mind about it. The sound of snoring is measured against quiet sleep and found wanting. To be tolerant is to act in a particular manner toward the one who snores for some reason, such as affection for him or her. I am not however indifferent about sleep!

Not only is tolerance to be distinguished from indifference, but a "second condition that must be satisfied is that those who are tolerant could get their way if they chose."(3) This distinction is marked by the difference between tolerance and acquiescence. That is, the power to prohibit is implied in tolerating. This condition moves Nicholson to assert that: "strictly speaking there cannot be toleration of opinions, or the holding of opinions, only of the expression of opinions, since the latter alone is within other people's power to reject or not."(4)

While the tolerator is in a position to exert power, to be tolerant is to restrict oneself from its use. This idea is connected with the sense of tolerating in the statement: She has a tolerance for penicillin; that is, she does not have a strong reaction to it. While one has strong feelings about X one chooses not to express a strong reaction toward not X through the use of force.

The question arises as to what is meant by force. There are three senses which are important: physical force, through violence; psychological force, through threats; and epistemological force, through deception.(5) Those who may be described as tolerant refuse to use their power in any one of the above ways. Often it is disdain for intolerance that motivates toleration.

Intolerance, which is primarily psychological, is fueled by prejudice which is primarily epistemological. Prejudice, or pre-judgment based on flimsy or inaccurate evidence, operates on two levels. These are: judgments about the characteristics of a person or group, such as "All natives are lazy"; and judgments about people which are logical errors or errors in inference.(6) An example of the latter is the following syllogism. There is a high crime rate in low-cost housing developments. Native Indians live in low-cost housing developments. Whites should not associate with Native Indians. Newman proposes that logical errors are more difficult to detect than empirical, and even when errors in judgment-making are pointed out, and when the individual appears normal, he or she may still choose to hold to a pre-judgment, and to express intolerance. This is so because intolerance has a moral base. We describe someone as intolerant who will not put up with something that we believe she or he should put up with.(7)

The intolerant person may be caught up in some enthusiasm or superstition, to use Hume's terms, and is therefore unrelenting in his rejection of those who neither fear nor obey his gods.(8) Yet it must be noted that the alcoholic who anaesthetizes himself from any responsibility to support what is good and valued in his culture, or the arch materialist who pursues no good but goods, is just as unhelpful with respect to what tolerance requires as is the fanatic who would save us against our will from his particular brand of hell.

It is the moral base of toleration that distinguishes two concepts within the term. The descriptive concept whose features have been outlined already, and the moral concept are now to be separated from one another by raising the question of whether all instances of toleration are to be thought of as good. It is not the same to ask someone to tolerate snoring as it is to ask that she tolerate Hitler, pornography, or child abuse. Just as intolerance stands on one side of the tolerance-concept as its opposite, so indiscriminate tolerance stands on the other. That is, tolerance does not extend to allowing or enduring what ought not to be allowed.(9)

In summary, our values are displayed in large measure through our tolerant, intolerant, or indiscriminantly tolerant responses. To be tolerant is to set limits upon our interference in another's action, but a reaction is only properly tolerant if it is expressed towards a proper object. Agreement about showing tolerance is a second-order activity based upon first-order activity of establishing what should be esteemed.

In raising the moral aspect of tolerance it is often supposed that the mere presence of diversity is sufficient reason to insist that tolerance be shown. The argument is that diversity, or the existence of individual differences, in itself requires tolerance. The question arises as to the relationship between the presence of difference and the moral prescription to be tolerant. Does the existence of individual differences constitute conclusive reason to show tolerance? The answer is no, since differences may give rise to other reactions as well, such as indifference or punishment, and these may be justified depending upon the particular difference in question. Features of tolerance as a moral principle and an historical context for the concept will help to establish the nature of this relationship.

J.S. Mill's essay, "On Liberty," is an historical focal point for the tolerance debate. In this work Mill proposes and defends one principle:

> the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent

> harm to others.... Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is sovereign.(10)

Two arguments concerning toleration formed a backdrop to Mill's essay. The first justified tolerance on the claims of conscience; that the nature of conscience is such that it cannot be subject to effective external coercion. While behavior may be controlled, thoughts cannot. The second arises from Locke's view that there are some areas of individual activity that are not the state's business unless they pose a serious threat to its security.(11) These arguments can be picked out in modern society as a rationale for showing toleration. Three areas of difficulty arising from Mill's assertions are: his concept of harm; his distinction between self-regarding and other-regarding actions; and his defence of free speech.(12) A discussion of these problems is necessary to an understanding of tolerance as a moral ideal.

In considering toleration as a moral ideal, Nicholson outlines six constituents of the term: deviance, importance, disapproval, power, non-rejection, and goodness. What is tolerated deviates from the tolerator's values, is important, receives disapproval from the tolerator, represents an area in which the tolerator has power to interfere, but he or she chooses not to and the deviation continues. The assertion that tolerance is a good distinguishes it from the descriptive aspect of the concept in that the moral ideal is not value-neutral. Disapproval rather than dislike is a constituent because toleration "is a matter of moral choice and our tastes...are irrelevant."(13)

In a descriptive or sociological assessment, one merely reports that X was tolerant of Y. In order to discriminate between the two concepts within tolerance, two differences are worth noting. First, if one is being descriptive what is morally right depends upon social context, whereas the moral ideal raises questions about the rightness or fairness of that social context. Second, in the descriptive sense, people either are or are not showing toleration, whereas the moral concept supposes that one has a duty to be tolerant.(14) There are two arguments for showing tolerance, a negative and a positive.

The negative argument arises from the disinclination to show intolerance and four points are included. First, it may be too expensive in material costs or moral values to end the wrong. Second, it may be more effective to tolerate a wrong while actively campaigning against it. Third, it may be argued that beliefs and motives are beyond the law's reach. And fourth, if opinions and actions are not socially injurious, what reason is there for not tolerating them?(15) Nicholson describes the negative and positive as two complementary sides of toleration concept. But the positive argument is seldom raised by other theorists and only this aspect is really useful in the multi-ethnic classroom.

By itself the negative argument raises certain problems. Statement 1, referring to costs, is a value judgment. The current debate over pornography provides an illustration. There is no agreement in our society over pornography and its effects. To many feminists pornography constitutes violence against women and these individuals want it abolished. This concern comes from an entirely different set of values than those held by someone who is trying to establish whether, or to what extent, pornography tends to deprave or corrupt.(16)

An argument that it may be too expensive to eliminate pornography presupposes that something else has an equal or greater value. To some, eradicating pornography would be too costly; to others no expense is too great. The nature of this debate is similar to the multicultural one. Multicultural education presupposes new societal ends; to some the cost of achieving these ends is too high, to others no price would be.

To return to the negative argument for showing tolerance, statements two and three allude to the effective use of influence to eradicate what one does not approve. In two the advice is that a direct attack on what one wishes were different may not be productive, but active campaigning against it may be. Is one tolerating a thing if one campaigns against it? To Nicholson the answer would be yes because he believes that commitment to X does not preclude tolerance of not X. Disapproval of not X is a condition of tolerating it. This point is missed by theorists who expect tolerance to dissolve intercultural dispute; only acquiescence would serve such a function.

In statement three, to say that something is beyond the law's reach is to beg the question of whether it should be, or what features of it should be, beyond the law's reach. In four the problems are full-blown. The difficulty we have with tolerance is in deciding what constitutes social harm. As Horton asserts: "there is no uncontroversial way in which such a distinction [between actions that are and are not harmful] can be drawn, and...any attempt to justify toleration which relies on such a supposedly agreed distinction is likely to be seriously defective."(17)

The problem is not with proposing tolerance as a moral ideal but with assuming it as the primary one in its general form. Statement four obscures the difficulties that are inherent in the notion. To show toleration toward a wrong action may amount to showing indifference to an individual's need to be reinstated within a community that has been harmed by the wrong.

Further, the moral effect of reckless action by A, may involve B in a duty to A which causes or brings harm to B. Suppose B sees A walk along the top rail of a bridge then slip and fall into the river. As A calls to B for help, B has a moral duty to assist. Tolerance as a moral principle is, on the one hand, the refusal to interfere with another's walk along the rail, and on the other, the moral duty to aid a drowning person. Interference in the first instance is accused of being paternalistic and in the second applauded as Samaritan concern. Supposing that B cannot swim the issue of equity between A and B suggests that there are some instances in which tolerance or intolerance may bring about harm to someone.(18)

In Mill's idea of harm there are three assumptions: that the individual is sovereign over his or her own person; that freedom of expression will lead to positive social progress; and that the individual is the best judge of his own situation. The current debate is carried on in a culture that has changed since Mill's time certainly, and even since the 1960's and 1970's when tolerance was conceived as the best policy to address dramatic changes in the cultural landscape. The question of how much and what kind of dissent, faction or conflict a society can endure and survive as a society must be weighed against Mill's assumptions.

Fortunately the society at large is not our immediate concern; the classroom is. Yet the discussion above is intended to counter facile prescriptions that teachers should show and teach tolerance. Tolerance is not enough to create the environment that fosters intercultural learning. Two conditions would have to be met in order to support the view that diversity requires tolerance in the classroom. First, differences must center on issues important to the children, and second, children must not be expected merely to acquiesce. A description of the moral development of the young should accompany the proposal that students learn to show tolerance. And it is only when teachers come to understand what the moral requirements of the classroom are that a positive argument for tolerance can assist them.

It is a political or religious question whether one is sovereign over oneself, a sociological question whether free expression in the classroom leads to positive social ends, and a psychological question whether children are the best judges of their own situation. Yet these underlying assumptions must be shown to be related to the moral principle to be tolerant in order for it to be useful in the way that multicultural literature presumes that it is. It is only the positive argument for showing tolerance that, as the teacher understands and adopts the assumptions inherent in the assertion that tolerance is a good, enables children to be brought along in a rational manner to eventually see that this is so.

There are two sets of reasons for seeing tolerance as a good: instrumental and intrinsic. The first reasons make relations between tolerance, liberty and justice. "Everyone has an equal right to toleration: no one can claim it for his own opinions and actions, and in fairness deny its extension to everybody else...[and] toleration is necessary for human progress and the advance of civilization, both technological and moral."(19) This instrumental view fails in three ways: it does not appreciate tolerance except as a means to something else; it does not account for effects created by indiscriminate tolerance; and it ignores the lack of value-consensus within a society. Yet it must be said that tolerance on the whole is good because it serves as a safeguard against misuses of power. If children are to become autonomous moral agents they must be empowered to do so.

The second or intrinsic set of reasons for showing tolerance are well suited to serve this aim in the classroom. In this view tolerance functions as a format for thinking that moves an individual to consider others seriously and to set limits on himself with respect to his reactions to difference. An extensive quotation is useful:

> By being required to take heed of the ideas of others, whether simply as opinions or as embodied in their lifestyles, and above all when one is forced to do so, one is schooled and educated. One is shown that part of being moral, and of treating other moral agents morally, is to give serious consideration to their ideas; not to do that, whilst claiming it for one's own ideas, is not simply selfishness or the illegitimate demand for a privileged position, it is in a profound sense immorality, failure to respect human personality. Again, one is having pointed out a duty to understand ideas which may be alien and unpalatable, even evil, but which have a valid claim to our attention because they too are deeply held convictions of human beings. The moral ideal of toleration does not require the tolerator to acknowledge any merit in the opinions of which he disapproves; but he must respect the personality of the holders of those opinions, and treat them as rational moral agents whose views can be discussed and disputed, and who are capable of changing their minds on rational grounds.(20)

It is therefore important that children come to understand one another. It is evident that Nicholson assumes that no harm will befall someone who engages with divergent views in this manner, and he considers changes in the tolerator's views as a result of such an exchange to be side-effects independent of toleration's intrinsic moral worth.(21) In refusing to use power to interfere with another we set limits on our own responses rather than eliminating the expressions or behaviors of the other. It must be remembered that the tolerator freely consents to self-restraint since he must possess the power to do otherwise for tolerance to be operative.

This brings us to the recognition that toleration sets its own limits, as must any moral ideal. Two major limits are: that we should reject whatever contravenes the moral base on which the ideal rests, namely, respect for all persons as full moral agents; and that we should reject whatever contravenes the ideal of toleration itself. Quite simply, we do not tolerate the destruction of toleration. A crucial practical problem remains in distinguishing between expressions of opinions that must always be tolerated and acting out of opinions that need not always be tolerated,(22) but to do this requires an examination of the concept of understanding.

With respect to the tolerance concept, however, the complaint of minority ethnic groups members in Canada picks out the ineffectiveness of current policies and pedagogic practices to prevent the obfuscation of "cultural hierarchy and the redefining [of] ethnicity until it is meaningless."(23) Tolerance as a general concept is unsuited to ameliorate this condition. It is the intrinsic set of reasons within the positive argument for showing tolerance that must be emphasized and that has any hope of furthering the moral maturity which multiculturalism requires. Toleration as a moral ideal will open the avenue to inter-ethnic dialogue but it is inadequate alone. Diversity requires more than toleration and intercultural sharing arises from the political and moral valuing of those people who bring differences to Canada.

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(1) Peter Nicholson, "Tolerance as a Moral Ideal," John Horton and Susan Mendus, Eds., Aspects of Toleration, (Methuen & Co., 1985), p. 159.

(2) Jay Newman, Foundations of Religious Tolerance, (University of Toronto Press, Toronto 1982), p. 5.

(3) Albert Weale, "Toleration, Individual Differences and Respect for Persons," Aspects, (1985), p. 16.

(4) Peter Nicholson, Ibid., p. 161.

(5) John Elmer Thiessen, "Educational Pluralism and Tolerance." The Journal of Educational Thought, Vol.21, No.2, (August 1987), p. 74.

(6) Jay Newman, op.cit., p. 35.

(7) Ibid., p. 153.

(8) Ibid., p. 151.

(9) Ibid., p. 6.

(10) John Horton and Susan Mendus, Eds., Aspects of Toleration, (Methuen & Co. 1985), p. 14.

(11) Ibid., p. 2-3.

(12) Ibid., p. 14.

(13) Peter Nicholson, op.cit., p. 160.

(14) Ibid., p. 162.

(15) Ibid., p. 163-164.

(16) Susan Mendus, "Harm, Offence and Censorship," Aspects of Toleration, (Methuen & Co. 1985), p. 110.

(17) John Horton, "Toleration, Morality and Harm," Aspects of Toleration, (Methuen & Co. 1985), p. 114.

(18) Peter Jones, "Toleration, Harm and Moral Effect," *Aspects of Toleration*, p. 144.

(19) Peter Nicholson, *op.cit.*, p. 165.

(20) *Ibid*., p. 165-166.

(21) *Ibid*., p. 167-168.

(22) *Ibid*., p. 169.

(23) Kogila Moodley, "Canadian Multiculturalism as Ideology," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 3, (July 1983), p. 320.

Response

BELLOUS' CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF TOLERANCE

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Bellous considers tolerance to be central to multicultural education because intercultural learning is thought to require tolerance. Bellous argues that these beliefs about tolerance are based on a faulty understanding of its meaning, hence the need for a conceptual analysis of tolerance. Secondly, Bellous considers the role tolerance should play in the study of multiculturalism. Bellous' paper involves a conceptual analysis which is then used to inform an ethical question.

Initially, Bellous is concerned with the intrinsic character of the concept of tolerance. Tolerance always involves a tolerated object. In Bellous' terms, 'the object is measured against some ideal state or standard and is found wanting." In order to show tolerance, the tolerator fills "the gap between the object and the standard with patience or indulgence." For an object to be tolerated, it must be important to the tolerator. Tolerance is not indifference, but rather the willingness to allow a condition to continue despite having the power or leverage to have it discontinued.

Bellous attributes the lack of tolerance, or intolerance, to prejudice. She argues that prejudice is based upon "flimsy or inaccurate evidence." More reliable information is assumed to be available and so ought to be employed by all. This precarious reasoning allows Bellous to describe intolerant people as "those who will not put up with something that she or he should put up with." It is not clear whether Bellous is adopting this characterization or presenting it for critique. In either case, this characterization raises an important question. Are all cases of tolerance good and all cases of intolerance bad?

At this point Bellous' discussion reveals the ambiguity of tolerance. Bellous describes a continuum, with intolerance at one extreme and indiscriminate tolerance at the other.

intolerance **indiscriminate tolerance**

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The notion of indiscriminate tolerance emerges from the claim that "tolerance does not extend to allowing or enduring what ought not be allowed." There are, then, circumstances where the response ought to be intolerance. Indiscriminate tolerance is exhibited when someone tolerates circumstances or behaviors which are likely to render harm to others. In this case, the individual ought to have been intolerant. A host, for example, ought not tolerate an impaired guest driving themselves home. Tolerance involves a judgment of potential harm and the choice of an appropriate response.

Because intolerance may be an appropriate response to certain circumstances, intolerance need not inevitably be the result of prejudice. Intolerance, more simply defined, need only constitute an inability or unwillingness to indulge or be patient with a condition which deviates from certain standards. While holding these standards does constitute a form of prejudgment, intolerance need not be associated with poor reasoning or inaccurate evidence and could as easily be the result of careful analysis and ethical reflection. As Bellous herself points out, values often dictate that people be intolerant of certain behaviours. Likewise, one could be said to be tolerant of intolerance.

Having described the concept of tolerance, Bellous turns to consider its ethical implications. In particular she is concerned with the argument that

> diversity, or the existence of individual differences, in itself requires tolerance. The question arises as to the relationship between the presence of difference and moral duty to be tolerant.

Bellous addresses this argument with a critique of the assumptions which shaped Mill's essay, On Liberty. These assumptions are distilled to the sociological assumption that "freedom of expression will lead to positive social progress," and to the psychological assumption that the individual is "the best judge of his own situation." By describing these assumptions as sociological and psychological, Bellous labels them as descriptive as opposed to normative claims. The morality of tolerance, Bellous argues, cannot be justified through descriptive claims. The morality of tolerance is an ethical question which demands inquiry into the intrinsic worth of tolerance.

This reasoning leads to Bellous' final distinction between instrumental and intrinsic arguments for the worth of tolerance. Instrumental arguments "make relations between tolerance, liberty and justice," yet they fail to "appreciate tolerance except as a means to something else," they do not account for the potential for harm in acts of indiscriminate tolerance, and they ignore "the lack of value consensus within a society."

While Bellous recognizes the validity of these instrumental claims on tolerance, she argues that these are not sufficient to justify tolerance as a good. This justification comes from the observation that tolerance involves a decision for self control. Tolerance requires that one ought to "take heed of the ideas of others" and to limit one's response to these ideas. Toleration involves learning about others and one's self, and it involves changes in the toleration's view. Toleration, then, is an intrinsically educational activity. In the light of Bellous' analysis, tolerance does emerge as both a central and problematic notion in the study of and pursuit of multicultural education.

MODELS FOR THINKING ABOUT THE FUTURE: SOME PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

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> Man's tomorrows are hostages to the clarity by which they are deliberately or methodologically known.
> T. Frank Saunders (1)

Everyone involved in educational decision-making thinks about the future. Teachers make decisions which may have direct and/or long term impact on the individuals in their classrooms. Administrators, board members and other policy makers' decisions have potential for widespread effects on entire groups of people. Reflective educators will think about *how* they think about the future. An appropriate task for philosophy of education is providing models and frameworks for such double-thinking.

In "Philosophy in Educational Research," Ernest Nagel suggested a tripartite classification of philosophy as the critique of discursive thought. The highest level of such inquiry is in "problems relating to the construction of systematic bodies of knowledge" and includes "discussions of the types and functions of general statements, of patterns of explanation and prediction, *of the role of* analogies and *models in the expansion of knowledge*, and of the logical conditions for assimilating different branches of inquiry into a common intellectual framework."(2) The purpose of this paper is to identify some major strategies for thinking about the future, discuss some philosophical assumptions underlying those models, and suggest some possible implications of these various "futures."

Models for Thinking about the Future

Frank Saunders has identified three major strategies for predicting the future.(3) The first is a simple extrapolation technique by which the future is viewed as a direct extension of past or present trends. This approach is illustrated in Figure 1, the Simple Extrapolation Model for Future Prediction. The works of Alvin Toffler including *Future Shock* and *The Third Wave* and the content analysis used by Naisbitt for his *Megatrends* are examples of the results of such methods for future prediction. A limitation of such futures research is that it is, in Dewey's words, "but past history reversed."(4) It does not account for innovation, assimilation, or other unanticipated changes. Unfortunately, much educational planning assumes such continuation of the *status quo*. This lack of anticipation of change in the future has put American educators in the uncomfortable position of being caught by surprise by external catalysts such as Sputnik or "the Japanese talent for inexpensive cars and electronic gadgets."(5) Educational change takes the form of reaction in some reform movement, and educators must play "catch-up" to today rather than looking ahead with some future vision.

A second extrapolation model accounts for the alteration of the direction of the past by the introduction of events which change the flow of history. Figure 2 represents a contingency extrapolation model. This approach to futures attempts to predict events and influences which may "change the flow of history through the occurrences of undetermined influences."(6)

In another sense, "the future is a remarkable kind of value imperative whose progeny is the present."(7) Such a conception of the future entails a planned adoption of values not necessarily available or operational in society at the present time. This future as a value imperative informs the present in a determinant way. A community of inquirers may get together to formulate or construct a set of values and plans for operationalizing those values. Such future planning is depicted in Figure 3, the Futures Model for the Present as the Future Realized.

The next level of analysis for approaches to futures is to relate the methods for predicting the future to the three major schools of philosophy: idealism, realism, and experimentalism. This can be done by using the syntactical model type associated with each philosophical orientation to graphically represent those approaches to the futures issue.(8)

As It Was, Is and Always Will Be

> Tomorrow is everyone's past: Unless we get there first.

A target model represents the idealist orientation to the future. As Figure 4 illustrates, the past, present, and future are all a continuum of some perfect, complete whole. The illusion of progress or decline may occur during segments of history, but that is only a symptom of human inability to understand the master plan or comprehend the whole system. This perspective is often associated with authoritarianism, mysticism and most religions. A major problem with this approach is that insight into the "big picture" and knowledge of it are based on authority, intuition, or faith. It is not public or sharable and is not a community construction. The worst atrocities in history have been committed in pursuit of exclusive plans.

The future from this perspective may be viewed in a Hegelian sense. The future, as a cyclical extension of history, is but the next step on the path of God marching across the Earth. Unfortunately, He may be running around in circles or chasing His tail.

Conservative futures preserve individual cultural heritages without reconstructing mutual futures. "Winners" or survivors with such attitudes are found somewhere on a continuum from ethnocentrism to xenophobia, and the excluded others are the victims of long punch lines in Jonestown, genocide and cultural extinction.

Tomorrow

The simple extrapolation model and the contingency futures model are both cases of the sequence model type. These models as methods for predicting the future reflect realist philosophical orientations. Movement toward the future is evolutionary or developmental, and predictions are based on present trends. Cycles of growth and decline occur, but there are small increments of Sisyphusian progress. This is illustrated in Figure 5. If a modified extrapolation model including contingencies is employed, those contingencies are in a sense already today's problems, for they are anticipated based on the next step in technology or some other development which may be realized sooner than expected.

Figure 6 is one such contingency futures model. Some imaginable events could include: -biochip implants of information, holographic ectoplasm, new life forms as miscegenations of animals and vegetables.

Artificial intelligence research is exploring the use of organic materials for information processing purposes. Some enzymes have up to ten steady states which would offer more flexibility than the binary system used in today's electronic technology. Education could be as "simple" as baking memory worm pie by implanting biochips containing complete culture-language translators. A predictable value issue will be criteria used for designation of the recipients of such implantation or ingestion. Toward what kinds of culture specific and intercultural futures would this technology be used? It could produce undetectable terrorist-spies or unprecedented wise diplomats. -encounters with other intelligences.

Tomorrow's Tomorrows

The range of intelligent encounters for the 21st century will surely expand beyond current human and tomorrow's man-made problems. Astronomers currently estimate the number of intelligent civilizations in our galaxy to be 10,000.(9) As technology expands horizons to include space, time, and possibly other dimensions, the future will include coventures with other intelligences. This approach to the future as an end-in-view, goals which are the operationalized values generated by a community, is characteristic of experimentalist philosophy. A major task of philosophy of education is one of integrating the different futures that can be anticipated into a unified pattern and to help clarify value conflicts and lay the groundwork for a partnership in future values.(10)

How can we define intelligence in order to teach it and possibly identify it when newly encountered so we could communicate and construct mutual futures? Wittgenstein is credited with saying "in order to draw a limit to thinking, we should have to think both sides of the limit." Rather than trying to define intelligence by describing known human limitations, it would be more useful to prepare for unprecedented encounters by identifying some generic structural elements of intelligence.

The ability to have a future is one characteristic of intelligence. Dewey stated this as follows, "A being which can use given and finished facts as signs of things to come; which can take given things as evidences of absent things, can, in that degree, forecast the future; it can form reasonable expectations. It is capable of achieving ideas: it is possessed of intelligence."(11) Champlin restated, "To have purpose--anticipation or expectation--fashioned in terms of the means to its achievement is to have symbols. The process of activity of ordering means to ends is symbolic--a case where a future, a non-present, is represented in the present."(12)

Intergalactic, interdimensional, intercultural futures will be constructed using a relational futures model. The end-in-view for such a community of symbolizers would be the quality of life(?)--(that language bias may change if the intelligent coventurer is a real gem)--for those participants.

Intelligent Futures

This discussion will conclude with more down-to-earth scenarios. What are some educational implications of this experimentalist approach through which the present becomes the future realized?

Saunders' three models for thinking about the future provide a sharable classification for the epistemological concern for how we think about the future. If we adopt the learning assumptions:

1. What can be described via any model can be taught.
2. Thought patterns that have been learned can become deliberate.
3. Once thought style is deliberate, it can be changed;(13)

this framework could be used to teach educators to think about the future.

Educators could now identify how they usually think about the future. Discussion of the philosophical assumptions underlying the various approaches to thinking about the future may provide them some foresight into implications of the use of a futures strategy which they may not have otherwise anticipated. Finally, since "intelligent formulations are contingent on making clear and deliberate the habitual use of frames of reference,"(14) this analysis of ways of thinking about the future may help educators become more intelligent intelligences by refining their abilities to construct those valued ends-in-view which give meaning to the present.

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(1) T. Frank Saunders, "Futures: A Procedural Question," in James John Jelinek, Ed., Proceedings of the Twenty-Second Annual

Meeting of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society, (Tempe, AZ: College of Education, Arizona State University, 1973), p. 261.

(2) Ernest Nagel, "Philosophy in Educational Research," in Frank W. Banghart, Ed., Annual Phi Delta Kappa Symposium on Educational Research, (Bloomington, IN: Phi Delta Kappa, Inc., 1960), p. 75.

(3) See T. Frank Saunders', op.cit. and "Futures Research," Directions for Research: Educational Research, (Tucson, AZ: College of Education, University of Arizona, 1975).

(4) John Dewey, Art as Experience, (New York: Capricorn Books, 1958), p. 346.

(5) Stan Aronowitz and Henry A. Giroux, Education Under Siege: The Conservative, Liberal and Radical Debate Over Schooling, (South Hadley, MA: Bergin & Garvey Publishers, Inc., 1985), p. 215.

(6) Saunders, 1975, p. 12.

(7) T. Frank Saunders, "Think Tanks: The Stylization of the Inarticulate," In James Jelinek, Ed., Proceedings of the Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society, (Tempe, AZ: Arizona State University, 1970), p. 200.

(8) The three syntactical model types; target, sequential, and relational; were first presented in Saunders' "Some Theoretical Considerations of Measurement: A Philosophical Analysis," Proceedings of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society, 1972, and again in Decker and Saunders' A Model for Models. (Tucson, AZ: Farmington Press, 1976).

(9) Eugene Levy, Director of the University of Arizona's Lunar and Planetary Laboratory as quoted in The Arizona Daily Star, Sunday, August 2, 1987, p. B1.

(10) Saunders, 1973, p. 262.

(11) John Dewey, "The Need for a Recovery of Philosophy," Creative Intelligence, (New York: Henry Holt & Company, 1917), p. 21.

(12) Nathaniel Champlin, "John Dewey: Beyond the Centennial," Educational Leadership, (October 1969), p. 34.

(13) T. Frank Saunders, "Think Tanks: The Stylization of the Inarticulate" (1970) and "A Think Tank Approach: The Problem of Judgment Stylization," in James Jelinik, Ed., Proceedings of the Far Western Philosophy of Education Society, (Tempe, AZ: Arizona State University, 1969).

(14) Saunders, 1970, p. 199.


Present
Past

Figure 1. Simple Extrapolation Model for Predicting the Future. (Saunders, 1975)


Present
Past

Figure 2. Contingency extrapolation model.
(Saunders, 1975)


Past
Present
Future
interpreted by future purposes
determined by values employed
determined by values agreed on by all affected

Figure 3. Futures model for the present as the future realized. (Saunders, 1975)


PAST
FUTURE
PRESENT

Figure 4. Idealist futures model.



Figure 5. Realist futures model.


Present
Past
biochip implants of cultural info
creation of AI cultures
encounters with other intelligences

Figure 6. Cross-cultural contingency futures model.

Response

SCHLESSMAN-FROST AND SAUNDERS

Mark Stange
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The writers begin their paper with the claim that "everyone involved in educational decision-making thinks about the future." They substantiate this claim with the argument that humans are intelligent and that the ability to "have a future," to "forecast," to anticipate and to expect is one characteristic of that intelligence. While all humans possess this ability, there is little uniformity in the way they exercise it.

The writers describe three strategies for predicting the future. The first is a simple extrapolation model exemplified in the works of Toffler and Naisbitt. This involves the projection of trends of the recent past into the future. Its limitations result from its inability to account for innovation, "assimilation" and "other unanticipated changes." The result of the application of this model is that people remain in the position of reacting to unforeseen events.

The second model also depends upon extrapolation and, in addition, involves the anticipation of innovations or circumstances which may produce a significant change in the direction of the events which follow. This contingency extrapolation model attempts to predict events and influences the course of the future.

The third model, the present as future realized model, views the future as a remarkable kind of value imperative whose progeny is the present. It involves the planned adoption of values "not necessarily available or operational in society at the present time." One is tempted to ask how values which are "not available" could be "adopted"? Within this model an exclusive set of individuals "may get together to formulate or construct a set of values and plans for operationalizing them."

These models for thinking of futures are next discussed in relation to three schools of philosophy: idealism, realism, and experimentalism.

In this discussion the present as the future realized model is aligned with the idealist school. The "past, present and future are all a continuum of some perfect, complete whole" and the "illusion" of change is the result of the human inability to perceive or comprehend the whole system. The writers seem to find this model quite unpalatable because "insight into the big picture and knowledge of it are based on authority, intuition, or faith." This type of knowledge cannot be shared and is not "a community construction." They describe this model as a "conservative future" which preserves a particular cultural heritage without "reconstructing mutual futures." This futures model is typical of and associated with authoritarianism, mysticism, and most religions.

The final, experimentalist orientation (not represented in the three models previously described) is generated by the merger of elements of the idealist and realist orientations. The idealist notion of the future realized in the present is evident in the experimentalist orientation, as is the realist use of projecting contingencies. The projection of contingencies within this model involves both the prediction of events, and the effort to anticipate ethical issues which such events may generate. Presumably, when such ethical questions have been anticipated, the arrival of those events will not be as traumatic for those who are present.

Faced with this typology of models for futures research, the most obvious and pressing question which emerges is "what is the future?" What is meant when one speaks of the future? In what way can someone know the future?

The Oxford Concise defines the future as "the time to come" and as the "prospective condition" of people, countries and so on. Humans experience the future as both an unknown stretching into infinity beyond their experience, and as a prediction for this unknown which is based upon their experiences. For humans, the future is experienced both as a void and a guess. Ultimately, the accuracy of a guess cannot be tested until the space of time within the void approaches and eventually merges with the present and then the past. It is only then that what was predicted may be assessed against experience.

Schlessman-Frost and Saunders are concerned with the future as prediction and not with the future as void. They seem to be particularly interested in how predictions shape behavior in the present. They argue that users of the present as future realized model, see the future as predetermined and act in order that the present will conform to their expectations for the future. Extrapolators who see the future as a continuation of the past through the present, tend to emphasize continuity in change and try to anticipate events which may require flexibility or some particular adaptation. The objective here seems to be to minimize modifications to the status quo in the face of incremental change. Finally, experimentalism involves the merging of elements from the two previous orientations to produce the impulse to anticipate events which are likely to force the fundamental transformation of values. Here the objective appears to be to nurture changes in values that will meliorate the trauma which is expected to accompany the predicted events. The authors claim that their typology enables educators to identify how they presently think about the future, and that it also provides insight into how the particular models shape the futures which are predicted. These are worthwhile objectives, but they are difficult to achieve when the term 'future' is undefined. Is there more than a prediction or an expectation involved? In what way does thinking about the future involve notions of faith, hope, or risk? How is the concept of time employed by each of these models?

The analysis was also hampered by a lack of balance in the characterization of the implications of the various models. The assumptions and limitations of each model did not receive equal treatment. While the limitations of the simple extrapolation model were noted, and the present as future realized model was glossed as the source of human suffering, the contingency model and the experimentalist model are described as a methods without reference to implicit values or limitations. This imbalance seems so extreme that it is difficult not to view the paper as an argument for the adoption of these models over the others.

The typologies generated are from philosophical and social scientific traditions and not out of an attentiveness to the way educators, and also people generally, think about the future and use these thoughts in their daily lives. This type of attentiveness is likely to contribute many more "models" for thinking about futures but, perhaps, not necessarily to a better understanding of how people use futures to reshape the present.

CRITICAL THINKING AND PAULO FREIRE: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR TEACHER EDUCATORS

Roberta Ahlquist
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Critical thinking has become the new educational buzzword in the arena of fads in U.S. public schooling. Yet among academicians and laypersons alike who are caught up in the new wave of pop educational culture there is little clarity, and in some circles, widespread confusion about the meaning of critical thinking. The California State Department of Education, for example, has developed a Critical Thinking Network for educators. Critical thinking is described primarily as a movement away from the basics.

> Critical thinking skills are straightforward, practical, teachable, and learnable. Addressing them is a part of reordering priorities in social studies (or English or other fields) -- a movement away from the rote memorization of facts to processes that enable students to structure, order, and assess the information they receive from books, lectures, hallway conversation, and endless hours of television.(1)

Many public school teachers ascribe to the above view. First, terms must be clarified, then information must be judged, and finally conclusions are drawn from the information. Logical inductive and deductive reasoning becomes a primary focus of this form of critical thinking. Content is atomistic, sequential, often void of a context but within a hierarchical structure. Form or technique takes precedence over content.

The materials that are being distributed as 'critical thinking' is Benjamin Bloom's 'higher' levels of his cognitive taxonomy developed in the late fifties, namely: analysis, synthesis and evaluation. This approach is not new in education. But it is being peddled as the most solid academic approach to critical thinking, even though it is a limited, narrow and incomplete definition.

Richard Paul, Director of the Center for Critical Thinking and Moral Critique at Sonoma State University, California and coordinator of an annual international conference on critical thinking, makes a distinction between two types of critical thinking. Critical thinking in the "'weak sense,'...is a set of discrete micro-logical skills ultimately extrinsic to the character of the person; skills that can be tacked onto other learning"(2) and critical thinking in the "'strong sense' is...a set of integrated macro-logal skills ultimately intrinsic to the character of the person and to insight into one's own cognitive and affective processes." "Weak sense" critical thinking focuses on what Paul calls "'technical reason' -- skills that do not transform one's grasp of one's basic cognitive and affective processes," while "strong sense" critical thinking is a concern with the "development of 'emancipatory reason' -- skills that generate not only fundamental insight into but also some command of one's own cognitive and affective processes."(3) The latter requires thinking with one's heart as well as one's head.

The underlying assumptions about knowledge in the "weak sense," fit neatly within the positivists' paradigm: knowledge is rational, technical, logically predictable, antiseptically scientific and often value-free. Students must consume a great body of value-free knowledge on which they will be objectively tested. A high passing grade on the exam leads to the assumption that students are ready to be initiated into the adult world as critical thinkers. Teachers know what is important for students to learn. In this view of knowledge, students are passive receptacles into which knowledge is poured.

The content of 'weak sense' critical thinking is similar to Mortimer Adler's 'great books, great ideas' curriculum. There is one uniform, standardized curriculum for all students which is organized hierarchically, from simple to complex. Methodologically, the teacher teaches by telling, then coaches, and at the advanced stages uses Socratic questioning and invites active participation.(4)

Recently, Adler has taken the position that critical thinking programs are unworkable. He argues that teaching logic to students will not make critical thinkers. His *Paideia Proposal* says students need to be coached in the skill of critical thinking over long periods of time, just as all habits of skill are learned. Students must be steeped in critical thinking in all that they do. Primarily, they need to be required to "think about what is being taught."(5) It is not clear from his definition to what degree his third stage Socratic questioning is much beyond "weak sense" critical thinking. This stage engages students in Socratic dialogue about abstract ideas, technical skills, operations, and processes, the voice of reason, but not as a wholistic worldview. The missing link in Adler's work is that knowledge does not lead one to act on that knowledge, to take control of one's life, to transform and improve one's reality. "Paideia" means the upbringing of a child. This view implies shaping and molding a thinker in "appropriate" ways.

The Orange County, California PROJECT IMPACT program is another example of "weak sense" critical thinking. Learning is fragmented into affective and cognitive identifiers and then teachers are inventoried to assess how often they..."foster a social climate of openness, encourage student interaction, demonstrate an attitude of acceptance, encourage students to gather, organize information, cooperate, justify their ideas, explore alternative viewpoints...model reasoning strategies...encourage questions,...probe student reasoning for clarification and promote the silent reflection of ideas.(6)

The extreme of "weak sense" critical thinking would be to have students learn the technical steps to logical, sequential, analytical thinking by rigorous training in the procedures of formal logic. The culmination would be to teach abstract mathematical formulae, which once mastered, would certify the learner as a "weak sense" critical thinker.

Other educators concerned with critical thinking advocate more discussion, more inquiry, more cooperative or student-initiated learning, less lecture, less isolated individual study. But, in most cases the "weak sense" epistemology postulates that there is a generally accepted body of often ahistorical knowledge which needs to be taught piecemeal. The epistemological base of this view of education attempts to ground understanding in atomistic pieces rather than as a form of organic process in relation to one's own voice, experience and historical context. In other words, fragmented, scientific knowledge becomes the *sine qua non* of an educated person, a "critical thinker." The assumptions underlying this paradigm are not only specious but also faulty, they contribute to training rather than to education. In order to live in a democracy, the learner should discover how to act on and shape that democracy rather than to conform to it, be shaped by it, fit in, to follow. Too little teaching provides the learner with ideas to be able to make fundamental autonomous choices. And, too little teaching helps students toward action on their learning in order to change or improve their reality.

Theorists such as Henry Giroux in *Theory and Resistance in Education: A Pedagogy for the Opposition* and Frederic Jameson in *The Political Unconscious* speak to critical thinking in the "strong sense." Jameson's essential ingredient in his method of cultural interpretation stresses: "Always historicize. This slogan -- the one absolute, and we may even say 'transhistorical' imperative of all dialectical thought -- will turn out to be the moral of the *Political Unconscious* as well."(7) Ira Shor in *Critical Teaching and Everyday Life* provides us with concrete applications of critical thinking strategies for the classroom. His description of the "withering away of the teacher" is especially helpful to teachers interested in "strong sense" critical thinking. And Mary Field Belenky, et al. in *Women's Ways of Knowing* describes "constructed knowledge" in much the same way that "strong sense" critical thinking is defined. "...All knowledge is constructed by the knower herself... We can assume that something exists out there -- but something is thinking that something exists. Our consciousness is part of the world. We are creating the world at the same time."(8) Context and frame of reference are crucial factors, and the subjective and objective experience of the learner must be a starting point in the process of the development of dialogical or critical thinking. We must inject the knower back into the known. Yet, the problem for many educators interested in "strong sense" critical thinking is that the message of some of the critical theorists, although rich in content, is often abstract and dense. The vocabulary is that of the scholar rather than the practitioner. As such, it is not readily accessible to teachers unschooled in critical studies.

Paulo Freire is a major "strong sense" critical theorist. He is an international figure in the area of educational philosophy and much of the critical studies theory in the U.S. has evolved out of his problem-posing approach to education. This theory arose historically out of the contradiction between beliefs or values, and the perception of reality around us. The graduate students in my classes begin to articulate this contradiction when they leave the university classroom and go into the high school classrooms as beginning teachers. Only after intensive study of the work of Freire, did I come to realize that he was addressing himself to conditions which exist in American education, as well as conditions which affect illiterate peasants in Third World countries. My students in the university classroom often respond to schooling much as the peasants did; they see themselves as spectators rather than as active learners.

In my experience as an instructor of students who are beginning their year of preparation for high school teaching, one of the most serious problems for my students is a numbness or general apathy, a disturbing docility among the secondary school students they encounter. This numbness is deepest among those students who are poor; especially students who are the victims of the dual oppressions of poverty and race. Attempts to awaken or bring to life, to energize these students is almost universally met with failure and frustration. These students are typically described as seeing themselves as mere objects, silently and passively responding to the world around them. They are typically unable to clearly perceive their personal and social reality or to deal critically with it.

Recent research confirms this view. Goodlad in *A Place Called School* and Theodore Sizer in *Horace's Compromise: The Dilemma of the American High School* describe students in this way.

> No more important finding has emerged from our study than that the American high school student is all too often docile, compliant and without initiative. (Goodlad) ...On the one hand, notes Sizer, there are too few rewards for being inquisitive. On the other, the heavy emphasis on the 'right answer' ...smothers the student's efforts to become an effective intuitive thinker.(9)

Much of the lethargy manifested by such students resembles descriptions by educators in underdeveloped countries of students who have lived under conditions of poverty and illiteracy for generations.

Often, I encounter college students whose first reaction to Freire is "What is he saying? What does teaching illiterate peasants have to do with schooling in the U.S.?" Underlying these questions is a general frustration encountered by most readers of Freire. Almost everyone is tantalized by the abstract truth of what he ways. At the same time, concrete applications seem just as tantalizingly, exasperatingly out of reach to those who would like to put his ideas into practice. Yet, Freire is probably one of the most important "strong sense" critical theorists of our generation. Part of that importance lies in the fact that his ideas have a totality and coherence seldom found elsewhere. And his ideas are addressed to the liberation of oppressed peoples everywhere.

In the U.S., we are taught to seek solutions to problems from "experts," the authorities. We are taught to seek solutions from above instead of generating solutions from below. We are given little experience in our schooling in which we learn to develop solutions to problems through social practice. Immediately the question presents itself: What is social practice? It is a foreign concept to most of us. We have to look outside our own experience to define what it means. And yet, it isn't really that foreign at all: it is primarily what we would call the scientific method. In other words, through observation and investigation we develop ideas about the nature of the world, about the nature of our experience, and how to change the world.

But, these ideas will remain abstract concepts and of no value until they are tested in the laboratory of our everyday lives. Only through the test of putting ideas into practice can we measure their correctness. This process in turn leads to the development of new ideas which in turn must be tested by putting them into practice. What is strange about our use of the scientific method is that we relegate its systematic use to the realm of professional science. What Freire advocates is simply to spread the use of the scientific method among ordinary people to use as a tool in trying to overcome the oppressive conditions of their lives. Hand in hand with making use of the scientific method comes the awakening of people's awareness of the need to act. This major theme of Freire's work addresses itself to the question: How do you rouse the people out of the sleep of passivity, resignation and consequent hopelessness? Freire recognizes that investigation of reality is part of the awakening process, but it is not sufficient in and of itself. Only through action to change reality and subsequent reflection on that action do the sleepers become more awake. The critical element of Freire's ideas is the decision to take the action and the act itself.

Educators who work with Freire's ideas find that this is the most difficult barrier to cross. Implicit in Freire's approach is the call for action to bring about fundamental change, in other words, a revolution. It is no wonder that the pivotal point of action stymies those who would make use of Freire's pedagogy. Yet, countless educators in the developed countries of the world have been drawn to Freire's ideas and are trying to solve the dilemma he presents to them. Can the kind of action for change required to fulfill Freire's pedagogy take place in advanced countries in which broad revolutionary change seems far away? This question frustrates and excites many educators. It remains unclear what this means in terms of concrete experience. Freire provides us with no formulas and insists that we are the only ones who can solve this dilemma for ourselves.

Paulo Freire's fundamental insight has long been a part of the "strong sense" critical thinking in America of philosophers such as Dewey and individual classroom teachers given to intuitive rumination. Freire insists that the educational process, learning, must involve ideas generated by the life experiences of students and teachers and that action grows out of those ideas. It must be dialectical, but not only dialectical. It must incorporate an ethical concern for the welfare of society. A humanizing education must reveal to people their connection to the world and ways to act on that world to make it a better place. This in itself is not a new insight. What is different is that Freire underlines the necessity of dialogue, focusing on fundamentals of daily life problems and issues in a dialogical exchange to bring about greater understanding of a person's own existence -- the political, social and economic realities of that existence. Thus, in Freire's epistemology, education is not neutral, static or value-free. It functions either to maintain the status quo or to free people to transform their reality.

Freire realizes that efforts to use his pedagogy amount to a political act which will encounter strong resistance from the power structure in an educational system designed to preserve that power. Only by confronting and overcoming that resistance can education fully contribute to the transformation of reality. Of equal importance is his emphasis on using that understanding to transform or establish control over reality by those who are submerged in it. This thesis goes several steps beyond that of most American educators because it formulates a new theory of education: for education to be possible it must enable people to change their reality at its root, at its fundamental level. This is no education for life adjustment, it is not just a theory of education which teaches people to cope with or merely adjust to their existing reality. Instead, this is a theory which advocates empowering learners to grab hold of history and become actresses and actors on its stage.

Freire's theory is based on the conviction that "every human being no matter how 'ignorant' or submerged in the 'culture of silence' is capable of looking critically at his/her world in a dialogical encounter with others. Provided with the proper tools for such an encounter she/he can gradually perceive their personal and social reality...and deal critically with it."(10) Freire refers to this process as "conscientization." Conscientization implies the critical insertion of people into history and culture. Because history changes as people act on the world according to their own objective and subjective world view and circumstances, knowledge and human consciousness are integrally connected. People continue to create new knowledge in their search to make sense out of the world. "Culture" in Freire's paradigm is defined as the transforming action of people on nature. The difference between "nature and "culture" is that humans are viewed as "subjects," as creators of culture, the contribution of human beings to nature.

In the traditional American educational system, people who are placed into student roles resist involvement in their education experience. They want education to be something done to them toward which they can remain for the most part passive. Their passivity, conditioned by previous schooling, is a reasonable response on their part to a social system which will reject their involvement except on a superficial level. Freire would describe such students as "objects" to be acted upon and thus manipulated, or as receptacles into which teachers deposit content. Freire envisions a liberating education as problem-posing, one in which students and teachers together become "subjects" engaged in a critical inquiry into a changing historical process. This process leads to praxis -- a unity of thought and action. It is a creative and recreative act of discovery and action to produce change. Traditional education allows little opportunity for students to become engaged in praxis. This dilemma often leads to attempts to create enclosed educational systems in order to simulate praxis, often called simulation games. When people are denied real opportunity for praxis, they may seek forms of artificial praxis or lapse into passivity. Our schools encourage both forms with the latter passivity, often encouraged for those who are slow or defined as having behavior problems.

It is problematic to teach problem-posing "strong sense" critical thinking in a non-liberating school environment. It is difficult to develop critical thinking skills of prospective teachers who in turn can teach in a liberating way. Many of my college students exhibit the same kind of passivity they see in the students they will teach. Few prospective teachers have a view of schooling as transformative. If they do believe in education for change, they have few ideas of ways to implement transformative education in the classroom. Few have developed their own personal voice as a way of speaking about problems much less taking control of those problems in education or society. And few see the importance of looking at school problems from a historical perspective. Freire states, "...To wash our hands of history is to be less human. Every time we wash our hands we help other hands."(11) The current political climate is such that teachers are losing what control and autonomy they have had over their work place. Giroux states "..The tendency (is) to reduce teachers to the status of specialized technicians within the school bureaucracy, whose function then becomes one of managing and implementing curricula programs rather than developing or critically appropriating curricula to fit specific pedagogical concerns."(12) And in the California State University system, teacher education projects like clinical supervision and behaviorist techniques for evaluating teachers militate against the transformative goals of teachers and administrators alike.

Dialogue is a key factor in "strong sense" critical thinking. It must be on equal terms. It must be non-authoritarian. Dialogue feeds on hope, faith, love, confidence and optimism. Dialogue is critical inquiry. It requires mutual respect. Anti-dialogue is authoritarian, acritical and lacking in love. The role of the teacher in the process of a critical inquiry is crucial. A teacher seeking dialogical inquiry must want to develop the ability to see and transmit to students the relationship of major life themes, generative themes in the lives of students to the larger social context in which she and her students live. She must make the educational experience a way of developing personal meaning, a level of knowing that is much deeper than the acquisition of information. The teacher must create a climate of openness, a secure willingness to risk and explore, a healthy skepticism or critical approach to learning, self confidence, and an understanding of personal responsibility. Talking is not enough. Action on the words and efforts to develop concrete solutions to problems is the crux of "strong sense" critical thinking. Speaking the truth is only the first step. Students need to help direct and shape the process of a critical examination of reality. Such things must be experienced to be understood, and the teacher must provide the opportunity and environment for such experiencing. A major goal is to engage in individual confrontation and communication in order to discover, share, and act on personal meaning. This means that the students and teacher must spend time together discovering and sharing how they feel about what they know, don't know, and need to know in order to act.

In my teacher education foundations classes, I first try to encourage students to talk about their own school experiences as a way of helping them develop their own voices about schooling. We then look at how gender, ethnicity and social class influence our views and experiences in the school world. Many of these student do not have a well developed understanding of their own class background. They are fascinated with and at the same time somewhat apprehensive about delving into, their own roots and sharing those roots with their classmates.

Students slowly begin to break out of their own silence and passivity when they realize that no one's interests, especially their own as prospective teachers, is served by it. An atmosphere of trust and mutual respect must be built between classmates so that all see themselves as co-learners and collaborators in the investigatory process. Classroom themes slowly develop for discussion.

One theme that students often raise is "why schooling." First students describe their own experiences which are quite often negative. We then break up into small groups and students are asked to brainstorm and record a list of the real and ideal purposes of schooling in America. Students first describe the "way it is" according to their experience and observations and then develop a list of the "way it ought to be."

We then meet as one group and share our lists. Students pick the four or five most important real and ideal purposes of schooling and are asked to research historically how these goals have changed over time. We build an historical context for the current situation. Students are asked to present their research to the class in an innovative way, often in the form of a skit. Solutions to the current conditions of schooling are developed by each group and critiqued in class. This is the beginning of a critical investigation of schooling and ways to develop concrete alternatives to the oppressive aspects of schooling.

It is evident that the traditional lecture model of teaching does not work. Students from the third grade through university resist soaking up content like sponges. Teacher education colleagues often perpetuate this model and thus hinder the possibilities for change. It is imperative that positive alternatives be developed to counter this pattern. Cooperative learning as a method is one positive alternative. But both form and content must be intertwined in any new models. In the current reform movement, we have the opportunity to shape alternatives to the outdated models. Honest critical dialogue and action to change oppressive conditions in the schools is a first step in the direction of transformative schooling. Strong sense critical thinking is the most viable way to begin.

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(1) "Assessment of the Critical Thinking Skills in History -- Social Studies": California State Department of Education, (1985), p.1.

(2) Richard Paul, "Critical Thinking: Fundamental to Education for a Free Society," Educational Leadership, (September 1984), p.5.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Mortimer Adler, "The Paideia Proposal: Rediscovering the Essence of Education," The American School Board Journal, (July 1982).

(5) Mortimer Adler, "Why 'Critical Thinking' Programs Won't Work," Education Week, Vol.VI, No.2, (September 17, 1986).

(6) Orange County Superintendent of Schools Office, "Critical Thinking Instruction-Teaching Behavior Checklist," (1982).

(7) Frederic Jameson, The Political Unconscious, (1984), p.9.

(8) Belenky, Clinchy, Goldberger, Tarule, Women's Ways of Knowing, (Basic Books, 1986).

(9) Walter Karp, "Why Johnny Can't Think," S.F. Chronicle, (July 21, 1985), p. 12. (insert: "This World")

(10) Richard Schall, Introduction to Pedagogy of the Oppressed. p. 13.

(11) Paulo Freire, Workshop at University of Santa Clara, CA (March 1984).

(12) Henry Giroux, "Teachers as Transformative Intellectuals," Social Education, (May 1985), p. 376.

Presidential Address

THE HEART'S EDUCATION: WHY WE NEED POETRY

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J.M. Beil Waugh, in "Art and Morality: The End of an Ancient Rivalry?," contends (question mark notwithstanding) that the ultimate outcome of "Plato's attack on poetry" in The Republic is a reconciliation of poetry and philosophy.(1) We remember that Plato cites the "longstanding quarrel between poetry and philosophy"; but most of us probably thought, since the poets end up banished, they were the losers in this epistemological and educational feud.(2) Not so, we are now told; indeed, by ostensibly losing, poetry paradoxically wins, "For if philosophy is to be the core of an educational curriculum, those educated in this curriculum will not lack the aesthetic and moral education necessary to give both Homer and Plato their due."(3)

What an ingenious argument! Prior to Socrates, the poets were fully in charge of Greek education; their words were influential and taken literally.(4) But the burden this placed on poetry was excessive. All Plato is trying to do, says Waugh, is redress an imbalance by arguing that reason should be primary in education. Once enthroned, reason, a.k.a. philosophy, will include aesthetics in its kingdom, thus enhancing, rather than diminishing, the stature of poetry and other arts.

Waugh's view assumes that poetry, after Plato, becomes a more dynamic element in Western education: this is arguable. She also assumes that in education and culture at large the development of art follows the formal study of aesthetics and aesthetic education. Isn't it more likely the other way around, that aesthetic study depends on the creation of art?

In any case, what interests me most in Waugh's gloss on Plato is the idea that there was a moment, as it were, in our intellectual history when education was genuinely revolutionized, when both aims and method were turned full circle. I confess not to having thought of so dramatic a result of the dialogue about poetry in The Republic, and I am grateful to Waugh for encouraging me to look at Plato anew.(5)

Admittedly, the "moment in history" approach simplifies a complex interaction of forces brought to bear continuously on Western education. But what if, prior to Socrates, the system was based in fact on poetry--and what if the revolution had never taken place? Or what if there were, today, a counter-revolution? I propose to look briefly at what Plato claims are the problems poetry causes in education; then I will assess these difficulties by placing them in the context of contemporary poetry; finally, I will speculate on some effects of poetry-based education, were it practiced now.

According to Plato, the trouble with poetry in education is as follows: 1) because the poet professes knowledge he/she does not possess and hence tells lies about the subjects of his/her poetry, the student is intentionally taught a false perception of the world; 2) because the poet emphasizes the role of emotion in human destiny, the student's faith in reason is undermined; 3) because the poet creates situations in which traditional values, like resolve in war and respect for the gods, are qualified, the student is taught to doubt, rather than accept, the mores of society; and 4) because the poet is an innovator, poetry teaches that the new, rather than the established and venerated, is of value.(6) At root, really, is artistic hubris, which embraces all the alleged malfeasance of poetry in education; the poet has the hubris to create his/her own reality, which even if faithfully based on "reality," will differ from it. Such differences are aggrandized by The Republic since Plato proposes only two acceptable realities, the ideal (existing in the mind of God) and its approximation on earth (that produced by literal minded artisans). As we know, Plato proposes to housebreak the poets and then invite them back to the Republic; but we are rightly doubtful whether these persons could then produce poetry or would more likely be driven to writing the state approved doggerel of poet laureates.

Speaking of hubris, it may take some chutzpah for me, now, to proceed by using examples from my own poetry. Yet I will do so because it is the poetry I know best from inception to completion, because it is the poetry of a Platonist insofar as I share at least Plato's view of poetry's power, and because it will be a challenge to see if I can successfully employ my own art in the service of a scholarly analysis of poetry's role in education.

Let us hear, first, a poem which has as its subject something about which I have no personal experience; in this work I am the complete example of Plato's warning that the expertise of poets is false.

A Miner Describes His Death

This long day when I have worked
as hard as I can work, I work one hour
more until my great weariness becomes
a mist of dusted light swirling toward me.

I see what I have been unable to remember:
the foot bridge leading to the colliery;
how, in the mines, we boys crawled naked,
and the men blew out our candles for a prank,
leaving us digging in the dark; and how
at night our skins washed white.

(continue new stanza)

It was strange to come out of the mine
into whatever the air had become that day--
thinned by rain or heavy with smoke--
and, in a way, to prefer the world below.
Faces layer the air now; your pale eyes
shine like the brave birds we took with us.

My enfeebled present is nothing compared
to these images; they rise like the coming-to-be
of shapes on silver paper. I was shown once
how this can happen in an unnaturally dark room.
I realize what Death is, a tiredness and
luminous outline, a marvelous cloud of love.(7)

The poet's presumption is awesome; not only does he lay claim to knowledge of life in the mines which he does not have, but he claims to know "what Death is." Plato would have me exiled with my betters. His fear, from the point of view of education, is that the naive reader, our presumed student, might believe that men typically played pranks on naked boys in the mines, that death really is analogous to film releasing its image in the developer, that--and here's the most severe transgression--a mortal might give unique shape and meaning to his/her own death.

If we counter that, unlike the naive student, we can distinguish between poetic truth and actual truth, and if we claim that the poet hardly wishes us to believe his narrative actually happened, I will respond otherwise. As the poet who wrote "A Miner Describes His Death," I do indeed hope you believe what I describe is true, and either did happen or could have happened. Is "could have happened" a bit slippery? Not insofar as it comprises a claim on reality: the poem is actually a mixture of verifiable, factual truth (e.g. the use of canaries in the mines to detect poisonous gases) and fictional truth (how it might have been, how death might appear to the worn and loving miner).

The oxymoron, "fictional truth," may be conceptually abrasive. Poet Robert Pack calls poetry's fictions "impersonal truth," and tells this anecdote of the misunderstanding occasioned because of it: After he gave a poetry reading, a woman came up to Pack, took his hand and proclaimed, "I feel so sorry for you; believe me, I understand." At first Pack thought the woman was commiserating on an unsuccessful performance; then he realized she was referring to a poem he had read. The poem described the death of his brother in a hunting accident, and contained the lines, "But at his funeral I would not cry/Certain that I was not to blame for it." Pack apologized to the woman, explaining that he never had a brother, that the brother was invented for the sake of the poem. The woman responded with disgust. She abruptly disengaged her hand from his and said, "You mean you lied; you took advantage of my sympathy." Pack recounts, "I didn't have the wit then to say that is exactly what poems ought to do. Poems tell personal lies in order to express impersonal truths."(8)

Now the evidence I have submitted is not conclusive; but it does suggest that Plato's accusation of false testimony against Homer and other Greek poets can be leveled with no less accuracy against modern poets. It also suggests that poetry based education, were it to occur, would be education not only of the actual, but of the possible, of fictional (or impersonal) truth. Why this kind of truth might be educationally valuable is a matter we will take up later.

What of Plato's concern that poetry elevates emotion at the expense of reason, that it undermines resolute faith in the rational life? This next poem, "The Heart's Education," is avowedly fictional; there is no question of actual or empirical truth. It is wholly aimed toward the life of feeling and how one's destiny requires coming to terms with an intricate welter of intense emotion.

The Heart's Education

You tell your heart stories;
it cries at the sad parts,
how it is staked in a garden
trying to speak to ripening
versions of itself, a harvest
of red hearts, all hanging
like caught fish: the sun points
its big finger at your heart.

You set your heart afloat
in the cold ribs of the sea:
this too is a lesson in distance,
how the buoys recede like voices,
and the shore becomes unnecessary
while your heart paddles toward
something like itself, turtle-shaped
and wide-eyed and almost obsolete.

You bring your heart into night
where it grips the arms of your chair,
trying to get hold of itself despite
the improbability of happy endings
and the sunset you witnessed,
that huge bruise on the horizon's
forehead, the leaves entering
the forest on their knees.

You show your heart its hydraulic
limits, the weight it can lift
and how it must live by a kind
of harmless burning: you hold
your heart in your hands the way
a fakir holds a coal, ignoring
the complex detonations of flesh,
your heart's bright teeth.(9)

If a "man of character" in the Republic requires "the lawful authority of reason" to suppress "the presence of contradictory impulses," a poem like "The Heart's Education" runs counter to such requirements.(10) The poem envisages precisely the kind of character Plato doesn't wish education to develop; and poetry based education is far more likely to produce a Eugene McCarthy than an Oliver North.

Yet neither "A Miner Describes His Death" nor "The Heart's Education" offers an explicit challenge to official societal values; their visions are more personal than social. Further, I confess I am not a "political" poet in the usual sense of the word. Nonetheless, the following poem, "Practice: Father and Son," does take on the long standing national pastime, baseball, and some of the values associated with it:

Practice: Father and Son

Baseball matters;
baseball is the handshake
which will break my arm. It will be
summer forever, leaning against
a wooden porch where Mom sits almost
still, and curtains rest before rain.

Your line drives and grounders crack
the air into slivers; I know the bad
bounce is curled inside the ball, a whip,
an embryo full of malice: I am too young
for the heart attack waiting for me.
The ball leaps toward my chest, misses
and takes a shot at my chin, leaving heat.

Dusk is a long inning, but darkness finally
rolls up, a low car with a quiet motor.
We can stop. I have fielded everything you hit,
but I ache with a kind of desire I will learn
is permanent; and my gloved hand holds its sting.
You carry the bat like a jack handle you have used
to lift something heavy, love which will settle

into itself, a ball in thick grass, despite
what we do with our arms to keep it airborne.(11)

In this poem, the distinction between actual and fictional truth is not pertinent. The poem almost literally recounts a recurring event of my childhood. But what it recounts, or reconstructs, giving as Langer would say, form to feeling, is the compelling tyranny of baseball, of love and of fatherhood. And in so doing, baseball, even moreso father and son baseball, which our culture enshrines in a variety of ways, is portrayed not as sunnily innocent, but as dangerous, as something which must be endured because the persona of the poem is an American boy. If the poem succeeds, baseball is both itself and more, emblematic of a certain way of life. That this way of life is not unmitigatedly praised is the poem's challenge. The work suggests that a poetry based education, either in Socrates' time or ours, will complicate matters, in this case, poetry could call into question certain assumed relationships, between males and sport, between fathers and sons, between national values and their unqualified acceptance. An obvious comparison is between "Practice: Father and Son" and "Casey at the Bat"; the latter is commonly taught in schools.

Or let us consider this poem, "The Widow Speaks From Her Pyre," which as inspired by a New York Times article on a woman in India who burned herself to death following the death of her husband. The Times piece questioned whether the immolation was in fact voluntary and noted the justifiable outrage of women's rights groups in India. As the poet working off the news article he has read, I am not concerned with who's right, nor with any political position as such. Instead, I am working first, with the persona of the woman, who she might have been, what she might have thought. Next, I try to evoke as much empathy, as much connection, between us and the Indian woman as possible. And I attempt in the poem not to take a stance, but rather to explore complexities: it is "negative capability" described by Keats as the state "of being in uncertainties, mysteries, doubts, without...reaching after fact and reason" which impels the poem.

The Widow Speaks From Her Pyre

I will tell you how it is; I have lived all my life
on this lordly plateau which rises above the plains
of Rajasthan. My people and my husband's people are
the decendents of warriors, prosperous and cruel,
a caste to whom tradition is everything, the Rajput.

In your country, change parades down the streets
like a woman who thinks she is beautiful. Fools
lust for her, but men of wisdom know her for
what she is. I am told in America women destroy with
knives the infants their husbands plant in them.

There is nothing sacred where you live; so how
will you understand sati, my immolation? A bride
of just twenty months, I became a widow and only
shame was left to me. Less than a yellow dog, I
would live belonging to no one, living beyond him.

Instead, I am sacred now, adorned with gold and
scarlet scarves, adorned with flame; I am wed
once more and twice over, to the husband I was
just learning to love, and to Shiva, who I
have always loved. Do you see the pyre's glow

(continue stanza)

and smoke ascending? That is love which my people
will keep burning for weeks. My body is bathed
in flame, then my spirit, then sweet milk will be
poured on my ashes and all my heat will join
my husband and my god. No other man will have

me or leave the dust from his heel on my sari.
Freedom in your country is a fly buzzing against
glass, frantically trying one window after another.
I shall not be such an insect. My freedom
is to choose this ascension rather than fall
to the dirt floor of a house without love.

The poem, as you can see, is in one sense avowedly political. It speaks of the oppression in India created by an ancient caste system, it confronts sexual liberation in America, and it offers a view of abortion. Yet while the poem evokes and questions, it does not assert a given political view. This, I think, is precisely what caused such consternation in Plato--the poet is free to challenge, and the greater the poem, the more serious its challenge to authority; but the poet is not obligated by his or her art to mold that art into any single viewpoint. On the contrary, the obligation of art is precisely the opposite.

I might note, parenthetically, that I recently heard Gwendolyn Brooks read. One of her poems, "The Mother," portrays a woman who has had several abortions.(12) Brooks told us this poem has been acclaimed by both Right To Life groups and Planned Parenthood; the opposing organizations both sought to incorporate "The Mother" in their official literature!

Now, we come to the problem of innovation, of the "new kind of song" which Plato fears might masquerade as simply a "new song."(13) Plato's argument that poetry based education replaces conservation with innovation, and leads the young into fashion rather than wisdom, is sweeping. It is problematic also, in that poetry, and all art in our culture, works out of a tradition, as T.S. Eliot tells us, and concomitantly strives to "make it new," as we are admonished by Gertrude Stein.(14) In my own case, reviewers have placed my work in the post-Modernist tradition while perceiving some of its structural elements (e.g. syntax) as innovative.(15) I would hope that every poem I write worthy of your attention achieves something not hitherto done in poetry. What we are talking about, after all, is originality; and one of the damning criticisms commonly levied against even accomplished artists is that their work is indistinguishable from a host of others by their peers. Artistic conformity in our culture--no matter how skillful the execution of the work--is uniformly disparaged by critics. By contrast, in education conformity has specific virtues and is part of official policy, whether it be in legislation which requires fundamental interchangeability among schools or in the arrangement of parallel rows of identical desks common to our classrooms.

The poet's worry about innovation, then, is the opposite of Plato's. The poet labors to create not just another "new song," but "a new kind of song." And poetry based education would have as its core curriculum new kinds of songs, not ones conventional and tamed enough to meet the approval of society's elders.

By way of illustration, I could chose, I would hope, among many of my poems, all of which claim originality. But some are in fact more original than others; and "What The Wing Says," is one I think is particularly original, close to the ideal to which I aspire.

What The Wing Says

The wing says, "I am the space behind you,
a dent in the fender, hands you remember
for the way they touched you. You can look
back and song will still throb. I am air
moving ahead, the outermost edge of desire,
the ripple of departure and arrival. But

I will speak more plainly: you think you are
the middle of your life, your own fulcrum,
your years poised like reckonings in the balance.
This is not so: dismiss the grocer of your soul.
Nothing important can be weighed, which is why
I am the silver river of your mornings and
the silver lake curled around your dark dreams.
I am not wax nor tricks stolen from birds.

I know you despair at noon, when sky overflows
with the present tense, and at night as you lie
among those you have wronged; I know you have failed
in what matters most, and use your groin to forget.
Does the future move in only one direction?
Think how roots find their way, how hair spreads
on the pillow, how watercolors give birth to light.
Think how dangerous I am, because of what I offer you."(16)

With these examples and commentaries, I suggest that Plato is an able aesthetician. He is correct in identifying certain significant characteristics of poetry; he is also correct in identifying the complicating effects of poetry based education against which The Republic campaigns. I suggest further, in my use of contemporary poetry, that the admonitions voiced in The Republic are by no means inapplicable today. But we are not moving from education based in poetry to education based in philosophy. We are moving instead from philosophy based education--education which, at least ideally, values not only rational discourse but the consideration of abstract principles--to technologically driven education.

One might argue that the popularity of Alan Bloom's The Closing of the American Mind signifies a resurgence of philosophy-based education. I contend that Bloom's book, while good reading and the occasion of some lively debate, will not turn the current tide of technology-based education. Consider, for example, this hortatory exclamation issued by Donald Kennedy, President of Stanford University, and endorsed by thirty-six additional university presidents and chancellors:

> It simply will not do for our schools to produce a small elite to power our scientific establishment, and a larger cadre of workers with the basic skills to do routine work. Millions of people around the world now have these same basic skills and are willing to work twice as long for as little as one-tenth our basic wages. To maintain and enhance our quality of life, we must develop a leading-edge economy based on workers who can think for a living.(17)

Kennedy and the co-signers of the missive from which I quote may not be fully cognizant that they are defining education within the boundaries of technological expertise ("workers who think for a living" is itself innocuous), but they are--technological productivity is the single aim valued, not only in the paragraph above, but in the document as a whole.

In technologically driven education there is no reason to worry about the place of poetry since poetry is an ornament, not a threat. And the considerations of philosophy, debates about the nature and purpose of knowledge, the continuous self-examination which has characterized education, become increasingly displaced by reaction to the latest technological news. Why, in this context, would we even talk about a counter revolution against the one instigated centuries ago by Socrates?

Without sounding apocalyptic, although tempted in that direction, let me say that the circumstances of our world, its dangers in particular, call out for generations of students who will understand varieties of truth, since any single truth elevated to The Truth invites employment of its opposite edge, the Big Lie. Also, we increasingly need persons familiar and comfortable with the life of feelings; otherwise it is too easy and sometimes inevitable that we are heartless. And quite obviously we are in no less need of questioning and original minds than any age. If poetry based education is in fact the heart's education, and likely to encourage these capacities, its restoration is overdue.

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(1) J.M. Beil Waugh, "Art and Morality: The End of an Ancient Rivalry?," The Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol.20, No.1, (Spring 1986), pp. 5-17.

(2) Plato, The Republic of Plato, translated, with introduction and notes by Francis McDonald Cornford (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 339.

(3) Waugh, op.cit., p. 15.

(4) Ibid., pp. 13, 14; cf. Eric Havelock, Preface to Plato (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1967).

(5) cf. David Swanger, "Ideology and Aesthetic Education," The Journal of Aesthetic Education, Vol.15, No.2., (April 1981), pp. 33-44; "Shadow and Light: Read, Dewey, Plato and Aesthetic Education," Journal of Education, Vol.164, No.3., (Summer 1982), pp. 256-270.

(6) Plato, op.cit., pp. 321-340.

(7) Chariton Review, Vol.6, No.2., (1980).

(8) This anecdote is from Pack's Affirming Limits, and is "Noted With Pleasure" in the New York Times Book Review, (September 28, 1986), p. 47.

(9) Poetry Northwest, Vol.XXV, No.1., (Spring 1984).

(10) Plato, op.cit., pp. 335-6.

(11) Negative Capability, Vol.V, No.1., (Winter 1985).

(12) Gwendolyn Brooks, "The Mother," in No More Masks, Florence Howe and Ellen Bass Eds., (Garden City, NT: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1973), pp. 116-117.

(13) Plato, op.cit., p. 115.

(14) cf. T.S. Eliot, "Tradition and Individual Talent," The Sacred Wood: Essays on Poetry and Criticism (London: Methuen, 1920)

(15) cf. Baxter Hathaway, jacket notes to my Inside the Horse (Ithaca, NY: Ithaca House Press, 1981).

(16) Georgia Review, Vol.XXXVII, No.3., (Fall 1984).

(17) Letter from President Donald Kennedy, Stanford University, to Chancellor Robert L. Sinsheimer, the University of California, Santa Cruz, (October 5, 1987).